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Abstract

This dissertation studies the inscription of social mores along Upper Canada’s
early frontier. It argues, first, that despite coming from the top and presuming
the weight of tradition and religious sanction, prescriptions for conduct masked
local circumstances that did not cohere, politically, culturally or socially, as
neatly as the model of conduct being promoted. These prescriptions did not
merely recognize messiness on the ground as their raison d’etre, but also helped
constitute that complexity directly. The dissertation also argues, though, that the
force of prescriptions does not lie only or even mainly in the brute top-down
authority of a social elite, but draws much of its strength from resonance among
social practices that were not obviously related. The spaces examined in this
dissertation include survey methods, prescriptions about conduct in a provincial
newspaper, domestic practices, geographic implementations of gender ideology,
the practices of dueling and game hunting, and the nighttime prowl of a burglar.
The argument is that their importance at the time owed much to their conceptual
interdependence, which gave weight and character to the meaning of each.
Through examination of proper conduct, the mundane “dwelling house”
emerges in this study as a core moral space in the society of early Upper Canada.
Whether a stately mansion or a rented room, this space ranked even above a
church in the intensity with which the law defended it. At the heart of this moral
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protection resided a notion of fairness, whose overtones sounded in the wide
range of practices noted earlier.
My theoretical baseline is the practice approach of Ortner (2006, 1989), which
views action, embodied in individuals, as emergent in analytic tensions between
public institutions, particular situations and moments, patterns in history and
experience, and unpredictable, extra-systemic feedback. Since conduct is based in
observation, and because the immanent structuring forces of practice entail
relationships, I add to Ortner’s model the necessary presence of multiple actors
who are present to each other. This model helps unpack the concrete bodies,
relations, moments, and constraints in which exemplars emerge, and also
emphasizes their overall conservative tendency.

Keywords
Exemplar, Frontier, Practice theory, Ortner, Upper Canada, Upper Canada
Gazette, Conduct, Crime, Burglary, Dwelling House, Domesticity, Gender,
Female
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Preface
Standing below the Ambassador Bridge that joins Windsor and Detroit, looking
up at its massive pillars, girders and cables and the progress of traffic they
support, one is struck by a peculiar irony. This imposing construct, designed to
connect two countries, is precisely where division between the two hardens into
rigid, armed formality. Traffic lines, fences, booths, wait times, uniforms,
questions, documents, shows of available force, all supported by past experience
and an awareness of nation, conjure up a convincing obstacle. In this conjuring,
the river itself—the raison d’etre for the bridge—plays the part of a line in the
sand. So perfectly superimposed is this line upon alternative notions of a river
that even the passage of container ships and the frisky slant of sailboats fail, in
that moment, to suggest the connective possibilities of water.
How different this spot must have looked two centuries ago on the eve of war,
with enemy troops squaring off across the water. It gives pause, gazing across
today’s banks in an effort to connect those two moments, so awesomely strange
to each other one is reminded of Dorothy landing in Oz. One side of that
mystical divide features a bustling metropolis of magnificent scale, built
hundreds of feet skyward, interwoven across the water with other communities
by bridges, a tunnel, busy flight paths and endless water traffic, insulated from
even the most distant war drums by the cocoon of a long peacetime. In its scale,
the imposing and reassuring solidity of its structures, and the buttressing effect
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of living memory devoid of international aggression relevant to the place, the
present banks invite one to imagine that things were always this way. The other
moment, ostensibly identical in space, could hardly have been recognizable
viewed from today, even ignoring the matter of war. The settled population
along the Detroit River was something over three orders of magnitude smaller
on the eve of war than it is now.1 Relative to today, there was also no such thing
as building vertically—either skyward in the form of skyscrapers (never mind air
traffic), or into the earth in the form of massive, watertight traffic tunnels under
the river. Perhaps “place” was judged in more planar terms without access to
these vertical dimensions.2 One imagines subtler differences too, such as a more
direct connection to the processes, effort and liabilities of settlement materials
and structures than people typically possess in today’s huge urban spaces, vastly
greater technological complexity, and the highly specialized divisions of labor
characteristic of both. Not only were materials of the time hard-won in terms of
effort, expense and time, the average settler had a more direct sense of what it
took to obtain them and what it would take to obtain them again. This
awareness, if one follows McGregor (1985), derived its specific hue in turn from a
garrison mentality that viewed settlement as a kind of permanent pitched battle
1

The closest census date (that I’ve found) for Detroit, for the year 1820, lists the population at 1422, about
one-three-thousandth of the present population including the metro area, and that accounts also for
significant population decline after 1950. The population on the Canadian side at the turn of the century is
harder to find precise data for; what I’ve found so far is by county, but according to Statistics Canada, the
entire population of Essex county in 1824 was 4,274
2
This limitation of available dimensions—absence of technology to build vertically, as well as technology
to expand surveillance beyond the visual—may have shaped the role that surfaces play in military strategy.
Without access to vertical elevation that would allow one to see beyond, the tree line hardens as a barrier to
line-of-sight and as a threat of hostile forces concealed beyond.
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against wilderness, which always encroached and must be pushed back, if only a
little.3
And one cannot ignore war, how the gleam of an enemy’s cannon might have
shaped appreciations of distance, how the presence of a hostile army, poised to
do its worst, would reconfigure anyone’s sense of everyday life. Among Upper
Canada’s migrants who had fled America after its war of independence, threats
across the water also acquired the extra shading of personal memory. Far from
the settled routines and expectations of a long peacetime, this lining up along the
banks was the starkest of reminders that in moments of cataclysm, all bets for the
future were off. If the primacy of embodiment and concreteness, as opposed to
abstractions, has become the new theoretical normal, the awesome scale of stakes
and consequences entailed by war—human lives, geo-political territory,
community identity, international relations, individual rights, family narratives
that get passed down through generations—elevates ubiquitous concreteness
into something devastatingly poignant.
3

Appropriately, given a discussion of a looming war, McGregor opens her argument with the view of
landscape as seen from an isolated fort. The fort, McGregor argues, gets imposed through “art and
laborious exertion to push back the forest a short distance and to maintain its safety” (5), which requires the
protecting sweep of a cannon. Quoting Richardson’s Wacousta she adds, “to have crossed the ravine, or to
have ventured out of reach of the cannon of the fort, would have been to seal the destruction of the
detachment. But the officer to whom their security was entrusted, although he had his own particular views
for venturing thus far, knew also at what point to stop” (7). McGregor uses the term “langscape” to
highlight the sense in which encroaching nature, and the maintenance of a safety zone, is an active social
construction, which gets lost in a more passive idea of “landscape” as something independent of an
observer and merely perceived. This fort and its cannon, she says, is “a correlative for the beleaguered
human psyche attempting to preserve its integrity in the face of an alien, encompassing nature.” (5) Her
deeper argument is that this psyche entails a balance of imposition and accommodation, a practical
acceptance that the forest can only be pushed back so far, and that social life must be eked out in view of
that limit. This vision of encroaching nature and spirit of accommodation is a particularly Canadian
recasting of Lockean notions of progress and property rights, neither of which stresses accommodation or
real social limits imposed back on settlers by an active, encroaching nature.
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How does one get from one place to the other, from the river of 1812 to the
Detroit River of a customs line or sailboat today? Not, of course, by some
presumed permanence of the river “itself”, indelible and object-ified like ink that
dries to become a map. The very idea of a river, and also its physical matter,
gives the lie to any notion of permanence: rivers flow lengthwise and meander
sideways; they swell, shrink, freeze over and break up; they breathe life into
irrigable land and connect communities along and across its banks. They also
bring quick death to any who forget their ever-changing demeanor. We get to
today, then, through connections and continuities appropriate to the metaphor of
a river.
And it is a metaphor, at least in a dissertation that is not really about the Detroit
River, or the War of 1812. For a study that began by looking at constructions of
gender along exactly those banks and at that time, the present focus on conduct
prescribed by a government based in York, with special attention to the nature of
burglary, seems many meanders from home. Like movement of a river, though,
this new vantage point makes sense given the material and conceptual
connections in between, which allow one to jump frame and see the project of
research in new ways.
In one sense, I got to the present project by accident: I bumped into something I
didn’t expect to find, and it deflected me into directions I couldn’t have
anticipated. In the case of the Burton Historical Collection, where this accident
occurred, the notion of accident acquires the added inflections of a complexly
xiv

and inconsistently organized mass of materials, where there’s often no telling
what you’ll trip over along the circuitous route toward an intended or missing
object. The problem with a notion of accident, though, is that it downplays the
vitality of connections, that decisive moment of traction through which a new
insight or project is stumbled upon, the “gee whiz!” moment as your attention
shifts and lands in a new place. The word leaps over this crucial moment as if
decreeing that the connection isn’t itself important, only a brief sensation one
quickly suppresses in returning to the archival business at hand.
My meander away from gender and the Detroit River began by bumping into a
burglary trial transcript, which only caught my eye because someone left it out
on a nearby table. What I really noticed was the sentencing, especially the
metaphors it used in marching the culprit off to the gallows. The trial then
removed to a back burner for several months, until I came across a newspaper
column expressing outrage at the persistence of dueling in Upper Canada, and
especially, the perfect tendency to acquit duelists of any wrongdoing, despite the
clear letter of law to the contrary. The question suddenly wouldn’t go away:
what system of logic explains executing for stealing rum and a few furs, but
acquits for killing in cold blood in a duel? By looking further into legal
definitions of burglary and attitudes to dueling, the humble dwelling house
began to move into the limelight. On close inspection, it helped explain legal
orientations to dueling, burglary, and other high crimes such as rape and
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robbery. It also gave purchase to an emerging gender ideology at the time that
aligned women with domestic space.
The seeming disparity between practices of burglary, dueling, and everyday
domestic life thus helped me imagine that the strength of ideals centered in a
dwelling house had broad roots, and that other core ideals probably did too. The
question became how to talk about these roots, this resonance across social
spaces, in a way that accounts for its force, not only its presence. This is what I
attempt to do in this study.

xvi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Through the lens of what it calls exemplary practices, this dissertation explores
the inscription of social mores in Upper Canada from its formation in 1791 until
1820, when a wealth of new newspapers started to appear in the province.4
Specifically, it examines notions of conduct handed down from the top, from a
relatively small number of social elite who formed the government and
attempted to fashion the new society according to their own conservative ideals.
I argue, first, that this process of inscription, buttressed by rhetoric of enduring
loyalty to a British homeland overseas and to a God above, attempted to mask
local circumstances that were far less homogeneous, coherent, and politically
aligned than the view of society being promoted. The deepest challenge to that
alignment, indeed, was that wayward impulses usually ran oblique rather than
counter to top-down inscription, and thus didn’t even evoke its viewpoint
through the clarifying structures of opposition. In this view, certainty about the
society advertised in prescriptions on conduct betrayed deep unease about
creative adaptability evident at local levels, where enforcement of conduct often

4

Chapter 4’s focus on the Upper Canada Gazette, the province’s first newspaper, makes sense of the 1820
cutoff: until that decade, the Gazette had no real rivals among locally published newspapers, which makes
talking about its positions, politics and audience easier. Noting, however, that politics in Upper Canada
changed markedly after the War of 1812, especially with the rise of the Family Compact (for which see
Chapter 3, note 54), this dissertation stresses the period before that war.
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met with failure, and where practices in any case overflowed the tidy images
being promoted.
Second, I argue that seemingly disparate social practices, not obviously related
in terms of task, social purpose, geography or individuals involved, may
resonate at a level below the narrower field represented by each. Just as an
overtone series defines a particular timbre in sound, so culturally-specific
overtones of meaning shared among far-flung social practices produces a deep
signifier, a particular timbre of meaning perceptible only across social spaces,
and not when taking the surface-level logic or specificity of each in isolation. The
spaces examined in this dissertation include survey methods, prescriptions about
conduct in a provincial newspaper, domestic practices, geographic
implementations of gender ideology, the practices of dueling and game hunting,
and the nighttime prowl of a burglar. The argument is that their importance at
the time owed much to their conceptual interdependence, which gave weight
and character to the meaning of each. From an analytical point of view, such
interdependence is belied by the ease of imagining and explaining these spaces
in mutual isolation.
In one sense, these two arguments pull against each other, the one a claim that
top-down models of conduct were more tentative, wary and fragile than they
purported to be, the other a basis for finding the top-down view more robust
than it would appear from exemplars considered independently. But to question
which aspect might trump the other, and in which circumstances, would miss the

3
larger moment behind each—the larger elephant hidden from the six blind men
of Hindustan by the particularity of what each one senses. The point of the two
arguments laid out here is that, together, they suggest a more detailed and
complex sense of an exemplar’s social force than either would do independently.
Another general claim of this study, one which unites “exemplar” and
“practice”, is that the habits and structures of interpretation manifested in
exemplars are irreducibly concrete, a crystallization of particulars whose sine qua
non is traction among what get perceived, mostly after the fact, as discrete
standpoints. Traction is primary, the basis of distinction, and not a secondary
effect of pre-existing bodies, histories, experiences and networks coming into
contact. The underlying model of the world this implies is that traction, while
highly variable, is also unavoidable, at least in the habitable world sequestered
from the vacuum of space. Contact with particular things or people may be
intermittent or occasional, but contact with matter generally speaking is not; we
pass from one place to another by virtue of constant contact with air to breathe,
environments that are controlled for comfort, safety and basic existence, access to
supply lines where material necessities can be replenished, safe spaces in which
to decompress or become periodically unconscious, and so on. As distinct
moments, exemplars are thus defined not by the fact of traction, but by their
capacity to draw attention away from their contingencies and entanglements and
appear to stand by themselves.

4
Traction in this sense is similar to Bakhtin’s notion of dialogic relations. As with
Bakhtin, traction rejects the idea that people either exist or move in isolation.
Identities don’t relate: identity is relationship. Bakhtin further argues that
differences of perception and experience between two people who are
simultaneously present to each other are what drive an encounter. Indeed, there
is nothing suggested by traction that is not also implicit in the dialogic principle.
The difference is emphasis. Where Bakhtin’s focus is on the dynamics of
relationship, especially the complex dynamics internal to a person who is
dialogically constituted, traction stresses the dynamics and irreducibility of grip
among people in sight of each other, engaged in conversation or argument, at
war with each other, or otherwise on the radar screen. It forces attention away
from the hypothetical and the abstract, granting of course that language itself is
abstraction.
My decision to sideline such a promising model of dialogue, and base this
study instead on practice theory, recognizes that latter’s particular emphasis on
the integration of things usually conceived as separate. Except in certain
specialized vocabulary, which I try to avoid here, practice theorists try to inject
relations with heightened dynamism by playing opposing words off against each
other. The effect of focusing so intensely on the co-dependence of push and pull,
growth and inertia, subjective and objective, predisposition and feedback,
individual bodies and immanent social structures, is to evoke a deeper
appreciation of complexity and vital interdependence, locally and across scales.

5
As a basic frame, practice is thus congenial to both the concreteness of traction
and broader interdependence suggested by timbre. In its use of rhetorical push
and pull, practice also exposes the unavoidable crudeness of words as they
struggle, through various circumlocutions, to produce a view outside
themselves. In effect, they point out that there is no word for the thing they point
to, whose utter immediacy is always just out of view and evident only as trace
fossils.
Practice theory has a more specific advantage, too, in the context of early Upper
Canada. If we imagine interaction between two people, one common form of
traction in the province was mutual misperception of what the other was doing
or saying; and since this study focuses on top-down efforts at controlling
conduct, we are most interested in how the person on top—we’ll call him a
magistrate—misreads the one below. On various fronts—social or political
station, vested legal authority, political loyalty, religious orientation, ethnic
difference, (dis)connectedness to local affairs—the magistrate exercises his view
of and on the person below. In the particular traction this brings into view, he
does not grasp that his own view could be the problem. It is officially sanctioned,
after all. He also views this encounter as oppositional in many cases where the
local trajectories being confronted are actually more complex, oblique rather than
starkly oppositional, and this misperception drives the encounter still further.
Practice theory does not always capture well the minute articulations along
which transformations tend to be small and conservative habits made durable,
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but even when it only begs the question, that is exactly the right question to beg
in studying how, against the evidence of a complex demographic and local
circumstances, government authorities often reproduced their conservative
views of loyalty, conduct and proper society.
Exemplary practice, then, refers in a specific way to how official standpoint in
early Upper Canada crystallized locally and reverberated more widely. Using
that model, the mundane “dwelling house” emerges in this study as a core moral
space in the society of early Upper Canada. Whether a stately mansion or a
rented room, this space ranked even above a church in the intensity with which
the law defended it. At the heart of this moral protection resided a notion of
fairness, whose overtones sounded in the wide range of practices noted earlier.
Getting to those connections, of course, is the work of chapters to follow.
After a detailed consideration of the title’s key terms in Chapter 2, Chapter 3
then provides a brief historical sketch of events leading to the new province’s
formation. “Event”, of course, presupposes the capacity of certain moments—call
these presuppositions “landmarks”—to shape things to come. The purpose here,
however, is not to deconstruct historical narratives or to be comprehensive, only
to provide basic context for discussions to follow. The chapter then offers a
glimpse of the prior experiences, ideas and commitments of migrants to the
province, as manifested in encounters with new people and situations in Upper
Canada.

7
Chapter 4 moves on to the imposition of guidelines upon the province. Taking
this word first in the sense of prescriptions for morality and proper conduct, it
explores standpoints of the new administration evident in early issues of the
Upper Canada Gazette, Upper Canada’s first newspaper and mouthpiece for the
government (and hereafter called the Gazette). The chapter then considers
guidelines in a second, more literal sense: as survey lines that guided
administrators and settlers in transforming undeveloped parcels of land into
property. This second sense of guideline—produced in this case by David Smith,
the first Surveyor General of Upper Canada5—may seem apples and oranges
next to prescriptions in a newspaper. Below specific differences of task, purpose,
place and people involved, however, lay a shared sense of boundaries, proper
spaces and the basic value of property, and proper activities based on all of these.
In language introduced a moment ago, this common ground, a feature of shared
fields rather than any field in isolation, suggests the force of social overtones, the
enculturated (and enculturating) timbre of a practice when it resonates in
otherwise disparate fields.
Chapter 5 then looks at conduct defined in Upper Canada’s criminal code,
specifically as revealed through a burglary trial. It is here, finally, that the loaded
concept of a dwelling house takes the limelight. Once again, juxtaposition with
discussions of guidelines in Chapter 4 may seem incongruous. What does a land
5

Simcoe appointed him “Acting Surveyor General” in 1792, a title that became “Surveyor General” in
1798. Throughout this time he functioned as chief surveyor, a position responsible for producing all the
townships in the province.
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survey have to do with burglary, other than setting up the evolution from vacant
land into property one can steal? How, beyond obvious suspicions that a burglar
is probably also disloyal, do acts of burglary connect to discussions about loyalty
to Britain? And what do associations between female and domestic space really
have to do with burglars at night, other than their opportunistic potential to
sensationalize the vulnerability of women? By working through the trial and
toward a focused notion of a dwelling house, the chapter argues that these
apparently disparate elements have a great deal to do with each other—at the
level of timbre, where they would also have the deepest influence.
This sets the stage, in a concluding Chapter 6, to appreciate connections among
the various realms of social practice considered here. The abstract point behind
an exploration that covers newspaper content and order, survey lines and grids,
literature on female conduct, and a burglary trial (with its look at duelling and
game hunting), is that meaningful connection among diverse social realms goes
beyond their administration and beyond legal or social decree, into a realm of
shared basic orientations to proper and productive human lives and
communities. Committing to these orientations in one place resonates in others,
thus deepening the idea and commitment to it. As a final note, the dissertation
returns to the issue, raised in the preface, of doing anthropological fieldwork in
an archival setting.

9

Chapter 2
Parsing the Terms

To help set a foundation for ideas to come, this chapter parses three key
words—exemplar, practice, and frontier—in the dissertation title. The terms
overlap substantially, but it may be clearer, after the discussion that follows, to
propose that they are really three ways of articulating the same larger idea. A
first step involves distinguishing commonsense meanings of the terms from the
more specific usage deployed here.
2.1 Exemplary…
Although my sense of example and exemplar developed through encounters
with archival materials I used, credit for the impulse to look for them at all goes
to a story from grade school, which a judge’s report on a rape crime prompted
me to recall. The story begins moments after a modern-day sixteen-year-old boy
has been stabbed, then left on the sidewalk to bleed to death. He was a member
of a gang called The Royals, which is all the identity he gets from either his
attacker or from the policeman who finds him at the end, after he is already
dead. The reader, of course, gets an insider’s view of the real boy, Andy, through
his musings, which form the body of the story. The premise is that categories—
“Royal”, “gang member”, “criminal”—entail erasure: the coherence of category
comes at the expense of details that are singular rather than generalizable to
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other people or groups; it hides complexity and ignores messiness and
contradictions. It also favors objective formality over subjective consideration.
The letter that provided a springboard to that recollection dates to September
22, 1820, and like the story, involves a victim, a felon, and the categorical
judgment of formal authority. Writing to the Governor’s secretary, Judge
William Dummer Powell tells about a group of men who had raped the wife of a
comrade after catching her alone at home. Powell recommended that the law,
which defined rape as a capital offence, should hold firm to the letter rather than
grant exceptions. When the rape victim herself and her husband, based on
knowing the rapists personally, appealed to Powell for leniency, Powell
responded: “I cannot consistently, with my sense of duty, second the application
of the injured party…. Example is necessary for the protection of females, whose
occupation retains them alone in their houses, in the absence of their husbands,
fathers and brothers.” The rapists were duly convicted, and as with Andy, no
fuller information about their identity was known, sought, or publicized in
making examples of them, whatever else may have been known in other
contexts.
So it is with examples: they are always of something, either to be emulated or
avoided, and clarity requires that they be schematic in reproducing a moral
formula. As a schematic, divergent and extraneous detail would be particularly
out of place—examples are no place for the meandering incongruities of a life
story. The schematic is also figured in advance of actual examples, as tokens that
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presume an existing type; examples do not embody new ideas or ways of
thinking. In this sense they are conservative, not radical. And owing to this
reduction of detail on one hand, and conformity to something already shaped on
the other, examples are not about individuals or individuality at all, although
sleight of hand causes them to appear so. In being singled out and named,
located in specific bodies, entered as case information, and passed along as news,
examples and exemplars seem to stand out from the crowd. Their sheer visibility
easily distracts from the carefully crafted, structured, and omission-based aspect
of the narratives that prop them up to serve as warnings or monuments. Andy
was a Royal, which in turn exemplifies violent gangs. He wore the jacket, and
one needs no further explanation to make easy sense of the attack. The rapists, in
juxtaposition to their female victim, represented a class of violent felony as
categorically obvious as it was universally abhorred. Making examples of the
perpetrators required the public reproduction of both that category and the
abhorrence in the form of a legal verdict and associated punishment. Further
information would only hinder that purpose.
Another dimension of exemplars and examples appears if we consider the
female victim. She was certainly visible—obscenely so, in fact. No doubt she was
the subject of much news by word of mouth at the time, in addition to
disclosures in a courtroom. But what makes her a victim rather than exemplar (at
least in the absence of detailed case information) is that her role in the event was
passive: the crime was done to her, not by her own hand. And in the making of
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exemplars and examples—the perpetrator of a deed, the courageous act of a
patriot, the defense of honor in a duel—the active voice turns out to be critical.
At a basic level, this is supported in legal discourse through the distinction
between criminals and victims. But action gets parsed more finely than simple
agency by considering culpability as well, the main foundation of which is
intention. Throughout the Magistrate’s Manual—the legal bible for Upper
Canada as of its publication in 1835 (and hereafter the Manual)—one finds crimes
defined or distinguished through close consideration of intention. In one
illustration of culpability for killing someone, the Manual imagines a cart driver
causing the death of a child by running over it. If the driver saw the child and
drove on heedless, it is murder. If he didn’t see the child but drove carelessly, it
is manslaughter. But if he drove with due care and the child came out of
nowhere, then it is homicide by misadventure, which removes culpability from
the driver. Wrongdoing is thus graded according to how intention associates
with the outcome: intention to do wrong, simple lack of intention to drive safely,
and sure intention to drive safely that gets circumvented in ways beyond the
driver’s control. In keeping with this scheme, one murder trial from the court
records of Oyer and Terminer6 describes how a young man named Louis Roy
threw a stone that ended up killing his friend, Francis Lalonde. Through the trial,
it emerged that four young men were simply horsing around by throwing things,
6

The court of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery tried the most serious criminal cases in early
Upper Canada, while lesser crimes often landed in other courts in the court circuit. On the structure and
evolution of Upper Canada’s court system, see Riddell (1918).
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and one particularly unlucky throw proved fatal, in part because the victim
rushed toward the stone after it had been launched, and if not for this would
have remained out of range. Satisfied that there was no intention even to harm,
and that playing in reasonable good fun also ruled out a judgment of
carelessness, the judge ruled the event as homicide by misadventure, which
assigns no culpability to Roy.7
Similar distinctions occur in burglary scenarios. Given burglary as a breaking
and entering into a dwelling house by night with intention to commit a felony,
each aspect of the definition is measured by intention. As the Manual states,
every entering is not a breaking, as when a door stands open and the offender
walks in. Even stealing at that point would not make it a burglary. For that crime
to apply, there must be intention to destroy or undo something that fastens the
entry closed. A door that is simply latched but not locked, therefore, is a breaking
if the offender pulls back the latch. Entering is necessarily by intention in the case
of burglary, otherwise a plan to commit crimes inside would make no sense.
Night is also by intention, of course, since one chooses the time of action. And
the condition on which all else rides: for it to be burglary, all this breaking and
entering into a dwelling at night must happen with the intention of committing a

7

For a summary of this trial, see Riddell (1926:345-346). Note that while no culpability was assigned to
Roy for a verdict also called “excusable homicide by misadventure”, the courts nonetheless leveled a fine,
which Roy was to pay or do jail time until he could. Not having the fee at hand, he was remanded into
custody of the sheriff. This inconsistency between excusing Roy of all culpability, and fining or
incarcerating him anyway, seems to be a casualty of mixed traditions where a newer definition of
culpability mostly replaced an older system that downplayed intention in assessing the act.
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felony. An intention merely to trespass, for example, would not make the event a
burglary (Manual 86).
Intention also accretes to accidental felonies, where a perpetrator intends to
commit one felony but accidentally commits a different one. The Manual (222)
introduces this idea by imagining a man shooting at a deer in his own field,
whose arrow goes astray and kills a child he didn’t know was there. This, again,
is homicide by misadventure. But if he shoots at a deer in someone else’s field,
intending to steal it, and accidentally kills a child he didn’t see, then it becomes
murder because intention to commit a felony applies to whatever felony actually
unfolds.8 In the case of burglary, moreover, intent to commit a felony measures
the crime whether the intent was acted upon or not (Manual 82).9 It also accretes
to the actions of a person who was admitted properly into a dwelling house, and

8

This only applies when one felony is intended, and then another one occurs. It does not seem to apply
when one did not originally intend a felony at all. The crime of burglary is not charged, for example, when
someone breaks and enters a dwelling house with the intention merely to beat the owner, and then contrary
to intention, the owner is killed. (See Manual 86.) Murder and manslaughter are felonies, but beating is not.
Such a culprit would thus be susceptible to a charge of homicide for the killing, and a separate charge of
breaking and entering, but not of burglary since relevant intent was lacking both when breaking and
entering, and when applying the violence. One thing to stress is that burglary was among the most heinous
crimes in existence, and following Blackstone’s caution about death sentences, the onus was squarely on
the legal system to define this crime carefully. One sees this in exhaustive reference to precedents in
burglary cases, including cases where comparable circumstances were interpreted in conflicting ways.
Although one strives for consistency (a main purpose of precedent) and although fair judgment depends
upon profound legal understanding, the ultimate arbiter in heavy cases seems to be conscience. We
observed this, for example, in William Dummer Powell’s letter to the Governor’s secretary regarding
leniency over rape, which appealed to his sense of duty in taking the stand he did.
9
Although intent is probably hard to measure if the felony is not actually carried out, this severe stance on
culpability reflects how serious the crime of burglary was taken to be. As the MM says later in the same
passage, “the law will not endure to have its justice defrauded by . . . evasions” (83). Perhaps it stamps out
just such an evasion in clarifying that accessories, who merely stood watch from a distance and did not
perform the breaking, entering, or felony within, are nonetheless guilty as principals. We will observe this
uncompromising stance on accessories again when discussing the practice of dueling, where seconds on
both sides are to be charged as principals to homicide if someone is killed.
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once there, decided to commit a felony and then broke out of the house during
the night to escape.
Taking all such cases as examples before the law, what emerges is a sense of
exemplars as narratives of commitment to intention. It thus sifts out events,
however awful, that were innocent of any improper intention, like killing a child
in the wrong place and time. The cart driver did his full duty as a member of
society as long as he drove with due care and, despite that, could not avoid the
child. On close inspection, however, legal emphasis on intention exposes a gulf
between individual and society at the heart of the British legal system,
particularly when read against specific definitions of human rights that form the
underlying premise of English law. This gulf helps make sense of the stress on
appearances that one observes in conduct literature, notions of gender and
domesticity, and defense of honor in duels. It also helps illuminate egregious
violations of conduct, as in the crime of burglary.
The relevant notion of human rights comes from William Blackstone, an
eminent eighteenth-century English law professor and legal scholar whose
"Commentaries on the Laws of England" became a main interpretive standard on
English law. The four-volume work is also referenced ubiquitously throughout
the Manual and also in court records from Oyer and Terminer, where the
burglary case examined later in this dissertation was tried. Human rights, in
Blackstone's view, divide into absolute rights, which are due every person
independently of anyone else, and relative or civil rights, which describe a
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limited curtailment of absolute rights for the sake of a greater communal good
when masses of people start to live together. Absolute rights acknowledge
“man” (his language) as being possessed of free will, and guided by God-granted
discernment that knows good from evil. But this free agency, left unchecked
when people having diverse interests and priorities live together, would become
ineffective or even dangerous when one person's act of will impinges on
someone else's right to security, liberty or property. Thus the compromise system
of civil law.10
Blackstone (I, I, 119) also observes a close interrelationship between rights and
duties. To illustrate, he notes that allegiance is the right of a magistrate and the
duty of the people; and that conversely, protection is the right of the people and
the duty of the magistrate. Not only does a particular right only exist in
connection to a related duty, but a converse set of rights/duties is entailed by the
first set. A similar interrelationship exists between magistrates and the king they
serve, and ramified throughout society, one appreciates intricate webs of
reciprocal rights and duties binding people together. As far as the reach of law

10

Blackstone actually uses a four-fold system that includes absolute versus civil rights on one axis, and
rights versus wrongs on the other. This results in separate discussions for absolute rights, absolute wrongs,
civil rights and civil wrongs. He seems to parse absolute versus civil as meaning private versus public.
Keeping in mind that human law has no access to completely private, non-social elements like private
drunkenness that never emerges into public, “absolute” or “private” in the context of human law really
means issues that concern only specific individuals rather than the public at large. He uses the example of
disagreement over ownership of a field to illustrate this: the issue does matter to the particular people
involved, but not to anyone else in a legal sense. A murderer on the loose, by contrast, is a danger to
everyone, and is thus a public matter. Crimes and misdemeanors are defined in Blackstone’s system as civil
wrongs.
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goes, this mutual relationship between rights and duties concerns only their
relative rather than absolute forms, for as Blackstone says,
Public sobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws:
private sobriety is an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed or
not, human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never
enforce it by any civil sanction (I, I, 120).
Crucially, private matters that are out of sight from the public are not merely
beyond law’s jurisdiction: human law is actually blind to that which is not
shared socially. As far as law goes, then:
Let a man be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice,
provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against
the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws (I, I, 120).
The law, this suggests, is a science11 of interpreting observable human behavior
(that is, behavior that is not merely available to be observed, but actually is) in
order to produce and ensure an orderly society designed for the greatest good of
its members, both individually and in their social membership. What opens a
gulf between individual and society is that the measure of these observable
behaviors is intention, which is not directly observable: it can only be inferred,
interpreted through lenses of language, protocols that measure integrity, and the
weight of supporting or conflicting evidence.

11

This is Blackstone’s own word in introducing his Oxford lectures that became the published
commentaries: “The science thus committed to [my] charge, to be cultivated, methodized, and explained in
a course of academical lectures, is that of the laws and constitution of our own country” (I, intro, I, 4).
Given a preamble that sets human laws within a larger conversation about other laws of the universe,
including gravitation, this term is not intended casually.
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This conundrum deepens when we hear Blackstone say that private duties
(sobriety in private, for example) cannot be measured and hence are out of reach
of laws, whereas with private rights, “human laws define and enforce as well
those rights which belong to a man considered as an individual, as those which
belong to him considered as related to others” (I, I, 120). Didn’t we just hear him
exclude from legal purview the individual considered in isolation, beyond
relationship to others? A way to make sense of this is to note another distinction
between rights and duties: duties must be performed in order to exist, while
absolute rights are intrinsic to people, whether trespassed upon or not, and
whether the person acts or not. They are defined as being part of what makes us
humans, and as such, exist equally whether isolated or socialized. The purpose of
a legal system that does not see beyond the social, but nonetheless depends
conceptually on—indeed has its raison d’etre in—the existence of an
independent human nature, is to safeguard that essential nature of the human
being through acute attention to observable conduct.
Although intention can distinguish between the substances of acts that appear
on the surface to be the same, as it did in judging culpability of the cart driver,
many everyday acts are not so readily distinguished. Proper conduct in routine
matters, for example, may obviate scrutiny of behavior by conforming to
expectation. A goal in greeting someone properly, or dressing in a seemly way,
or speaking within ones social station, is to ruffle no feathers on account of those
behaviors; or ideally perhaps, to be considered exemplary, an instantiation of
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ideal behavior whose social significance was determined far in advance by
tradition and convention. In such cases where acts conform to convention, there
seems little practical difference between proper intention, and thus virtuous
conduct, residing below appearances on one hand, and the appearance of
propriety possessing a virtue of its own on the other. Treating appearances as if
they are virtuous blends seamlessly into them actually possessing virtue, and
either case loads enormous weight onto proper conduct and its observation by
others.
A risk in this discussion of Blackstone is that complexity of his ideas can hide
whole forests behind trees, or get misrepresented (as perhaps here) in attempts to
simplify. The gist, though, is that his view of English law, and thus of anyone
depending on him, adds an exclamation point to the importance of observing
conduct, and opens another node of resonance with stress on observation
elsewhere in society, beyond the technical musings of a legal scholar. This helps
give substance to obsessions over appearance in the discussion to follow on
notions of conduct, ideas of domesticity, centrality of the dwelling house, and
dueling. It also helps anticipate Chapter 5 by foreshadowing a key aspect of the
crime of burglary: it thwarts observation by taking place at night when the eyes
of society are closed. This places the culprit—as indeed our culprit, Josiah Cutan,
will be placed—completely outside the bounds of human society, and thus also
beyond the redemptive possibilities of law.
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2.2 Practice…
As a baseline for understanding a practice approach, I follow Ortner’s
(1989:96ff) response to critics of her 1984 paper, Theory in Anthropology since the
1960s, and her 2006 update on practice theory. Although Bourdieu, noted below,
is usually credited with outlining the theory as such, Ortner has the advantage of
equal brilliance combined with greater clarity, and in her deployment of history,
also greater finesse.
I thus take “practice” to denote a genre of social analysis having several key
features. First, it sees asymmetry in political and social relations as axiomatic,
and thus exposes its machinery as a basic part of analysis. Instead of presuming
balance and stability in the operation of structure, action, actor or history, and
thus hiding mechanisms by which they might be transformed or their balance
shifted, the presumption of asymmetry makes constraints on runaway instability
the thing to explain. Given dissonance, difference, conflicts of interest and bodies
that simply move further apart—and these happen, in no small part, because
feedback enters the system—a practice approach also offers insight into both
impulses toward transformation and where to look for them.
Second, practice theory views structure as inextricable from action, and
especially given the presumption of asymmetry and imbalance, this changes the
meaning of each term from their isolated (or at least isolable) versions. The
liability of isolable structure is not so much that it doesn’t interact with other
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dimensions, including function or action or agents, or that intimations of
structure can’t be traced historically, but that isolation grants structure ontology
prior to the interactions being analyzed. By separating its being from its
interactions, a static “being” emerges, a realm apart from and impervious to the
dynamism of actions, agency, events, as well as more nebulous dynamics
conveyed by notions of momentum or inertia. Movements thus become kinetic,
like a clash of billiard balls, precisely because the existence of balls in the first
place is a separate and untheorized issue. Severed from dynamism beyond
kinetics, isolated structure is no help in explaining how structures themselves
change; it merely poses change as a conundrum. Ortner emphasizes how
structure in practice theory differs from its counterpart in structuralism by
“containing an active assumption” (102), exampled in Bourdieu’s notion of
habitus. On one hand, as Bourdieu’s own parsing of oppositions in a Kabyle
house shows, habitus is structure a la structuralism; without explanations,
Bourdieu’s diagram would be perfectly at home alongside those of Levi-Strauss.
Ortner stresses, though, that habitus is doubly practiced: “it is both lived in, in the
sense of being a public world of ordered forms, and embodied, in the sense of
being an enduring framework of dispositions that are stamped in and on actors’
beings” (102). The result of this dynamic embedding of actors and connection of
scales is not that the issue of prior ontology is circumvented, as if one might do
an end run around existence, but that recognizing prior ontology as well as its
potentialities for change become the point; it is what the reconfiguration of
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familiar terms in practice theory (sometimes conjoined through neologisms)
attempts to parse.
“Action” suggests a similar contrast: “action” that somehow exists
independently of structural constraints and potentialities has different basic
parameters from action whose very being depends upon and emerges through
those structural forces. The puzzle in this case would be, if action, conceived as
independent, is studied for its effects on or through structure, this presumes that
“action” is brought to the engagement with structure. From where? From what?
In what sense is action, abstracted free of all worldly entanglements, even
measurable in the sense one must presume in a kinetic model of interaction? As
I’ll elaborate in the next section, this radical sense of free agency is not only
challenged by practice theory, but has been having a rough time of it recently
through much of the intellectual world, which dwells increasingly on
connections among things previously viewed in isolation. In practice theory,
linking action radically to structure—to its constraints as well as potentialities—
are among the key forces through which “free” impulses come into being in the
first place. Action conceived in isolation, which thus evades this sense of
freedom, is different in kind from action conceived as practice.
Third, this complex of asymmetries, emergent in a mutually entailing nexus of
structure and action, gets sedimented in concrete particulars that manifest over
time as inertia. Analysts may notice and assemble some of these particulars as
details of place, people, standpoint, environment, choice, occurrences, moments
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and so on, always retroactively perceived, into chronological assemblages known
broadly as “history”. In this sedimentation resides the overall conservative
tendency of structured action, evident in how many details appear patterned and
acquire limited predictive power. Although one can describe certain principles in
the abstract, as Bourdieu did in Outline of a Theory of Practice, such abstractions
can serve as anthropological analysis only to the extent that they are viewed in
their messy particularity, not simply as a discussion of principles that admit
concrete examples only as long as they behave. Unlike preceding theories, such
as structuralism or functionalism, or looser categories of analysis like
voluntarism and transactionalism, whose interpretive stability before the fact
rendered historical details tokens of a systematic type, concrete, accumulated
detail in practice theory is supposed to generate the analysis.12
The fourth keystone of practice theory, in Ortner’s model, is the so-called actor,
the physical and psychical bodies in and through whom all other elements are
manifested. Answering critics of her 1984 theory paper, Ortner stresses that this
actor is neither the unconstrained free agent just dismissed above, nor mere
drones in the unfolding of structural constraint, historical momentum or
12

Bourdieu’s Outline illustrates this point. As abstraction, it does the work of portraying the theory in
question, but because it engages historical particulars only as examples, and rarely at that, it does no real
analysis of particulars in the world. On the surface, his unpacking of the Kabyle house seems an exception,
in offering deep insight into the mutual reinforcement of everyday identification of things, people and
spaces, related functional behavior, and an underlying cosmological blueprint that makes sense of it all.
Even here, however, despite so much exactness detailing the geography of spaces, things and activities,
there are still no bodies, and thus no embodied history or exposure of living encounters and their feedback
effects that a practice approach now presumes. Indeed, Bourdieu’s analysis, though included as an
appendix in The Logic of Practice, evokes a static notion of structure more akin to structuralism, and not
the radical rethinking of structure that happens only when it gets yoked to embodied action, history and
particular people.
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biological programming. These poles “evade the problem of adequately
theorizing the actor, and leaves the scene to reductionist theories in which people
are either overly rationally calculating or overly propelled by biological and/or
psychological drives” (104). Nor, I would argue, does the practice actor suggest
limited freedom that might fall in between these two poles, both of which result
from denying the radical dynamism of elements whose origin is mutual
entanglement, not separation. Being radically dynamic instead, the actor in
practice theory is therefore not part of the spectrum these two poles imply—
unconstrained free agency or pre-programmed drone—but a different trajectory
altogether.
Before moving on to “frontier”, the third problem term in the dissertation title,
it is worth pondering the radical sense of connectivity that practice theory
entails. For although the expediency of explaining and rendering as discrete
paragraphs means separating terms temporarily, and thus necessarily
misconstruing them to a degree, it should already be obvious that their intended
sense depends on the inseparability of all when taken together, rather than just a
string of indivisible binaries. In this, practice theory reflects a much wider
reverberation through the intellectual world, and arguably far beyond it too. As a
way into this point, consider another distinction Ortner makes: practice theory,
she says, always involves a subjectivist moment of logics spun by thinking and
acting agents, and an objectivist moment constituted by logics beyond those
people’s immediate perceptions (1989:112). While she says practice theory
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always attends to these two moments, it attends most of all to “the ways in
which it plays on the margins between them, examining those processes by
which the one side is converted into the other. Thus we watch actors in real
circumstances using their cultural frames to interpret and meaningfully act upon
the world, converting it from a stubborn object to a knowable and manageable
life-place” (113). This process goes both ways: “At the same time we watch the
other edge of this process, as actors’ modes of engaging the world generate more
stubborn objects (either the same or new ones) which escape their frames and, as
it were, re-enter ours” (113). It is precisely this relationship, she concludes, that
generates the interesting questions for practice theory.
Few terms and oppositions have seen the breadth of challenge sustained
against the pairing of subjectivity and objectivity, and much of the difficulty has
come from trying to figure out which was king of the hill. As on the playground,
it is this premise of contest requiring a victor and a loser that precludes the
alternative of mutual entailment that practice theory takes advantage of.
Through much of the twentieth century, objectivism enjoyed the limelight
through a broad stress on scientific procedures of deduction and
experimentation which, despite contrary insights by the likes of Einstein, Godel
and Heisenberg, sought its conclusions as if the observer didn’t matter, at least in
principle: all s/he had to do was proceed carefully and get the facts right. If
“objectivity” as a term was often limited by its abstractness to specialized
audiences, “nature”, predicated on the same privileging of a world as it really is,
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was far more congenial to lay audiences and thus gave the assumption a much
wider circulation. Testifying to the truth of that assumption of an objective world
was a vast, industrialized array of things it had produced: automobiles,
airplanes, bridges, skyscrapers based on new understanding of materials, even
trips to the moon. Subjective minds had long imagined such things, even written
great stories about them, but it was a grasp of and commitment to objective
principles and materials, to properties imagined as not depending on the
presence, perception, experience or history of an observer, that actually achieved
them. As part of this objectivist world, anthropology offered its own specialized
insights into people-objects by measuring society and culture as objects, and
generalizing about them in ways that yielded, not completeness, but at least
accuracy as far as it went. The humility of this anthropology lay in human limits
that keep completeness always out of range, and not in the inescapably
subjective cast of observation per se.
Then the academic pendulum swung the other way with the emergence of a
negative counterview, a dangerous Mr. Hyde lurking within the objectivist
assumptions that seemed so congenial and productive before. In a strange
reflexive light, cumulative understanding became the threat and fact of
systematic misunderstanding, hidden agendas were seen lurking behind every
statement as they acquired political loading, and seemingly innocuous
institutional structures were revealed as engines of privilege and inequality.
Anthropology’s take on this new reflexive emphasis was to stress how analytic
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categories, and also styles of writing and presentation, relate to both disciplinary
and personal history, as well as to persistent forces introduced by colonialism
and capitalism.13 This general project of ending the myth of innocent, neutral
observers and frameworks of analysis resonated, partly through disciplinary
overlap and partly by drawing on similar theoretical source material, with
broader intellectual impulses such as postcolonialism, deconstruction,
feminisms, and practice theory. Indeed, overlap and resonance often makes it
difficult, perhaps even wrongheaded, to distinguish among the strands of theory.
Although some early stages of (over)reaction to previous dismissal of
subjectivity amounted to sinning in the opposite direction by limiting available
horizons to ones navel, the enduring fallout from this shift has been heightened
overall awareness of standpoint, including that of observers and how their
perspectives as well as presence shapes both what gets noticed and the very
process of observation. Even “nature” got recast in constructivist terms—by
Haraway (2008:159), for example, who argues that “Nature cannot pre-exist its
construction, its articulation in heterogeneous social encounters where all of the
actors are not human and all of the humans are not ‘us’, however defined.
Worlds are built from such articulations.” That is not to insist that trees in forests
don’t fall or make sound if no one observes them, only that those hypothetical
(non)events are completely unavailable to perception, never mind analysis: even

13

Canonical contributions to this effort include Clifford and Marcus (1986), Marcus and Fischer (1986),
and for a complementary feminist view curiously absent from the first two, Behar and Gordon (1996).
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proposing them in order to produce the familiar conundrum depends on
conjuring a tree, a forest, and events of falling and sounding, all of which depend
in turn on particular, historically and experientially loaded systems of
understanding, however naturalized and invisible these may be.
Thinking has moved, in other words, in the direction of reintegrating subjects
with the social, physical, geographical, historical, exteriorized worlds once
viewed as an opposing pole. A basic axiom of practice—its necessary
enganglement of subjectivist and objectivist moments is part of this integrationist
shift. As with the other terms she parses, the product of this integration for
Ortner is not the same subject and object as before, only brought together, which
would simply return us to the kinetic world of pre-existing billiard balls. The
condition of mutual entailment, and refusal to force sides of the contrast into a
hierarchy, reconfigures what gets evoked. The takeaway point in all this is not to
achieve a better, more defensible definition of subjective and objective, but to
appreciate how far the integrationist view reaches, to hear some of its
resonances. One main site for this in Ortner, in others who use practice theory,
and in practitioners of other theoretical approaches, is how one side of a contrast
is made to play descriptively off the other in order to evoke a more profound
dynamic. Ortner calls for examination of processes by which one side is
converted into the other; she infers a reciprocal process of actors using their
cultural frames to interpret and act meaningfully upon the world on one hand,
while at the same time, also sees these modes of engagement generate more
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stubborn objects. She sees dispositions stamped “in and on actors’ beings”. The
writer/analyst, Ortner stresses, is not exempt from this emergence of a new
product out of multiple presences. Pondering who shapes texts produced in the
intersection of sahibs, sherpas and ethnographer, Ortner (1990:19) says,
When we read sahibs’ characterizations of the Sherpas, we are aware of
the degree to which those characterizations are conditioned by both the
social position of the writer and the discourses within which the writer is
writing. At the same time I have argued that it would be absurd to
suppose that what is written is unaffected by the actual characteristics of
the people being written about, or to turn the point around, that the
people being written about are unable to affect what is written about
them.
Looking beyond Ortner, a similar dynamic shapes the established language of
practice theory though constant reminders of mutual entanglement, the
reciprocity of being shaped and shaping, constrained and constraining,
constituted and constituting. Most famously perhaps, Bourdieu renders practice
as the immanence of “structured structures predisposed to function as
structuring structures” (1972:72), a phrase whose force lies in binding together in
a single dynamic moment already-structured forms and predispositions that
carry their influence forward. This integrative moment is part of what Bourdieu
captures with the term habitus, which succeeding decades shows has the
advantage of dropping baggage that re-deployment of familiar words must deal
with.
Not everyone viewed practice theory as a breakthrough. Maurice Bloch, who
admits to playing a bit of devil’s advocate, sees the approach at best as a
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reminder of what people including but not limited to anthropology have thought
for a long time, and more cynically as just one more fashion, a simple
repackaging in some new terms. “Marxist theory”, he writes,
…has always been centrally concerned with the issue of practice and
praxis…there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost in seeing
“practice anthropology” as a new fashion. Of course this is not to say that
it is not very useful to remind people of this old and central issue, but
pretending that something dramatically new is being born runs the risk
that we shall waste all the important work that has already been done in
advancing and defining the issues and that we shall entangle ourselves in
brambles which have already been cleared (1989:8).
Indeed much would be lost in seeing practice anthropology as a new fashion, but
not, I think, because it is one. If it is actually more, then viewing it as fashion
would trivialize it, and contra Bloch, it does seem that something new is born in
the approach. He cites Marx as a major precedent, specifically “his
demonstration of the historical specificity of the idea of maximizing choice and
of its unsoundness when it was separated from historical process” (9). He sees as
the fundamental Marxist theoretical advance “the refusal to separate individual
motivation from historical process” (10). Ortner (2006:8), too, stresses the
importance of seeing the articulations of structures, action and agents as tied to
specific historical moments.
But a few things differentiate Marx’s work from practice theory. One is that
Marx proposed a teleology where social forms, driven by class struggle, went
through a series of modes of production culminating in communism. Practice in
the more recent sense admits transformation because predispositions are never
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total, and the new, non-conforming impulses are unpredictable. But such a
scheme is not teleological, even granting the conservative inertia of habitus.
Another difference is that Marx views society in terms of classes and their
relations, in which individuals are analyzed mostly as tokens of those relations.
As emphasis at least, they are collectivity writ small. As Marx put it, “Society
does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the
relation within which these individuals stand” (1865:265). Such a view follows
from his political and especially reformist goals, and expresses his deep belief
that in their essence humans are communal beings. The closest that practice
theory gets to an actual emphasis on collectivity is recognition that the ordered
forms of structures, which help constitute predispositions, are public. But
practice theory—in the most astute forms at least—balances this insight with
equal emphasis on particular bodies in and through which such forms emerge.
And the relation between these two describes a more fundamental difference
between Marx and practice theory, and that is the constitutive tension in the
latter, which is missing in Marx. According to the third and fourth of his eleven
Theses on Feuerbach:
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the
educator must himself be educated. This doctrine must, therefore, divide
society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence
of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can
be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.
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Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the
duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His
work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. But
that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself as an
independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the inner strife
and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must,
therefore, itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionized
in practice. (Cited in Marx 1998[1845]:569-570)
In the first passage, Marx’s second thesis, he stresses the capacity of people to act
on their circumstances to produce change, to take their future in their own hands
instead of leaving it with the other half of a divided society. This does go beyond
the kinetics of billiard balls, which describes passive responders to untheorized
action. One of Marx’s main points was to make people, especially among the
proletariat, conscious of their own agency, to jolt them out of passivity. This is
clear in the “coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity”
(my emphasis), and also in the underlying philosophy of dialectical materialism,
which weds Hegel’s view that meaning resides in oppositions, and the
materialist’s view that everything, from action to thought, belongs to the material
world of substance—no free-floating, abstracted ideals a la Hegel. As Marx says
elsewhere, “industry is the real historical relationship of nature to man and
therefore of the natural sciences to man” (1844:23).
Human agency is also evident in the second passage, the fourth thesis, in the
“inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness” of the secular basis which, when
ignored, leads to the alienation of spirit that gives religion its raison d’etre.
Where Feuerbach argues that resolving the distinction between religious and
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secular worlds would end estrangement, Marx goes the further step of locating
the source of estrangement in secular, material conditions of inner strife and
contradictoriness, glossed elsewhere as alienation. There could hardly be a more
poignant image of individual agency than a grand theory about the inequalities,
oppression and surrenders of power that follow from an individual’s loss of
wholeness when labor gets isolated from its products, and humans isolated from
each other in false communities of religion or state citizenship.
In practice theory, of course, there is no program for resolving the failure of
predispositions to totalize, or of the capacity of individual actors to be
unconstrained. Resolve this and you’re in a different theory altogether, for as
Ortner (2006:2) notes, the relations of practice theory are dialectical, a set of
mutual entailments, rather than a simpler opposition that imagines apriori things
turning themselves to the task of opposing something. More critically, the
contradictions, encounters, and (re)connections in Marx lack the immanence of
predisposition and patterning that is simultaneously constraint and potential for
something outside the pattern. They also lack the diachronic implications of this
immanence, which practice theory gauges as both a conservative tendency and a
capacity for transformation. Practice theory also provides an actual mechanism
for observing connections between scales—between particular actors, for
example, and a pervasive, public world of ordered forms.
But the core difference between these two positions, perhaps, is that practice
theory offers a reconfigured “I”. It is not the formulaic “I” in Marx, where the
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analyst has figured out in advance what “I” needs to focus on and do, and where
that adjustment will lead. It is also not an “I” born out of oppositions per se—
“appositions”, which admit vectors that are oblique, might be closer. Most of all,
being constituted in engagement, in the emergence of immanent tensions,
renders “I” both more radically individuated and more radically social than in
Marx. That is, what I just called immanent tensions is internal to the individual,
which is what makes embodiment mean what it does. By comparison, Marx’s
takes properly functioning individuals as wholes (and categorical ones at that):
individual activity and recognition of self entails change, yes, and that gives
them agency, but no complex of internal tensions is even hinted at which might
take analysis below the individual’s skin, to a sense of creativity and emergence
that suggests the first person. For all his talk of individuals, Marx’s work seems
to contain individuals in the third person only, individual bodies one can point
to and talk about. The refinements of individual and social are expression of
practice theory’s profound emphasis on integration. Perhaps as further
expression of all these points, the “I” in practice theory is also much harder to
talk about, much harder to pinpoint and be precise about.
One shortcoming of the schematic of practice theory is the “actor”, usually
noted in the singular. The category can be fleshed out and multiplied in actual
analyses of course, but it seems important even at the schematic level to highlight
how actors are present to each other, specifically. The lone actor is no more
visible or analyzable than the tree in the forest that no one sees fall. Presence to
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others is surely the primary node through/in which identity and value emerge as
such, and what brings the internal dynamics into analytical view. Another
liability, which might have been more of a strength than it was, is the redeployment of familiar oppositions and terms so that tension becomes
constitutive rather than analytically antagonistic. The danger, which proved real
and present, was that despite the rhetoric of tension, interpreters would default
back into the same oppositions as before. Ortner laments exactly that in a
response to critics of her 1984 theory paper, where she argues that even some of
the top minds—Maurice Bloch among them—managed to miss this intended
reconfiguration and criticize the terms of practice in their isolationist senses. As
Ortner writes,
The problem is that even the attempted syntheses in the current situation
get heard as one or another pole of the opposition. Mention the actor, and
get heard as another form of transactionalism. Mention the importance of
the cultural construction of anything at all, and get heard as another form
of "culturology" or "subjectivism". Mention the importance of theorizing
anything at all and get heard as another form of objectivism (1989:106).
This matter of distinguishing particular, especially new uses of a term, and
connotations of prior usage that apparently come along for the ride, seems
trickier than simply stating the problem would make it out to be. A further
hindrance to broader application of practice theory concerned timing: about the
same time practice theory gathered steam, postcolonialism, deconstruction and
feminisms mounted challenges against anything that smacked of grand theory.
Combined with the difficulty of taking the theory’s terms beyond isolationist
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space, words like “actor”, “action”, “structure”, and “history”, however
reconfigured in principle, started to sound like part of the problem, not a
solution.
And yet, returning to the notion of resonance, practice theory is alive and
well—more vital than ever, perhaps—if not taken whole the way it once was. Its
terms, from specialized kinds like habitus to the keywords just noted to the word
“practice” itself, pepper theoretical and ethnographic work across disciplines,
topics, standpoints, genders and political persuasions. The playful tensions of
language where terms pull against each other to evoke new analytic space are
almost de rigeur across such wide swaths as postcolonialism, postmodernism,
deconstruction, feminisms14, gender studies, cultural studies and film theory,
and the list could surely be extended. Integrationism and a reconfigured “I”, in
the senses produced through practice theory, have remained center-stage in the
decades since, although forms and styles of getting at them have meandered.
Its critical emphasis on integration, and recognition of a genuine first person
emergent in internal dynamic, also has much in common with Bakhtin’s notion
of dialogue. Like practice theory, the starting point in dialogism is that people
14

Singling out feminism as another site of integrationist thinking and language risks engendering a false
distinction. If feminism began as a relatively consistent stance against a monolithically perceived
patriarchy, it didn’t stay that way long, and these days, a common criticism of feminism is that it represents
no common cause at all, evident as much by the extent to which feminists argue with each other as by the
myriad different trajectories they pursue and stances they take. Feminists also employ diverse theoretical
tools, including bits of practice theory, dialogism, deconstruction, psychiatric theory, gaze theory, and
others. Yet they deserve mention as an assemblage for two reasons: they have generally in common a focus
on gender, particularly constructions of females (leaving that term un-deconstructed for present purposes),
which are often ignored or under-represented in other work; and the sheer volume represented by a feminist
assemblage, however internally diverse or argumentative, adds a great deal to the momentum of the
integrationist tendency I am trying to describe.
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are always already embedded in their worlds; abstracting them into an analytical
cocoon where they can be studied like variables or controls in an experiment
would miss the entire premise of dialogue, for it is only through that embedding
that people are able to perceive, make choices, act and speak. Dialogism parses
differently the balance between creative impulse and constraint, and between
individual and collective: although practice theory, too, reveals internal
dynamics within a single person, dialogism is more emphatic and precise in this.
Indeed, in contrast to a more casual sense of dialogue as interaction between
people, dialogism in Bakhtin’s sense focuses specifically on the echoes, double
voicing, experiences, and linguistic encounters within a single person, with the
definitive caveat that these internal dynamics depend utterly on multiple bodies
that are simultaneously present to each other, for it is in those engagements that
inner conditions are realized. As Holquist (2002:19) says, the dialogic self is first
of all a relation; “in Bakhtinian scenarios, the simple yet all-important fact should
be stressed again that [protagonists] always enact a drama containing more than
one actor” (18—emphasis in original). Dialogism thus gives definitive emphasis to
“I”, which is not merely a unique entity, or one that simply needs other people
around in order to distinguish and talk about. The dialogic “I” is also not just the
fact of two “I”s being simultaneously present to each other, although that is
critical. In addition, each I is internally complex and dynamic, and these
dynamics are what emerge through co-presence.
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Hanks (1996:207) notes that for Bakhtin, all speech is dialogic since it draws its
value from the ideological horizons of society, and one might extend that
observation far beyond speech as well. Ubiquity, of course, would mean that
“dialogue” doesn’t say anything distinctive about an interaction; as we shall
claim for the term “frontier”, problems of meaning are sure to crop up when an
insight appropriate to specific conditions gets applied beyond them.15 But that
push for a broad application of dialogism, however diluting of analysis some of
it may be, certainly helps suggest the breadth and strength of recent commitment
to integration and a radical sense of “I”.
These specific models of integration and “I” belong to a more general
intellectual view that one is always embedded, and that embedding makes one
partial in both senses of that word. Recognition of this manifests as a growing
agnosticism about how, and how far, one’s actions ripple outward into a wider
world. The view that individual actions and orientations are consequential, that
they promote certain ideas by virtue of excluding others, that ideologies and
their institutional structures are deeply imbricated within society, contingent
upon and emergent in interaction, and that visible boundaries are therefore
highly permeable, is incompatible with presumptions that society is reducible to
elements, or that only certain relationships are relevant. A given analysis may
choose—indeed must choose—to look only at certain things, but it cannot

15

For a specific discussion of this relevant to Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue, see Bernstein (1989).
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presume, in principle, that those it does not mention are irrelevant. The
postmodern recognition of personal standpoint contradicts that very principle.16
Going further out on a limb, this general integrationist impulse may also
register in non-intellectual practices such as the growth of interdisciplinary
activity and interest in supporting it institutionally, the proliferation of new
departments, increasing crosstalk between nation states, challenges against the
idea of a nation state17, new security threats that are global in scale and
unconstrained by national boundaries, increasing and immediate access to global
events, instant communication around the world, and through it all perhaps, a
growing sense that things happening over there actually do make a difference
here, to me. The point is not to call all of these trajectories practice, of course, but
to tune in to the profound stress on integration, and perhaps on a radicalized “I”
(which might include its plural form, “we”) occurring today. With his usual flair,
Sahlins once said of the long run that we are not just always dead, but always
wrong too. A more congenial and perhaps illuminating way to say that is, ideas
are important to the time(s) in which they arise, especially if they sound from so
many different corners simultaneously. One misses everything about that
importance and what the ideas are doing in the world by discarding them in
advance to the dustbin of a long run. Integration, and perhaps the radical “I”, are
profoundly significant, and the thing to figure out is how, and perhaps why.
16

This claim dovetails with the sense, offered by Marcus (1986:192), LaCapra (2001:21) and others, that
postmodernity is rooted in indeterminacy and incompleteness.
17
According to Swazo (2002), for example, given the compression of nations upon a finite globe, the
traditional logic of statecraft becomes ever more of a hindrance, and increasingly dangerous.
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Among the many threads of this larger idea, no single one constitutes a weak
link which, if broken, drops the whole idea. Peirce says
“to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the
conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is
no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so
slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately
connected.” (Collected papers, 5.264)
As a final point, the rigors of language, including the ordering of sentences and
thoughts into discrete moments, is an inescapable liability in evoking the radical
sense of integration being argued here. The basic problem, as Bakhtin noted with
his view of an “event”, is that thinking, let alone writing, is always a
crystallization after the fact. By the time we notice a thought or idea as such, the
contingencies in which it emerged have already moved on. The study of events is
therefore a study of trace fossils, of impressions that our emergently familiar
predispositions allow us to make in sedimented moments. Like Bakhtin said of
events, we cannot get at the heart of practice’s dynamism directly; even using
words like “force”, “element”, “predisposition”, “person”, “body”, “individual”,
and any others used in the preceding paragraphs, conjures the spectre of an
unexamined prior ontology that frames the focus of analysis. The rhetorical
solution when using these familiar terms has been to evoke a tension between
opposites, to see that tension as primordial rather than a consequence of things
supposedly brought together, and to look the other way when the words’ prior
histories dirty the scene with prior, isolationist meanings. Such words dirty the
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scene for the same reason we think to use them in a new way to begin with
instead of inventing a new, arcane jargon: if new jargon has the dubious
advantage of making a clean semantic break and thus allowing a fresh start,
familiar terms have both the advantage and the liability of being easily
understood already, which can be a powerful springboard into new territory
when done well. Although it has been done better by some than others, the
telling thing is the sheer number and breadth of people doing it.
2.3 Frontier…
The most contentious of my three keywords, I choose “frontier” over
alternatives because some of its baggage proves useful to my analytic purpose,
and because no one needs another new term. In distinguishing my sense of
frontier from prior usage, it will help to touch briefly on the latter, beginning
with Fredrick Jackson Turner’s 1893 essay, The Significance of the Frontier in
American History. This highly influential work almost singlehandedly brought
“frontier” to the fore of American historiography, where it has since suffered on
three fronts: challenges to the concept itself, disagreement over what Turner and
others mean by the term, and vague or unreflective usage that obscures issues
buried in the word. Some advocate continued use of the term after
accommodating insights gathered through the fruitful century since Turner.
Others, preferring terms such as border, borderline, borderland and contact
zone, argue that “frontier” is inherently loaded in ways that make
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accommodating it wrongheaded. Still others take up positions between these two
poles, and differ in their kind and degree of accommodation.
Turner’s basic thesis is that a westward-moving frontier, along which
settlement, increasing density of population and related shifts in ideals prevailed
over a sparsely populated, unsettled wilderness, definitively shaped and
produced the America of Turner’s day. According to Pierson (1942:49), who
surveyed 106 people18—mainly established scholars and professionals in history
or allied disciplines—Turner’s frontier is generally taken to be a zone rather than
a line. “The effect of this zone was change, the change showing particularly in
personal character, in the fostering of individualism, democracy, energy,
optimism, inventiveness, coarseness, materialism, idealism, etc.” That is, “change
in the character and attitudes of the people is more essential and noticeable than
change in institutions” (50). In any case, this frontier contrasted sharply in kind
with counterparts in Europe, which tended instead to consist of fortified borders
running through more densely populated areas. Granting this modest agreement
about what Turner said, respondents to the survey embodied a deep divide over
the details and merits of the thesis; as Pierson notes, “fifty years after its
formulation historians are still not agreed on either the contents or the validity of
the celebrated frontier hypothesis” (48). Indeed, almost sixty years after Pierson’s
essay, a special forum in The American Historical Review19 returned once again to

18
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Pierson sent out 220 letters for the survey, but about half did not reply.
Vol. 104, No. 3 (June 1999)
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the larger issue of how to think and talk about cultural, geographical,
demographical, economic and political conjunctures, beginning with a reappraisal of Turner’s model of a frontier.20
Without getting stuck in this debate, suffice to say here that the thesis was both
wildly popular within and also beyond the academy21, and deeply problematic,
and retains today a considerable capacity to generate discussion. Some argued
that Turner’s obsession with an advancing frontier, mainly in terms of
population density, geography and politics, while probably important, had
blinded him to other influences on American development, notably ideas,
traditions and arts. And even many of Turner’s own supporters22, observe
Adelman and Aron (1999:814), acknowledge the imperialist suppositions of a
thesis that cast the movement of American settlement and influence from east to
west as a transition to civilization. Some scholars find Turner’s conception of a
frontier too vague to be useful. Others are more pointedly critical. Wade (1959),
for example, suggests that it was not farmer/pioneers at the edge of settlement

20

For a general review of the acceptance and influence of Turner’s thesis, see Billington (1971). For a
discussion that puts Turner’s thesis in the context of broader developments in American historiography, see
Bender (2002:129-153).
21
Theodore Roosevelt, for example, used Turner’s work as a lens for appreciating the 1890 US Census.
Roosevelt saw the declaration of a moribund frontier as reason, in effect, to seek new frontiers overseas.
The term also became a general metaphor for seeking new horizons that would continue to push the
envelope of American expression, as when John F. Kennedy promoted his political vision, which included
exploration into space, as a New Frontier.
22
Support, Pierson (41) observes, often tended to be emotional, a defense of the hypothesis as if Turner the
man were under attack. This irrational loyalty, and opposing emotions ranging from irritation to outright
hostility to the hypothesis, mark prejudice as a decisive obstacle to both understanding and fair assessment
of Turner’s ideas and influence. Appropriately, Pierson devotes a separate section of his essay to “the
obstacle of prejudice”.
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that drove westward expansion, but urban centres such as Cincinnati, Pittsburgh
and Louisville. In this view, Turner looked mostly in the wrong places.
Perhaps Turner’s sharpest critic is Limerick (1987), who doesn’t merely call
Turner’s frontier notion “an unsubtle concept in a subtle world” (25), but stresses
that the unsubtle point the term makes is exactly the wrong one. By agreeing
with the 1890 census that the Western frontier had closed, she argues, Turner
effectively blocked what he considered his discipline’s goal of “understanding
what came into the present from the past…. For the present is simply the
developing past” (Turner 1891, cited in Limerick 1987:17). What sounds in this
quote like attention to continuity gets blocked, Limerick suggests, by the closure
of a frontier that was deemed finished, whose process was based on limited-time
openings and opportunity for some that came at the expense of contractions and
closures for others. Such a scheme, she says, serves poorly as an explanation of
change into present-day (circa 1893) American identity. A closure model
downplays the complex mixing, syncretic adaptations and newly opened
opportunities that tend to emerge in cross-cultural space. Limerick conceives
instead of a West that, although changed, continues today, and where the
analysis of myriad threads recognize multifaceted, complex regions rather than a
homogenized, homogenizing “West”.
Some, such as Riley (1984) and Georgi-Findlay (1996), fault Turner’s thesis not
for its imperialist aspect, but for how it promoted an exclusively male vision of
westerly movement. Riley considers how women’s experience prior to that move
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constituted a different experience of frontier, different kinds of relations there,
and to a degree a different project than the unmarked “male” vision recognizes.
Georgi-Findlay, drawing on private letters, diaries, memoirs and fiction by
women who moved west, again stresses how these sources differ from the far
more visible, and historiographically influential male-oriented view—and even
subtly reshaped it sometimes—but also how, despite these differences, women
nonetheless colluded in the civilizing process through commitments to spread
Christianity and Christian-based morality.
Responding to Limerick in particular, Adelman and Aron (1999:815) caution
that obsessing over continuity and adaptation can create blindness where radical
transformation or attention to dissonance deserves the emphasis. As noted at the
outset of this section, definitions and models should be assessed with respect to
the analytic problems they are used to illuminate. Failure to do this results in a
reified concept, which seems to attach directly to “facts on the ground” instead of
to an act of problem solving undertaken by situated analysts. As Adelman and
Aron point out, a continuity approach may be less sensitive than Turner’s
frontier model—for all its shortcomings—to decisive transformations in the wake
imperial expansion. Indeed, its general point was to stress how Europeans,
migrating to eastern America and then westward across the country, were not
thereby simply transplanted Europeans, but a new product created in the
cauldron of place, people and circumstance. Granting that all products have
roots that can be traced, there is potential value in marking the emergence of a
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people and spirit that eventually commanded master narratives about the history
of a country, regardless of the empirical credence of such narratives.
Furthermore, if Turner’s particular stress on closures lacked subtlety, it doesn’t
follow that decisive moments of transformation cannot be analyzed with greater
finesse. Philips (2008), for example, shows how in the Pacific Northwest a
hegemon, influenced by the cumulative creep of migration, changing
circumstance and particular individual characters, may act decisively to set new
precedents on communal behavior, thus transforming local society with the
stroke of a pen.
The point is not that continuity in such moments fails: the problem is that
everything may be described as continuous, whereby the word distinguishes
nothing, including moments that may be the point of analysis to distinguish. If
detaching a term from specific analytical issues and problems leads to reification
of the concept, detaching it from concrete particulars on the ground leads to
undue generalization23, either by leaving the term detached and apparently
ubiquitous, or by misapplying it to different particulars where it fits badly. An
emphasis on continuity may also be a sign of present analytical times. Noting,
with Schmidt-Nowara (1999:1226), that “rivalries among empires, states, and
peoples manifest themselves not only through trade and warfare but also
through the interpretation of those struggles”, one might expand the statement
23

Overgeneralization is the main charge that Schmidt-Nowara (1999) and Haefeli (1999) level against
Adelman and Aron, whose model of frontiers, borders and borderlands rely too much on American sources
written in English, which could be readily challenged by examples from Latin America.
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to include interpretations of something other than rivalry; a spirit of
accommodation, for example, may manifest itself as an interpretive tendency
toward continuity rather than disruption or power struggle.
One major trajectory of redress to the notion of a frontier has been to
reformulate it more explicitly as a zone, either using the same term or by
deploying others, most notably borderland. This alternative is more emphatic
and intuitive than frontier in suggesting a three-dimensional expanse, an inbetween space that opens up possibilities for mixing, accommodation, creativity,
and potential to shape emerging interactions in unpredictable, unsystematic
ways. The main impulse for this shift was Bolton’s (1921; 1930) work on Spanish
borderlands, which detailed the complexity of relations not only between
American and Spanish forces, but also nuances of Spanish occupation as well as
relationships with Native communities. Coupled with the wealth of archival
detail Bolton mined, this borderlands approach opened the land up like an
exploded diagram, revealing complexities and analytical possibilities not
previously imagined. But neither Bolton’s own work, nor the fact of a more
congenial term, make “borderland” inherently less susceptible to vague usage, or
application to such drastically different situations that the use of a single cover
term itself becomes misleading. One distinctive aspect of North America, Haefeli
(1999:1224) observes, is that compared to most places in the world, its political
edges were remarkably unstable and fluid: “In North America . . . forts, frontiers
and boundaries rose, fell, and shifted drastically within the span of a single
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lifetime”, which makes most of North America (excepting the Spanish
borderlands in the Southwest, which proved more stable) a poor type specimen
for identifying and talking about borderlands elsewhere. Or more to the point, it
argues against any search for type specimens.
A further liability of borderland in Adelman and Aron’s model is what seems
to be a sequence from frontier, which was “a meeting place of peoples in which
geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined” (815); to “borderland”,
referring to “contested area between colonial domains”; to “bordered land”,
characterized by a “shift from inter-imperial struggle to international coexistence” (815). The process is not cast as a manifest destiny, but one hears
echoes of Turner’s imperialist teleology in this narrative about the emergence of
colonies and then nation states: “Thus, as colonial borderlands gave way to
national borders, fluid and ‘inclusive’ intercultural frontiers yielded to hardened
and more ‘exclusive’ hierarchies” (816). The words “gave way to” and “yielded”
imply struggles that produce winners and losers, those who gain at the expense
of others. And putting the critical terms in the plural generalizes this march of
some over others. As Haefeli (1999:1223) asks, “must a trajectory always be from
borderlands to borders?”; and, “can a region not go from a frontier to a
borderland and back again?” What of frontiers, as in Egypt, China, the Middle
East, the Andes and Mesoamerica, and unlike most of North America, that form
along harsh ecological boundaries and remain stable for centuries?
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Schmidt-Nowara also stresses that the trajectories of imperial expansion and
interaction can look different depending not only on which empires one is
talking about, but also on who is thinking about them. Cuban intellectuals, he
notes, understood deep differences in the rationales and effects of Spanish versus
British colonialism: although economic exploitation characterized them both,
Spanish colonies pursued racial intermixing as a strategy—emphatically not the
case for Britain. If religion was a key motivator for the Spanish, British colonists
were driven more by commerce. Haefeli also disagrees with Adelman and Aron
about the status of the Great Lakes region as a borderland in the centuries prior
to the War of 1812; arrival of the British and thus emergence of a borderland, he
contends, heralded an end to the complex negotiations that had characterized the
region. Furthermore, Haefeli and Schmidt-Nowari both argue, Adelman and
Aron make much of English language scholarship about America, and very little
of scholarship in other languages about other regions, where articulations
between peoples read and played out very differently.
For the regions bordering what would become Upper Canada, White (1991) is
worth special mention as illustration of what a meticulous, region-sensitive
unpacking of historical materials can produce, and of risks that attend
specialized terms. Contra Turner, who envisioned a steadily advancing imperial
frontier and an equally steady retreat on the other side, and thus the overall
upperhand of empire, White argues that from 1650 until 1815, in the Great Lakes
region of the pays d’en haut, there existed a particular situation between various
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natives and European settlers in which no side could achieve a decisive
advantage militarily or politically. On this leveled playing field involving
peoples who were radically different in their cultural traditions, politics,
language and senses of history, there emerged what White calls a “middle
ground” of uneasy, often violent accommodation in order to achieve a common
ground where productive interaction, especially trade, could occur. It was a zone
where accident and contingency led to invention and convention, which in turn
created new purposes, and so on. Also characteristic of this zone was a
“willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what
they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises” (52), even to the point of
advancing deliberate misunderstanding where this proved expedient. Such
emergence depended substantially on new generations being born into this intercultural conjuncture, who were thus not identical to any one side in isolation.
The resulting space was complex, unpredictable and often contradictory; it
expressed life lived from the ground up, and with only a bit of ground in view at
any moment. An “advancing frontier”, in contrast, presumes to see both the
wider country and where it is headed. Seeing “advance” isn’t merely teleological,
of course, but depends for its teleology on looking backward from the imagined
end point (as the inevitability of “bordered lands” also seems to do), and also on
assuming that because the end point supposedly came to pass, things were
always headed there. That, in turn, presumes a developmental and narrative
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structure, and either fits on-the-ground contingencies, relations, and perceptions
into that mould, or if they don’t fit, filters them out as noise.
If one follows Limerick’s view that frontier comes loaded with opposition, and
openings for some that mark closings for others, then it is an awkward choice of
term for the kind of unpacking White does. But a major lesson of White’s study is
that analysis of any border zone—however called—must be grounded in time
and place. White’s portrait of unfolding relations in the Ohio valley between
1650 and 1815 is not intended as a template for understanding border zones
elsewhere—a mistake by those who apply the term “middle ground” without
acknowledging the grounded specificity of White’s argument.24 Looking at
negotiators in Pennsylvania up till about 1750, for instance, Merrell (1997)
demonstrates that frontier space was not everywhere marked by the same kinds
of negotiation or the same ultimate goals. Where White’s middle ground was a
place where negotiators looked past differences in order to eke out a common
ground, Merrell portrays a space where natives used negotiation to maintain
24

Wagoner, for example, describes frontier settlement practices involving Lakotas in what is today Bennett
County, and notes how recent ethnohistorical approaches to a middle ground have helped challenge models
based on facile dichotomies between self and other. Such studies, she says, “locat[e] the field of analysis in
fluid interstices” in which “processes of accommodation, assimilation and acculturation become salient”;
the approaches “highlight moments when groups in early contact situations are forced into tenuous alliance
through ‘a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings’” (1998:141). The problem is
certainly not that White succeeded in inspiring challenges to previous analyses of cross cultural interaction
over time, and recognition of fluid interstices, creativity and expediency pinpoints an aspect of White’s
continuing relevance. But the term “middle ground” should be applied very carefully, especially when
quoting White as Wagoner does. One should remain sensitive to the extraordinary historical specificity that
locates his research in the Ohio valley and nowhere else, and which is a sublime achievement of that book.
That sensitivity isn’t obvious, for instance, when applied to Lakota without any reference to White’s central
proposition that the middle ground emerged in the absence of a military upperhand.
Another way of saying this, perhaps, is that there are two senses of the term “middle ground”: one that
appreciates all the subtlety and specificity of the term as White conjured it, and another that is much looser,
a cover word for whatever generalities may be gleaned from White. The problem with this second term is,
it is not always obvious that this is the intended meaning, and if it is, those generalities are not enumerated.
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distance from non-natives, and where the overall trajectory on the other side was
not persistent misunderstanding of the “other”, but long run failure to overcome
prejudices inherent in the “self”.
What any of these terms for emerging relations mean about a given region
must also account for who is meaning it. White’s analysis, for example, is not
only specific to the Ohio valley, but also a function of the specific—mostly
written, largely colonial—materials he uses. As Trigger (1982:11) points out,
analysis that relies on colonizer documents easily mobilizes the same biases
inherent in those documents: the blind spots, the willful omissions and the
exaggerations—a charge often enough leveled at Turner. Using different
evidence, including substantial emphasis on Ojibwe oral traditions, Chute (1998)
extends the notion of a middle ground in Sault St. Marie into the early twentieth
century. Indeed, she argues that prior to 1830, a middle ground in White’s sense
did not characterize the Sault. “Relatively untrammelled by external laws or
social mores, it conformed poorly to modern frontier social models, for it fitted
neither the image of an exclusively fur trading hunter-gatherer society, nor that
of a cohesive multiethnic community similar to those identified by Richard
White” (272:n1). Although Chute does observe a deterioration of supposedly
equal relations between natives and non-natives during the nineteenth century,
she also argues that from the Ojibwe standpoint, equality and respect were still
understood to be the goal of negotiations; this was not lost with the dissolution
of a middle ground. Kugel (1998:199) makes a similar point:
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Unlike the American public, the employees of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and Christian missionaries and reformers, the Ojibwe at the
century’s end did not contemplate their impending demise. They did not
see themselves as vanishing. They did not see themselves as a conquered
people . . . nor did they consider their culture and belief system as
deficient to those of the Americans and in need of replacement.
And the Ojibwe, Kugel goes on to observe, did not see their fundamental
relationship with the Americans as having changed in the wake of shifting
politics; such shifts “did not alter their insistence that they had created a
reciprocal political relationship between equal partners” (1998:199). In this sense,
White’s model of a middle ground, based on the disappearance of equal
relations, under-represents a Native perspective.
Much more can be said about the language used to analyze border areas,
however conceived. Two more brief points will suffice. First, just because current
analytical sensibilities prefer to conceive of frontiers as zones of complexity
rather than straightforward lines in the dirt, doesn’t make the line metaphor
inappropriate. At certain times, notably the War of 1812, provincial boundaries
hardened to a saber edge, one that slashed, retreated and lunged with the
convulsions of battle. Lines don’t get any starker than when opposing armies
face off across a river, where movement across that line defines invasion and the
start of a war. Recognizing complex relations in the zones leading up to that river
does not detract from the significance of the line as such or the act of crossing it.
And whatever present-day preferences of terms and concepts might be, one
should credit natives of an earlier society and time with a capacity to say what
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they mean with a reason for meaning it, as when William Robertson writes to
John Askin on March 26, 1792:
“It is said that the Americans will insist upon the posts as the means of
enabling them to chastise with effect the Indians; while on the other hand,
there appears no disposition here to comply with such a requisition—at
the same time a new line has been suggested for a frontier between the
Indians and the Americans…” (Citied in Quaife 1928 vol.1:408).
The other point touches again on the issue of ubiquitous application of a term.
Reacting to overemphasis on the divisive, isolating aspect of border, the current
tendency is to stress permeability.25 Permeability, of course, like division and
isolation, is a heuristic, a way of framing something in order to draw attention to
particular features. Given that frame, one focuses on the ways in which no
society is ever hermetically sealed against its neighbors, and that even aggression
against intrusion is a form of contact. Stressing this point brings useful attention
to the complex processes by which neighboring societies negotiate their coexistence; it reveals, as critics of Turner have done, what gets hidden by
imagining hard lines representing isolation, rejection of the “other”, or a line of
advance of A over B. At the same time, categorical emphasis on permeability can
obscure moments when exclusion and reduction to schematic simplicity are
salient characteristics and even engines of change. The degree to which one
might generalize permeability depends, again, on the particular problem being
studied, and also on what historians have called scales of observation.26 Given
25
26

For the Great Lakes region see, for example, Bukowczyk, Faires, Smith and Widdis (2005).
For discussion of this, see Revel (2010).
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enough time depth or spatial expanse and a dedicated eye for cumulative
evidence of crosstalk along a border, every border that ever existed shows
abundant crosstalk. A different view, set of questions, evidence and conclusions
may emerge by restricting to a much narrower scale.27
The liability of a term, in sum, does not reside in its limitations: definitive
limitations on a term—particular configurations that hone meaning to a fine
edge—are precisely what make the term useful. Liability arises, rather, in the
quest for encompassing terms that pretend to slip their ties to context and
concreteness and become general to a whole discipline. No term is perfect, or
perfectly bad, for all cases. Even Turner’s sense of a moving line of opposition
between settlement and wilderness, for all its anachronisms, its blinders to
syncretic adaptation, accommodation and continuity, manages to capture
something about the sheer presence and influence of imperial ambition. While
one probably wants to deconstruct its implicit notions of “event” and
“narrative”, the point is not to seek a retelling that avoids narratives and events,
but to understand more about this unavoidably human mode of making sense, to
shed light on previous narratives by making new ones that allow a deeper sense
of what got said before, and why, and therefore—with a final nod to Turner—
where present ideas came from.

27

A good example of relating scales of observation is Tsing (2005), who shows how local economic affairs
in Kalimantan, and Indonesia more broadly, emerge in the engagement—the grip—between local
perspective and global ambitions, particularly those related to natural resource exploitation that gets tagged
globally as development. This ethnographic stance, and the metaphor of friction itself, makes sense given a
project of “refusing the lie that global power operates as a well oiled machine”.
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With that backdrop, this dissertation uses the term “frontier” to suggest the
various media and moments in which core ideas, beliefs, practices and traditions
relating to proper conduct, represented by Upper Canada’s new government,
crystallized as part of a social and physical landscape. Wherever located
geographically, on whichever side of a geopolitical border, frontiers in this sense
are the moments when government officialdom pushed its standpoints and a
world pushed back; as traction, such moments do not bring standpoint to the
new scene, but are the very conditions of its emergence. Although the “media”
just noted can in principle include anything—even the medium of a hangman’s
noose, a last line of defense guarding society’s civilized edge—the present study
focuses mainly on newspapers, advertisements and books; proclamations
circulated through print and mandated to be read publicly; moralizing
anecdotes, fiction and poetry; the creation of settlement land through the
surveyor’s scribe; and legal court rooms, jails and instruments of punishment,
through which the most basic fundamentals of social living emerged from the
vague half-light of background assumption into the spotlight of intense public
scrutiny and remembrance.
It is worth stressing that a frontier in the sense used here does not map in any
direct, conformist way onto the geo-political boundaries (however defined) of a
new province. To be sure, ideas and ideologies always occur in space, are always
located in place, bodies, social contexts and the constraints of sedimented or
fragmented history, but nothing beyond habit or kneejerk assumption fixes those
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locations according to legal jurisdiction, survey grids or militarized borders.
Thus we find vectors of Upper Canadian moral identity being inscribed in
prospective emigrants from England, Ireland, Scotland, France and Germany
who, guided by well-informed emigration guides, may collude in their
moralizing stance about work ethic and courage, proper practices and risks for
settler women, religious obligations toward others, implicit civilizing missions,
and transformation of property as a basis for acquiring rights to it. We note
Upper Canada’s vision of conduct in Loyalists south of the border, even those
who never managed to migrate north; being Loyalist made them, in a sense,
metonymical extensions of Upper Canada. Of course we also find the Upper
Canadian vision of conduct inscribed in conduct literature printed in the Gazette,
the source for which in most cases was newspapers from the States or overseas,
or books, many of which were printed abroad. And we see Upper Canada’s core
ideals of conduct recreated in criminal trials in England, whose discourse
underwrote criminal categories and legal procedures in the colony.
What makes these unities of moment, media and context a frontier is the
traction in which they emerge. Refusing once again the “billiard-ball” notion of
interaction, we should not imagine moments of engagement as a meeting of
“things” or even standpoints that become visible under certain circumstances, as
if they somehow exist invisibly in nowhere space until that moment: moments of
recognition are the scene where, in and through which the thing recognized gets
created. Exemplars, a particular kind of recognition, take form through the grip
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of contrast to alternatives, something like how lexical choices along a
“metaphoric pole”, according to Jakobson (1960), depend for their meanings
upon alternative words not chosen in that moment; without this implicit
contrast, meaning would be impossible. Similarly, exemplars signify as such only
through implicit contrast to other choices of conduct: meaning is the contrast.
Witnessing the sentencing of Josiah Cutan for burglary is not just a
condemnation of contemptible behavior, but a finely parsed delineation of what
burglary was, how it was not robbery, or larceny. It was this fine parsing of the
act that provided the sharp sense of society’s edges, and of what lurked beyond.
Frontier, for all its loaded history, evokes a sense of this grip of difference that
“borderland” does not. It also evokes a sense of edges, and thus the project of
pushing and defending core ideas, of defining precisely where conduct
transgresses the threshold between acceptable and not—a project that was both
self-conscious and urgent in carving out a new province. Exemplars, in being
conservative rather than radical, in contributing to inertia against change and
experimentation, are one aspect of frontiers where collective representations get
worked out. Such moments of traction, we noted, do not correspond in any
simple way to geo-political borders, which is not to suggest that frontiers,
otherwise defined, wouldn’t relate meaningfully to those borders.
Such a frontier, Tsing (1995:32) says, is not “a place or even a process but an
imaginative project capable of molding both places and projects.” Exemplary
conduct practices relating to Upper Canada do just that: as concept, they imagine
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a limited suite of places relevant to settlement, with dwelling house as moral
center and beasts of prey stalking the periphery. They also locate the concept
geographically, sometimes by naming and describing the place called Upper
Canada, as dedicated emigration guides do, or by evoking a sense of shared
virtues among Upper Canadian communities. Exemplary practices also imagine
and help shape projects, from creation of the Gazette as a government
mouthpiece, conceived in the future Lieutenant-Governor’s moral vision for the
new province; to failed projects such as the Queens Rangers, in whose imagined
wake Simcoe envisioned the natural growth of settlement and moral structure. In
each case, exemplary practices crystallize alongside the spectre of their shadow
side, tokens of the disorder that administrators imagined as being kept at bay by
frontiers of proper conduct.
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Chapter 3
Roads to Upper Canada
This chapter provides a snapshot of circumstances on the ground leading up to
and during the earliest years of Upper Canada. The point is not to be
comprehensive or even balanced, but to establish context for a discussion of
certain institutions and events in subsequent chapters. Because we are concerned
here mainly with British-derived notions of conduct, we likewise highlight
British threads of influence in areas that would become Upper Canada. After
noting a few canonical landmarks in this process, we briefly survey the criminal
court system, which will set the stage for the burglary trial explored in Chapter 5.
The chapter then suggests a sense of how plans and unknowns might have
looked to those who participated in forging the province. What ideas and
practices did people arrive with, and how did these help constitute what they
saw and shape what they did? How did this same legacy of practice help
produce (rather than just recognize) obstacles and demand unforeseen and
perhaps unwanted adjustments? I try to get at these issues in two ways. The first,
based largely in the abstract, considers the socially and conceptually loaded idea
of “empty land”, as settlers and administrators alike often imagined frontiers.
The second window onto these issues, grounded more in the concrete words
and actions of early Upper Canadians, finds a gap between the province’s
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frontiers (physical, demographic, institutional, ideological) as understood and
enacted by government authorities on one hand, and by non-elite, more locallytuned settlers on the other. Drawing on insights from de Certeau, I suggest that
the former, which one can imagine as power imposed from the top, owed much
of its visibility and structure to misfit rather than a more straightforward
capacity to impose. It was not just the subordination of ordinary settlers, or even
their resistance, that crystallized the visible forms of social prescription, although
these occurred too. More fundamentally and pervasively, prescriptions
expressed unease, even jitteriness, about limits to how effectively or far the
diverse momentums of a real population could be brought into alignment with
the formal purity of Britain’s moral system and constitutive hierarchies.
3.1 Road to Upper Canada
The new province of Upper Canada materialized through the Constitution Act
of 1791, which divided what had been the province of Quebec into a lower and
upper province, defined in terms of position relative to the headwaters of the St.
Lawrence, with the Ottawa River serving as the east-west divide. In the creation
of any new territory, of course, a great deal is not new, but expression of deeplyrooted assumptions, cultural lenses and filters, articles of faith, habitual practices,
and specific threads of intellectual lineage. One of the difficult and defining
aspects of Upper Canada was that these various elements were diverse, not

62
homogeneous, despite enduring attempts by the new government to imagine it
otherwise and to force that imagination into reality.
Starting points are always arbitrary, of course, but a convenient one for the
story of Upper Canada is the Royal Proclamation of 1763.28 Its conditions helped
shape the future province in several ways. First, it restricted the sale of Indian
land so that only the Crown could buy and dispose of it. On one hand this
inhibited (but did not actually prevent) sales between individuals, unmediated
by the government. One supposes that had this inhibition not been in force,
settlement in future Upper Canada might have looked quite different, and
required some different measures to deal with, by the time the province came
into being. At the same time, this condition gave the Crown the means for
acquiring native land as needed, and a basis for negotiating Indian reserves,
some of which would shape the landscape in Upper Canada. In other words, the
proclamation’s decree on Indian land gave the Crown an instant monopoly.29
Put in geographic terms, the proclamation decreed that all land west of the
Appalachians belonged to Indians, and was thus prohibited for settlement. One

28

Just to stress the arbitrariness of starting points, this proclamation only makes sense in light of the French
and Indian War to which it serves as a culmination of sorts. That North American war, in turn, can only be
understood in the context of conflicts overseas, not only between Britain and France, but also Austria,
Sweden and Prussia. And so it goes, with each “event” an outcome of myriad prior and concurrent
influences on one hand, and of an analyst’s narrative habits and choices on the other.
29
Sir William Johnson, an Irish trader who was awarded a baronetcy for military services against the
French, and who later married into Mohawk society, wrote in 1973 that “they were amused by both parties
with stories of their upright intentions, and that they made War for the protection of the Indians rights, but
that they plainly found, it was carried on, to see who would become masters of what was the property of
neither the one nor the other.” Cited in Calloway (2006:48). An irony of Britain’s ostensible protection of
Indian land, then, was that those supposedly protected saw it as a sham, and on top of that, the move
angered masses of American settlers, many of whom had experienced Indian violence on the frontier
during the French and Indian War and thought they were the ones deserving of protection.
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notable effect of this condition, which sat poorly with settlers already deep into
plans to migrate west and even more poorly among those already in place, was
that it fueled the resentment against Britain that would eventually explode into
revolution and then independence. That outcome, of course, would directly and
profoundly affect the demographic and ideological make-up of the new province
through waves of migrating Loyalists, whose loyalties then helped distinguish
and shape attitudes and policies toward late Loyalists and others. More basically,
the revolution also helped shape attitudes to Americans and the idea of
democracy they represented. Errington (1987:36) suggests that “the best way to
characterize colonial attitudes toward their southern neighbors is to describe
them as ambivalent.” No doubt some were, but the problem with that claim is
the blanket category of “colonial attitudes”, which ranged from staunchly proAmerican to exactly the opposite. Indeed, much of the clamoring about
Americans was over this lack of a united front.
The prohibition against westward expansion, whose line in future Upper
Canada ran from southern Lake Nipissing to a point on the St. Lawrence just
west of Montreal, also helped create an internal division between west and east.
As Douglas (2001:2) explains, existing posts in the western regions, including
Detroit, had no provision for civil government since they were, literally, guests of
the Indians according to the new provision. It was the job of military
commanders to provide rule, both civil and military. Relative isolation of the
west deepened after the new province’s inception—through the checkerboard
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layout of crown and church reserves just east of the Detroit River, for example,
which made communication with the east awkward. The natural inclination of
settlers facing road blocks to points east was to find their hub in Detroit instead.30
Douglas (7) goes so far as to suggest that this inward-looking identity along the
river and the southwest shore of Lake Erie persists among some communities
even today. Suffice here to say that division of west and east was not incidental
but a pattern that got reinforced on multiple levels, from royal decree to the
social geography resulting from land surveys, which also combined to separate
the western frontier politically from Loyalist heartlands to the east.
The Royal Proclamation also set boundaries for Quebec, which at that time
included all of present-day Quebec as well as Ontario up to the western limit just
noted. It was from this vast territory that Upper Canada would later be carved.
Although the proclamation stipulated that English civil as well as criminal law
should apply, a few timely visionaries including Attorney General Charles
Yorke, Solicitor General William de Grey, and James Murray, the appointed
governor of Quebec, realized that uprooting the present civil administration also
meant uprooting the seigneurial system, the embedded social system, and also
the Custom of Paris which governed property inheritance (Calloway 2006:119)—
in other words, wreaking social and political havoc and sowing widespread,
grassroots resentment. Governor Murray, appointed to enforce a sweeping
30

The John Askin Papers, a major window onto economic and social life along the Detroit River up to
1815, reveals a web of relations as people routinely worked, traded, socialized and married across the river,
especially prior to the repossession of Detroit by an American garrison in 1796.
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Anglicization of Quebec and initially committed to this task, deserves special
mention for his advocacy of the French social cause, even against the stated
interests of his own superiors. As Browne (2000)31 observes, Murray’s actions
gave the succeeding governor, Guy Carleton, a precedent for ratifying the French
civil system into law. So it was, in any case, that these French elements remained
intact in Quebec, and would form a key contrast to Upper Canada when Quebec
got divided a few decades later.
The next landmark on this fly-by tour, just alluded to, is the Quebec Act of
1774, which was in large part an attempt at damage control following the Royal
Proclamation. Some of that damage—the upheaval and resentment that would
surely have followed from implementing the letter of the Royal Proclamation in
Quebec—was averted thanks to the wisdom and determination of Governor
Murray, as well as Charles Yorke and William de Grey. The Quebec Act simply
made these moves official: the civil and social system remained French, while
English law applied to the criminal sphere. The other element of damage control
with this move—an ulterior motive behind concessions to the French way and
people—again derived from the impending blow-up wrought by the Royal
Proclamation: with the drums of war now sounding on the near horizon, British
authorities feared the prospect of an internal French population siding with
Americans, and therefore sought to appease them. The real goal though,
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Cited online on 2 March 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01e.php?&id_nbr=2085&interval=15&&PHPSESSID=hpod4oehjlfl554kittjfnm4o6
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suggested in a letter from Guy Carleton to General Gage on 4 February 1775, was
not merely non-aggression from the French, but capacity to sign up their
aggression for service against America. While the French seemed content with
concessions made to them in the Act, Carleton reports that
…the Gentry, well disposed, and heartily desirous as they are, to serve the
Crown, and to serve it with Zeal, when formed into regular Corps, do not
relish commanding a bare Militia, they never were used to that Service
under the French Government…. as to the Habitants or Peasantry, ever
since the Civil Authority has been introduced into the Province, the
Government of it has hung so loose, and retained so little Power, they
have in a Manner emancipated themselves, and it will require Time, and
discreet Management likewise, to recall them to their ancient Habits of
Obedience and Discipline. (Cited in Shortt and Doughty (1918:660).)
Another fateful component of the Quebec Act, which stoked the ire of Americans
and Indians alike, was its retraction of the Royal Proclamation’s promise to
protect Indian land and rights to it. With this new act, the previous western
boundary—beyond which supposedly lay Indian land—retreated all the way to
the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, with the exception of patches around the Great
Lakes. So much for protection, based either in word or in writing. American
settlers, meanwhile, were incensed that Britain would unilaterally decree
ownership of lands the settlers thought already belonged to them. As an act of
granting concessions to an existing French settlement population—which
dwarfed any British counterpart—the Quebec Act was astute. As an attempt at
reversing some of the major problems with the Royal Proclamation, the Quebec
Act could not have failed more massively. Indeed, that act would be named one
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of the so-called Intolerable Acts, cited by Patriots as a basis for going to war
against Britain.
Next, of course, came the Revolution itself. For present purposes, suffice to note
its denouement in the Treaty of Paris in 1983. With this treaty, the western
boundary of Quebec moved east again, this time to a line (the conceptual
fuzziness of “lines” would generate quibbles and skirmishes over its exact
location) running through the middle of Lakes Ontario, Erie and Huron, and
through the navigable channels connecting them. It thus set what would become
the western boundary of Upper Canada. The change of political scene south of
the border also urged British Loyalists north in droves, which gave future Upper
Canada most of its initial population and part of its political slant. Another
condition in the treaty, noted in Article 5, was restoration of losses suffered by
British Loyalists during the advance of Patriot causes:
Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective
states to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties,
which have been confiscated belonging to real British subjects; and also of
the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the
possession on his Majesty's arms and who have not borne arms against
the said United States.32
Earnest recommendation, however, apparently did not amount to an order, even
when it came from Congress. When this restitution failed, Britain responded by
holding onto ports it already occupied on the American side of the new border
(Douglas 2001:3). These minor aggressions would help escalate relations once
32

Full text of Treaty of Paris cited online on 2 March 2011 at
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/paris/text.html
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again toward war in 1812, during which the international border migrated
several more times. By the end, however, it settled back to the same place it
began before the war: the boundary set by the Treaty of Paris.
In 1788, Lord Dorchester (Guy Carleton) issued a proclamation dividing the
western part of Quebec into four districts, intended to facilitate administration of
a far-flung population, which was growing from migrations following the
revolution. With a largely French population concentrated in eastern Quebec and
increasing concentrations of English-speaking Loyalists in the middle and
western parts, the Constitution Act of 1791 took a further step toward effective
administration by splitting Quebec into two provinces, with the Ottawa River as
a divide between Lower Canada in the east and Upper Canada to the west. The
act also held back from settlement a certain amount of land in every township,
equal to two-sevenths of the total, for future sale by the Crown to raise money
for the government and for the church (of England) (Douglas 2001:6). These
reserves, so-called Crown and Clergy reserves, typically occupied a
checkerboard pattern, except around more densely settled areas where they had
to be clustered together in blocks on the township’s perimeter in order not to
interfere with existing settlement. Ironically, given this apparent deference to
settlement, the checkerboard pattern proved much worse for social cohesion by
actually preventing it. Where the large blocks of an assembled block pattern
avoided settlement by design, the checkerboard, being laid out in more sparsely
settled areas, inhibited dense settlement from forming. Sparse settlement in turn
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made communication among farms difficult. As noted earlier, the presence of
checkerboard patters just east of the Detroit River helped isolate river settlements
from the rest of Upper Canada, encouraging them instead to look to Detroit.
In the Constitution Act, one observes sedimented influences of the several
landmarks just reviewed. The division of Quebec into large districts under Lord
Dorchester was part of a larger recognition, also addressed in the formation of
two provinces, that Quebec was both vast and internally complex, and on both
counts difficult to administer. The Quebec Act’s recognition of French presence
in what would become Lower Canada helped formalize distinctions with its
Upper counterpart, where English models became the basis of both criminal and
civil law; French settlers in what became Upper Canada, meanwhile, gave shape
to social geography and attitudes, not least of all attitudes to the French. At the
same time, that act was decisive in marching the American colonies to war,
whose cataclysms were the birth pains of a new Quebec, and then of two
provinces. If the Quebec Act thus served, in effect, as a declaration of war, all of
these landmarks derived from conditions laid out in the Royal Proclamation of
1763.
Looking back on the Royal Proclamation from the view of what transpired, it
would be tempting to say that it conceived a fatal discontent, recognition of a
gulf so wide that only independence could redraw relations in a way that would
allow the two powers to coexist as neighbors. But “fatal” would be a judgment
not knowable at the time by those busy being angry and recalcitrant. Getting
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pissed off comes long before getting massively organized about it. Humility
about hindsight, of course, opens the door to subjunctive history: What if this
had happened instead of that? What if Pontiac had won his rebellion? What if
Prussia had been victorious overseas in the Seven Years War? What if, in
achieving victories on both sides of the ocean, Britain hadn’t been so devastated
economically that they had to impose heavy taxes to recover their wealth—
another major factor leading to the American Revolution? What if that revolution
therefore hadn’t occurred?
Such questions, either asked outright or invited in identifying decisive
landmarks of history, seem to be valued33 as a way of appreciating contingency
and context, as assurance that the landmarks are genuine, or simply as a class
activity.34 Another potential use of the subjunctive is drawing attention to what
goes into making a landmark, which leads one to notice not just that the
generative force of things lies in their being irreducibly concrete, but also to
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A polemical Cambridge based group calling themselves “The Quadrangle”, on the other hand, calls the
exercise foolish and pointless by wasting time on things that didn’t happen or are not the case, when more
attention to things as they are would improve people’s engagement with the world. As a self-help attitude
to everyday life, which is really where the article goes, that may be. The article also tries its best to be
impudent and polemical, and manages to be patronizing on top of that, and is not a fair example of serious
thinking. But it does ask a certain question that makes an unintended valuable point. “What if Obama
weren’t black”, it asks in order to stress the pointlessness of the question in real life. But this question, like
others in the subjunctive, is one way of asking something that is poignantly relevant to “this” world: what is
it that causes us, today, to recognize Obama as black? How is blackness constructed, assigned and used in
cases, like his, where ancestry is ambiguous according to metrics used by the mainstream? How does that
mainstream choice, or perhaps sleight-of-hand, relate to other social practices in the news today, like
raising obstacles to gay rights? The subjunctive thus has great potential to raise questions about how we see
things, and how we choose what questions to ask.
34
A google search on subjunctive history, for example, brings up several outlines for questions appropriate
to class activities in a history class. Separate, more serious consideration of subjunctive questions also takes
place in philosophy, especially in work on modal logic, for which a key recent figure is Saul Kripke.
Specialization of the discipline and its language, however, makes much of that work inaccessible to lay
readers, who would probably not think to look for it in any case.
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wonder about the possibility of making a different narrative out of the same
concrete data. Narrative itself comes under scrutiny. On both counts, intimations
of the subjunctive should humble anyone who seems too sure about their grasp
of historical forces that connect the dots of data. Like the exaggerated wobbliness
when balancing a stick held the wrong way around, slight adjustments can bring
massive change—the more so when a narrative lines up a whole string of these
hyper-finicky conditions so that each amplifies the next. The point, though, is not
that what we see as having occurred is unthinkably unlikely, but that issues of
likelihood evade a better insight about what concreteness means. This insight is
not some algorithm for calculating chance or ranking material articulations by
their importance, but recognition of infinitesimally minute connectedness whose
totality would super-saturate narrative beyond all recognition. Such musings
invite one to ponder the mystical processes of attention, recognition, exclusion
and habit by which this elemental traction gets cast as narrative. We hear of
Brock’s fall at Queenston Heights, but rarely consider, compared to today’s
weapons, the crude targeting capacity represented by a musket ball, even in a
case where parties aren’t charging, on a hill, in the adrenalin frenzy of battle. The
question “What if the musket ball had missed Brock?” is, in this discussion, not
an invitation to wonder what else he might have accomplished in the War of
1812 had he lived, but the barest flash of a hint that coalescing so much minute
detail into a coarse aggregate must come at a cost to understanding nuances. If
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nothing else, the obscurity of those minute connections can discourage reading
backward with a comforting sense of inevitability.35
3.2 Framing the wilderness
Although much was new to those who moved into the region of Upper
Canada, comprehension always depends upon, and to a large degree reproduces
the standpoints and inertia of whatever background brought the traveler to that
circumstance. Indeed, it is engagement with difference—in this case, exigencies
on the ground that fail to satisfy expectations and perceptions based in another
place—that crystallizes as awareness of self. Such encounters helped guide, force,
and grow the colony, sometimes grudgingly, into its own thing.
To say it differently, there is no such thing as territorium nullius, to use the
phrase deployed by Chief Justice Marshall in several key US Supreme Court
decisions, notably in 1823 and 1832.36 This was first, as Marshall notes, because
the land in the so-called New World was not empty of people prior to the arrival
of Europeans, or even empty of people who mattered, but had been long
inhabited by people with original rights to the land. Rights of so-called
(European) discovery, or in our case, formation and settlement of a new province
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In the spirit of not over-valuing boundaries, I recall a cogent remark by Martin Pearlman, artistic director
of the Boston Baroque period orchestra. In his introduction just before performing Beethoven’s 2nd
symphony, Pearlman noted that at that time, this was Beethoven’s last symphony: he was not leading
inevitably toward anything, let alone the radical stylistic innovation represented (in hindsight) by the next
symphony, which ushered in the Classical style. One can only truly understand what creativity even is by
appreciating that locus in time; a narrative of development overwrites—precludes—the radical creativity
needed to achieve.
36
These cases were Johnson and Graham’s Lessee vs. McIntosh, and Worcester vs. Georgia, respectively.
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in only broadly charted territory37, do not annul rights that pre-existed those of
the newcomers. More abstractly though, territorium nullius is also an impossible
idea, a paradox of sorts, a victim of logic similar to the famous phrase, “this
sentence is false.” To imagine the land at all is to imagine it in specific ways,
informed by particular notions of land, nature, wilderness, their relation to
human society, their capacity to spark wonder and focus ambitions, their
ramifications through metaphor, our own individual and familial history, our
sense of and position within class structures, the broader history of our
homeland, and countless other elements that constitute our perceptions, most of
them below any threshold of awareness. In this sense, territorium nullius is a
specific expression, or rendering, of lands that are brimming with history, people
and conventions; the pre-figuring required to conceive of “empty” land is
impressive indeed.
And yet, something about this or any “new” land is empty, of the newcomer at
least, until the moment she enters. Or better to say, it consists of things beyond
whatever experience had shaped her up till then, and “new”, if one wishes to
keep the word, refers to moments of running into those things that are beyond.
In a climate of deconstructive criticism, too much is sometimes made of
difficulties in describing these encounters, of the futile compulsion to circumvent
radical subjectivity by postulating a truly independent object, or worse, the
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As Slattery (2005:50) notes, the effects of Marshall’s rulings rippled across the border into Canada, and
indeed through and beyond the Commonwealth.
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“real”. Perhaps one can simply grant that subjectivity can never be escaped, as a
first step to accepting that it can be transformed, and that words like “real” and
“objective” may usefully describe forces evidenced by the transformations they
produce. Such forces are evident regardless of—or perhaps because of—our
partiality when describing or understanding them. As noted in Chapter 1, we
want to avoid proposing “reality” that is simply there, ready for newcomers to
run into. A tenable sense of “real” is dialectical rather than ontological. It
describes the capacity we have to discover that when we push the world, it
pushes back, in large part because our partiality enables circumstances to
overflow it. We run into things that alter our trajectories and raise bruises. A
winning approach to those moments is not to think the bruises away by focusing
sufficiently hard on navels or other distractions, but to adapt our subjectivities so
that bruising gets reduced in the future.
This is the sense of real—of obstacles and bruising on one end, and sense of
“power over” and “power to” on the other38—that I try to evoke in this
dissertation. As far as possible, I speak not of kinetic obstacles that new
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Wartenberg (1992) uses these intuitive terms to contrast a sense of power as authority and subjugation on
one hand, and inner capacity to act on the other. (These terms align roughly with Foucault’s (1977)
distinction between negative and positive power, respectively.) If both terms describe the active voice—
someone acting rather than being acted upon—they differ in that power over is overly relational and
hierarchical; it entails a passive person in the same sense that a slave receives directives from the master.
(Foucault’s insight, very close to Hegel’s on this particular point, is that even passivity is an active choice,
and not a necessary one, which renders the authority figure critically dependent on those who are
subjugated—something that authoritative regimes do all in their power to hide.) Power to, while also
relational in the philosophical sense that everything must be, describes moments when individuals—
whether magistrates or poor tenant farmers—seize and use their own capacity to direct themselves. In the
sentence leading to this footnote, both of these kinds of power, measured as evidence of shaping something
according to plan, form a contrast to the unplanned, unwanted bruising that happens plans fail in their
design, or fail to give advance notice of obstacles.
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immigrants, from lawmakers to fugitive Loyalists to opportunistic American
settlers, bump into and bounce off of according to the constraints of prior
experience. I imply real insofar as obstacles or other sensations of an outer world
emerge through and as partiality of the subject.
3.3 Walking on the frontier
In seeking an idea of what the early province was like, one plausible tack is to
contrast the view from institutions and conditions of privilege on one hand, and
views closer to the local, everyday ground of settlement and settlers on the other.
A danger with this, perhaps reflected in a tendency to frame history too much in
terms of landmarks of legislation, actions of politicians, bureaucrats, military
commanders and other “notables”, is that anyone else gets seen, imagined or
ignored, and in this sense ranked, relative to a specific model of achievement.39
Ordinary settlers, unendowed with privilege, are harder to locate and hear, and
when located, they serve mainly to flesh out a framework already laid out by
canonical landmarks. They are the details that may get added to the basic survey
grid of canonical narratives.
Too much emphasis on privilege also overlooks considerable unease about life
on the ground that lurked behind the swagger and righteousness of some elites.
Through the optics of that unease, the intensity and repetitiveness of rules about
39

In a study on criminal boundaries between Upper Canada and the United States, Murray (1996:341)
notes that traditional histories of that border tended to be from the top down—the border as derivative of
relations between states. A focus on the perspectives and agency of criminals upsets that top-down view by
observing that criminals, no less than officials who were after them, used the border for their own ends, in
their own ways.
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moral conduct suggest a level of damage control, or at least of acting defensively
rather than always adaptively—reactively rather than actively or even proactively. They reflect limits to the capacity of hierarchal authority to impose its
visions of/for the province, and show that forces bubbling up from street level
also imposed on them.
I use “street” here in de Certeau’s (1984) sense that contrasts a view from high
up a building40, whose products are large-scale planning, mapping and topdown bureaucracy that exercises power to implement this vision, and a view
from street level, which de Certeau (98) calls “a space of enunciation”. By this he
doesn’t just mean agency relative to the designs and impositions of city planners,
a capacity to react, resist, conform or defy. He evokes a more profound kind of
subjectivity that is generative and original rather than a crystallization of topdown structure. Walkers of the street cut across boulevards, follow intuitions
through deflections and detours, pursue their own interests and relationships,
and in doing so, create stories and places for themselves that don’t occur on any
map. Crucially, this is not defiance or rebellion, although street-level acts can
include those. Street level subjectivity does not reduce to an opposition with the
city-as-object rendered on city plans. The power of street walking is its
obliqueness to hierarchy, and the feedback-driven creation of unpredictable,
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De Certeau’s inspiration for the contrast was a trip up New York City’s Empire State Building—a view
infused, no doubt, with a priest’s sense of God looking down from above.
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local-level places, relationships and narrative that follows. Mere resistance would
not confound planning to nearly the same degree.
De Certeau’s point, of course, was that these two should be better integrated in
planning a city, that planning should somehow harness the native subjectivities
of walkers in the city. My point is that in early Upper Canada, the recurrence of
official proclamations on proper conduct, the rapid growth of articles on conduct
(especially female conduct) in the Gazette, obsession over the political loyalty of
its printers, and the compulsion for magistrates to enforce laws beyond their
local means to do so, suggest that official views of conduct and how to produce
and enforce it were often out of touch with local lives. This view goes beyond
mere opposition, the sort where presence and enforcement of law would point to
violations and violators, or resistance, or laziness, or contempt for the law; all
such imputations express the administrative view of non-compliance. The
provocation for that view, though, was not opposition but obliqueness, and a
tendency for it to be misconstrued as such through attempts to impose
conformity. Like de Certeau’s street level, ground-level Upper Canada was
enormously complex; exigent, adaptable, and opportunistic to a degree that
stress on conformity filters out; driven by deflections and diversions of the
moment; alive with lateral relationships; organized and re-organized by an
accumulation of street-level narratives; and tactical where administrators were
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strategic.41 In part, what drove engagement of these different spheres was
incompatibility between their worldviews, coupled with asymmetries of access,
resources and broad-scale power to implement those views.
With this basic contrast between views of the land in mind, we may consider a
transplanted legal system along two categories of relation. One is tension
between levels of authority, in particular between rules coming from the top and
local-level practices, often contrary, bubbling outward and upward from the
ground. The former includes top-down proclamations such as Simcoe’s
“Proclamation for the Suppression of Vice, Profaneness and Immorality”, printed
in the first several issues of the Gazette. This proclamation represented a long
tradition of enforcing Christian piety and conduct, both in Upper Canada and in
the British colonial administration that preceded it. Looking into the future, one
finds the publication of similar proclamations, including the “Proclamation for
the Encouragement of Piety and Virtue, and for the preventing and punishing of
Vice, Profaneness and Immorality”, issued by King William IV and printed in the
Gazette on September 23, 1830. Looking the other direction, a parallel stance on
Christian conduct occurs in instructions to the new Governor of Quebec, James
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For de Certeau, strategies presumed that things had their place, defined through institutions, locations,
rules, hierarchies, and an underlying separation of the “other”. Relationships (business, social,
governmental, etc.) are then defined in view of those proper places. Strategies also presumed a separation
of subject (like a city) from its environment—insulation from sources of feedback that would soon threaten
the order of things. Tactics, meanwhile, are highly sensitive to context and thus adaptable and
opportunistic, and their localization exigent and fleeting rather than proper. Tactics also evade categorical
“others”: its distinctions among people are porous, expedient and flexible. In a sense, tactics are what
would follow from reconnection to environment: they are fundamentally about feedback.
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Murray, on August 13, 1763;42 thirty years later, Simcoe would quote item forty
of that instruction set almost verbatim in his inaugural proclamation in the
Gazette. Such a durable government stance on Christian morality gets explained
in another top-down source of law and order: Keele’s Magistrate’s Manual of
1835, which states that “The Christian religion, according to high authority, is
part and parcel of the law of England. To reproach or blaspheme it, therefore, is
to speak in subversion of the law . . .” (387).43 Indeed, as the last chapter noted,
Christian ideals wove society together not just in being wedded to law, but also
through the grassroots role of teaching youngsters to read: because teaching
materials were excerpts from Christian scripture, and ultimately the whole Bible,
learning to read—and thereby achieving social and economic competence—
entailed becoming Christian.
This prescriptive stance on conduct, urged on magistrates, justices and even the
lieutenant governors to enforce, could look quite different from ground level.
Murray (2002:75ff) records a court deposition about a magistrate, one
Bartholomew Tench who, out walking along the Welland Canal on Sabbath, saw
a group of laborers working on a house and tried to put a stop to it. He was, to
put it mildly, unsuccessful. Not only did the workers, especially an edgy fellow
named Joel Skinner, flaunt Tench’s incapacity to enforce the rule of law and
religion, but the latter’s attempt at a follow through—charging the workers with
42

For the complete text of these instructions, see Shortt and Doughty (1918:181-205).
Accordingly, the MM (79) defines the crimes and corresponding punishments for blasphemy and
profaneness, as well as breaking the Sabbath by working..
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violation of and contempt for the laws of Sabbath—did not result in prosecution
at court, only a bond of fifty pounds for Skinner to keep peace with Tench for a
year. As Murray (76) observes, “this must have been little compensation for the
public ridicule Tench had endured”—especially, as this dissertation suggests,
given the particular significance of appearances discussed in Chapter 2.
Worth noting is the political and religious background of the two men: Tench
was Roman Catholic and Irish, while Skinner was Protestant and a United
Empire Loyalist. Murray probably underplays this aspect of the confrontation in
saying “there are undertones of religious and ethnic rivalry here” (76). The idea
of undertones doesn’t capture the energizing, generative capacity such bitter
historical rivalries can have, or their capacity to bubble up in myriad forms—so
readily, indeed, that particular forms don’t explain their flexibility or their source
in a much broader antagonism.44 The takeaway point of this example for the
present discussion, though, is not the religious or political inclinations of two
particular men, but the vulnerability of top-down law to forces that are
multifaceted, oblique to hierarchy, and specific to a location, individual presence,
and context. These forces might include differences of class, ethnicity or religion,
individual personalities and rivalries, everyday economics, social connections,
history of events specific to place, and so on. Such vulnerability is exactly what
makes local practice messy rather than neat and categorical.
44

Friction between Ireland and Britain occurred further up the administrative hierarchy too, perhaps most
notably between judge and politician Robert Thorpe and various English rivals in the government,
including then Lieutenant-Governor Francis Gore, an Englishman of considerable peerage. See Patterson
(2000). Cited online on March 1, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=37818.
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Conspicuous defiance of order imposed from the top, of course, was just one
mode of negotiating everyday life on the ground. Heavyweight prescriptions in
the Gazette, the tendency to appoint a king’s printer based on loyalty rather than
training, the rapid blossoming of conduct articles (especially relating to female
conduct) in the Gazette, and legal directives to enforce Sabbath and other conduct
laws even when prospects for success were dim, evoke a rather black and white,
all or nothing sense of loyalty to the British crown and the vision of proper
conduct it entailed. From that vantage point, appreciation of American ways
easily generated suspicion, and this brings us to the second kind of relation for
considering a transplanted legal system: not as opposition between levels of
hierarchy, but as obliqueness between them generated when those on top think
oppositionally (as a spectrum between opposition and conformity) while those
below are doing something else entirely much of the time. From that standpoint,
the scene is complicated and messy, not non-conformist. It is messy and full of
shifting, wayward impulses not out of uncertain loyalty, but out of settlers’
sensitivity to where and among whom they are, and to the need to adapt quickly
and creatively when things got confusing. From street level they are not
wayward but nuanced, perceptive and adaptable, skilled at thinking on the fly,
able to embrace difference and contemplate ambiguity without resolving them
into contradictions, at least to a point.
At street level, even political loyalty was not so exclusive: loyalty to Britain did
not crystallize as homogeneous opposition to America and Americans, or even
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necessarily wariness of them. As Errington (1994:35) notes, it would be
oversimplification to characterize early Upper Canada as “a bastion of British
conservatism and the home of virulent anti-Americanism.” That is, not everyone
was a British conservative anyway, and being British conservative did not
require that one be anti-American. As she explains, physical proximity to the
United States, and a swelling American demographic in Upper Canada as waves
of settlers (by no means limited to Loyalists or even late Loyalists) migrated
north, makes a sweepingly oppositional view of relations difficult to sustain.
The moment of Britain’s defeat in the American Revolution was, to be sure, a
tense one for many Loyalists suddenly stranded in the States, a state of mind
suggested in part by their massive and headlong flight north. Being Loyalist
south of the border at that moment must, for many, have been like waking up in
a hostile eagle’s nest. Mackinnon (1995) relates the harrowing stories of New
England Loyalist women in particular who, without husbands and some with
children in tow, used their own wiles, devices, worldly wisdom and sometimes
guns to run whatever gauntlets lay between them and the Upper Canadian
frontier.45 Men could have it just as hard, as the father and family of Richard
Cartwright, Sr. did at home in Albany when in 1777, his son Richard Jr. was
discovered to be a Loyalist. Father negotiated for his son and niece to migrate
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Worth noting, as a footnote for now, that these same women then acquiesced where needed, and against
all evidence from their recent journeys, to prevailing models of conduct that associated women with
domestic work and with a sensibility best suited to life at home. As Mackinnon notes, this conspicuous
moment of agency, and the irony it held, was missed by British administrators and, until recently at least,
by mainstream histories of the era.
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north to British territory, where Richard Jr. became a leading entrepreneur, judge
in the court of common pleas, and member of Upper Canada’s first legislative
council. The taint to family left behind in Albany, however, soon resulted in
personal abuse against them, violence against their property, and finally their
removal under guard.46 It does not follow, though, that being Loyalist entailed a
complete split from everything and everyone they had known, from relatives
and friends to formative experiences in local, customary ways of life. It is worth
stressing a sense, as Gourlay (1822:10) does, in which these migrants were
“Americans who adhered to the royal cause” and “removed into Canada with
their families” (emphasis mine). Connections worked in the other direction too,
particularly in states that had adopted English common law as the basis of state
law (214).47
Early travelers through the region confirm this sense of political and social
complexity, and suggest not only that the province’s early population—the
“fabric” of Upper Canada—was substantially American, but that this worked
reasonably well overall. Traveling through Upper Canada in the mid to late
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See Rawlyk and Potter (2000), cited online on Feb. 25, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01e.php?&id_nbr=2315&&PHPSESSID=b0befejm13l846ufcflg1fg616.
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Patterson (2000) offers a contrasting picture of relations between Upper Canada and America. “At the
ideological level,” he writes, “politics were therefore characterized by the noisy opposition of a rhetoric of
republicanism and one of loyalty to government established by law, a conflict made the more intense by
threat of war with the United States.” (Cited online on March 1, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004119.01-e.php?BioId=37818.) The stress on politics, though, suggests that he talks mostly about opinions
and debates in the government. Even there, opposition to America and Americans was far from universal or
homogeneous in nature. In 1817, dissenters in the government of Francis Gore pushed to open the
international border once again to American immigration, and in Wise’s (2000) view, would have
succeeded if Gore hadn’t prorogued the legislative assembly at that moment. (Cited online on February 26,
2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=38587.)
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1790s, Isaac Weld relates the strong presence of American settlers to availability
of land:
In the United States, at present, it is impossible to get land without paying
for it; and in parts of the country where the soil is rich, and where some
settlements are already made, a tract of land, sufficient for a modern farm,
is scarcely to be procured under hundreds of dollars. In Canada, however,
a man has only to make application to the government, and on his taking
the oath of allegiance, he immediately gets one hundred acres of excellent
uncleared land, in the neighborhood of other settlements, gratis; and if
able to improve it directly, he can get even a larger quantity. (Weld
1799:235)48
Weld (loc. cit.) backs this up with at least a sense of statistics: “But it is a fact
worthy of notice…that great numbers of people from the States actually emigrate
to Canada annually, while none of the Canadians, who have it in their power to
dispose of their property, emigrate into the United States…” Robert Gourlay
supports this in his Statistical Account of Upper Canada. After estimating the total
population of the province at 76,984 at time of writing,49 he adds, “I have no data
for estimating the proportions of persons of different ages and sexes, or the exact
ratio of increase,” the latter being “affected by accessions from Europe and the
lower province, and still more from the United States.” As explanation for this
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This impression of costly land in the United States, and the premium associated with better land, also
comes across in Liancourt. Describing settlements along the road from Chippeway to New York, he writes:
“The houses, entirely built with logs, are better constructed, and more cleanly than in most other parts of
the United States.. The common price of land in this neighborhood is one pound, New York currency, or
two dollars and half an acre…. Peculiar circumstances, a favorable situation, more extensive buildings, etc.,
enhance the price.” (1799:224)
49
Gourlay adds that this number should not be relied upon as exact but can suffice as general information.
A footnote to that disclaimer adds that in 1806 one Mr. Heriot (probably George Heriot the artist and travel
writer) estimated the total population at 80,000.
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flux he evokes a sense of sheer opportunity awaiting anyone who decides to
emigrate:
A fair understanding of the real state of the country in respect to climate
and soil, the cheapness of land, the security of titles, the value of labour,
the lightness of taxes, and the protection of property, will, under the
continuance of a wise and liberal policy toward settlers, promote
emigrations, and accelerate the progress of population. (1822:140)
As to attitudes toward Americans, it depended on who got asked, and when,
but attitudes overall would be more hidden than revealed by an image of
rejection, bitter rivalry or other oppositional model. These had their moments,
particularly during cataclysms like during the War of 1812, and to a lesser extent
the rebellion of 1837. In the wake of war, provincial administration under
Lieutenant-Governor Gore supported an imperial ban on land grants to
Americans. But soon after the war, dissenters in the same administration thought
the ban should be lifted, and Gore had to prorogue the legislative assembly to
prevent it happening and also dismiss a legislative councilor who was granting
oaths of allegiance to prospective American settlers. In these examples and many
others, conflict over views of American attitudes was remote from the ground of
ordinary settlement: they occurred among the social elite in halls of government,
and they trafficked in ideology rather than individuals. Gore’s rigidity about
American settlers, Mealing (2000)50 observes, depended on a Toryism that was
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Cited online on March 1, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=38063.
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“conventional and unimaginative” in its utter incapacity to see any form of
dissent as legitimate.
Given Gore’s heavy-handedness here and the absolutism that drove it, Richard
Cartwright, Jr. offers a telling contrast case. As with Gore, Cartwright’s loyalty to
British government was immovable bedrock. Compared to Cartwright, though,
Gore’s loyalism seemed impervious to, and in that sense detached from people,
events and consequences on the ground. And maintaining that loyalty was a
practice that justified what could otherwise be considered shady means, as when
he intercepted mail of apparent dissenter Robert Thorpe and even bribed the
postmaster to pull this off (Mealing 2000).51 Cartwright, on the other hand, was
not merely connected to the world of people, places, geography, economics and
demographics, but thought primarily in terms of these. It didn’t make his
loyalism any less strict, but it allowed his thinking and politics to reflect specific
characteristics of Upper Canada, especially its contrast to the homeland overseas.
In a letter to Isaac Todd dated 1 October 1794, Cartwright reacts to charges by
colleagues in the legislative assembly that his opposition to the Marriage Act and
the Judicature Bill showed his disloyalty to Britain. In indignant but careful
language, he explains how Upper Canada’s demographics, scarce population,
vast territory, religious diversity52 and rudimentary infrastructure simply can’t
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Cited online on 1 March 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=38063.
One source of insinuation about Cartwright’s disloyalty was his criticism of the extensive privileges,
including better access to land grants, enjoyed by Anglicans (notably those constituting the Family
Compact) given a majority population committed to other faiths. Cartwright’s views would prove well
founded a few decades later, however, as resentment against the Compact grew violent. Although the
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support everything that was possible or sensible in Britain, and that merely
copying the homeland in every respect would only hurt the colony (1876:56-64).
His loyalism, as ardent as anyone’s, differed from Gore’s in being empirically
based, and thus in grasping that the best way to serve Britain’s plan for a sound
colony was to understand their differences. In a 16 June 1794 speech responding
directly to the Judicature Bill, he notes that the British parliament also expressly
condoned such understanding:
There is no maxim more incontestable in politics than that a government
should be formed for a country, and not a country strained and distorted
for the accommodation of a preconceived or speculative scheme of
government; that in all the several departments of it the arrangements
should be calculated for performing the business of the department in a
manner the least tedious and embarrassing to the public, rather than for
conferring splendour and emolument upon individuals…. And as the
British Legislature has left us unrestrained in everything that does not
militate with the constitution they have given us, I apprehend we are at
perfect liberty, in the present instance, to pursue this principle to its full
extent. (1876:67)
On the matter of American presence, however, even Cartwright, grounded and
empirical as he is, ends up tripping over his own prejudice. The following
excerpt comes from a letter, dated 23 August 1799, in which Cartwright explains
to the new Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, Peter Hunter, the problem
with American immigration to Upper Canada. First setting the scene, Cartwright

immediate causes of the 1837 Rebellion were complex, including economic hardship brought on by bad
harvests a few years earlier, and the cumulative immediacy of democratic ideals not only across the border
but within Upper Canada’s population, the discontent over second-class citizenry assigned to other
religions was one site where factions crystallized. It was no coincidence that one of the main fomenters of
the rebellion, William Lyon MacKenzie, was Scottish Presbyterian, a group that was not only among the
religiously disaffected, but whose principles included commitment to the separation of church and state.
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observes that while originally immigration was limited to proclaimed Loyalists,
Dorchester in 1788 opened this up to include “persons, who, although they had
not joined the Royal standard, were, however, well affected to the British
Government.” (1876:94). As a result,
…a great portion of the population of that part of the Province which extends
from the head of the Bay of Kenty upwards is composed of persons who have
evidently no claim to the appellation of Loyalists. I will not disguise from your
Excellency the opinion which I have always entertained, and on every proper
occasion expressed, that this ought never to have been permitted. (95)
But Cartwright finds plenty to admire about Americans.
It must be admitted that the Americans understood the mode of agriculture proper
for a new country better than any other people, and being, from necessity, in the
habit of providing with their own hands many things which in other countries the
artizan is always at hand to supply, they possess resources in themselves which
other people are usually strangers to; and boldly began their operations in a
wilderness, when the dreary novelty of the situation would appal an European.”
(96).
“But”, he goes on, “their political notions in general are as exceptionable as their
intelligence and hardihood are deserving of praise.” This is political, not
individual, he stresses: “I am not, however, inclined to impute to such of them as
emigrate to this Province either hostile or treacherous views.” That is, he will
impute it to ideas, but not to actual people: “It would be cruel and invidious to
point this to individual instances.” But then he calls this problem “a radical
disease which it would have been easier to prevent than it will be to cure.” Ideas
like pure loyalty can live in the abstract. So can a disease, perhaps, but only after
being identified—not just speculated about—in the flesh. Even an abstract
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disease first needs bodies to ravage—in this case, real disloyal Americans, not
just the idea of them (derived, ironically, from real people deserving of
substantial praise for their settlement practices). In any case, his solution to this
crisis of emigration, this disease-ridden exodus from the south, was to settle tried
and true Loyalists among these Americans, to have at hand proper sorts “who
have been bred up in habits of subordination, in sufficient numbers to
discountenance that affectation of equality so discernible in the manner of those
who come to us from the American republic.” (97)53
Cartwright’s unflinching loyalty to Britain, combined with his sensitivity to an
empirical ground ignored or perhaps invisible to some of his elite
contemporaries, makes him a telling figure here. He reveals the extent to which
even a fair minded, scrupulously honest, profoundly Loyalist (in a visionary
rather than merely stubborn sense), widely read, deeply principled, empirically
driven politician can nonetheless depend on ideas that blind him to awareness of
attitudes and distinctions within a settler population. This made it hard even for
him to judge settlers on their own merits and identities.
A basic difficulty for Cartwright, and also for analysts looking back from the
perspectives of today, is to find a workable balance between grounding in the
local and particular on one hand, and capacity to generalize in a way that
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The Scottish doctor and writer, John Howison, levels a similar blast against apparent dilution of British
hierarchy and order. “Many of the emigrants I saw had been on shore a few hours only, during their
passage between Montreal and Kingston, yet they had already acquired those absurd notions of
independence and equality, which are so deeply engrafted in the minds of the lowest individuals of the
American nation.” (1822:46-7)
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accounts for that particularity and grounding. In Cartwright’s case, a key
generalization was loyalty to British forms, ideals and principles, which he
imagined as necessary templates for a successful colony. For the colony to be
successful, however, templates and ideas needed the reality tests of exposure to
life on the ground in Upper Canada. They needed the local world to push back,
to bestow bruises, and thus teach administrators about differences between the
homeland and the colony.
One imagines a similar challenge for today’s analyst, who must find plausible
space between a narrative framed by canonical moments—acts of legislation,
dazzling political figures, decisive battles led by inspiring commanders, etc.—
and one where flow and coherence get hijacked by detail. Take abstraction and
generalization too far and particularity becomes token detail in the
implementation of analytical types, a fault leveled at anthropological theories
such as functionalism, structuralism, and in at least some of its incarnations,
practice theory as well. The charge might apply equally to the stubbornness of a
top down colonial administration whose vision of social and legal order, in being
cultivated abroad and also embedded in privilege, could be particularly resistant
to alternatives.54 Resist generalization too much, though, and description loses
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This was particularly true of the legislative council, whose seats were appointed by the LieutenantGovernor, for life, and inheritable to eldest sons—an ideal recipe for durable structures of privilege. Indeed,
this very structure of appointments to the legislative council, in duplicating various members also appointed
to the executive council, foreshadowed the Family Compact, a close-knit, York-based Tory oligarchy that
matured after the War of 1812. Note that not all scholars use the term, or even see it as viable. See Akenson
(1984) for a rigorous assessment of the term’s usefulness for the discipline of history. Among its problems
is disparate and confusing usage, and also its questionable explanatory power; as Akenson suggests, a
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itself in a kind of junkyard particularity, a flea market of observations whose
only organizing element is the physicality of the page they all end up on.55

useful term is not easily replaceable by another. The notion of family may also mislead, given that most
members of the Compact were not related by blood or marriage. On the other hand, these slippages of
meaning also make the term suggestive rather than precise, which might have its own uses—in evoking
centers rather than boundaries, rules and formal structures. There was a closeness among the eastern elite,
and also a compactness to the society even without a formal compact. Faulting the term for lack of
literalness would miss these more suggestive, figurative possibilities. For a look at how the term evolved,
see Brode (1984), especially 142ff.
55
Neither extreme is pure, of course. Even the grandest abstraction bumps into a world beyond,
in the sense used above—through readers and audiences, through increasing stresses of shifting
sensibilities about the world and ways of theorizing about it, and so on. On the other end, to the
degree that language itself is always metaphorical, a set of connections to words and ideas
beyond the immediate, particularity is never absolute.

92

Chapter 4
Provincial Guide Lines
Having devoted Chapter 3 to a selective historical overview of Upper Canada’s
formation, this chapter considers how its authorities imposed grids of social
order over the new province. Looking first at the Gazette56, we note some of its
strategies for regulating conduct among its audience, particularly given its status
as the province’s first newspaper and its role as official mouthpiece of the new
administration. In addition to frequent deployment of official proclamations,
moralizing anecdotes, and bits of prose and poetry on the theme of proper
behavior, the paper also regulated conduct indirectly through government
interventions that shaped its political slant and chose managing personnel, both
of which mobilized an assumption that proper conduct would follow from being
properly British. These strategies targeted a broad range of conduct, but we focus
here on three aspects: Christian morality, loyalty to Britain, and associations
between female conduct and domesticity, all of which become significant later in
appreciating a dwelling house.
Next, we consider land surveys, whose grid lines, largely insensitive to
physical geography, did not describe land but established a conceptual and
physical frame for the unfolding of settlers’ everyday lives. Thus was
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In 1807, the new printer, James Cameron, changed the name of the newspaper to York Gazette, which
lasted until a subsequent printer, Robert Charles Home, changed the name back in 1817. For more detail on
name changes, see Tobin (1993:25).
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reproduced, first in the abstract and then as immigrating bodies and social
relationships, a view of land as passive, something to shape, fill, improve, and
thereby own.
What I attempt throughout this chapter is, first, to evoke a sense that while the
organizing frameworks of prescriptions in the Gazette, and of survey and
boundary lines did not directly impose a notion of dwelling, they did reinforce
the ideological substrate on which dwelling was practiced. Recognizing this
substrate will help establish dwelling as a core moral practice, and the dwelling
house as a core moral place. Second, I build further toward a sense of
prescription and imposition as emergent contingencies of the moment rather
than the more straightforward, top-down forces that administrative agencies
apparently took them to be. Their worlds of prescription took shape against a
world beyond the prescriptive view, one that pushed back when pushed and
which thus gave the coherent structure of prescription its raison d’etre. Such
moments were among the frontiers noted in Chapter 2: As suggested in the
previous chapter, this “pushing back” ran oblique to formal order rather than
simply against it, which made success in organizing (against) it fragile and often
misguided rather than durable.
In part, these limits to control resulted from misperception: to the extent that a
prescriptive view of order, based in loyalty to Britain, tended to register
alternatives to that order as disloyalty (we saw this last chapter with charges of
disloyalty against Richard Cartwright), it missed many nuances about locality
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and, indeed, about the demographic constitution of the new province, which
featured diverse backgrounds, sensibilities, skills and loyalties. The complex
feedback this misperception produced helps illuminate a sense, suggested
earlier, in which inertia is movement. If the inertia of English traditions and ideas
was a kind of bedrock in setting up the new province, it is worth loading that
metaphor with the dynamism of its literal half: as always in motion, sometimes
explosively, through articulation along its myriad frontiers.57
4.1 Interrogating the Gazette
The task of measuring any aspect of the Gazette’s influence seems particularly
daunting. Administrative machinery of the new province, the particular
geometries rendered through survey, the mix of migrants that inhabited those
spaces, their diverse reasons for coming and staying, the presence of politically
contentious neighbors to the south, and the unpredictable, emergent, real world
traction between strong personalities (not least Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe),
were all uncharted waters, and chartable only as trace fossils. How does one
gauge the influence of a single entity amidst such profound sea change? The
present task is far more limited, fortunately. Beyond making a case for the

57

This admittedly cheap attempt to haul a title word into the conversation does help expose the limited
capacity of metaphor to excite new insights. In this case, “bedrock”, “articulation” and “frontier” all
conjure a sense of boundary that is a fact of analysis, not of nature. Zoom in closely and it becomes unclear
where the rock ends and interface begins; zoom in still further and a whole new domain opens up that
makes previous versions of boundary fuzzy and then wrongheaded. Defined in terms of boundary, bedrock
is thus a consequence of resolution. As with bedrock, one needs a coarser level of resolution to see English
traditions as having unambiguous edges—the level of a social class, for example, or a government
legislative institution, or a court system, or even an individual who gets stereotyped as a monolith incapable
of internal contradiction or capacity to adapt.

95
pervasive reach of the paper in early Upper Canada, my purpose is simply to
glimpse the kind of inertia just mentioned: moments when tradition and
prescription emerge as traction between divergent standpoints, habits, impulses
and interests, with consequences to all parties. It is in such moments of traction,
collected in these chapters and considered in aggregate, that the harmonics of
dwelling are constituted.
A benefit of focusing on early issues of the paper is relative visibility of
governmental purpose: through proclamations, speeches, official notices,
statements of laws and other government business, early issues of this
government publication were front-loaded with official standpoint about what
society was and how it was to be achieved. These basic legal, social and moral
building blocks would be especially clear in early issues for the same reason
structure is most obvious in the building stages of any endeavor, when not yet
obscured by facades, refinements and the blinding effects of established routines.
An example of this clarity, which we’ll study shortly, is Simcoe’s proclamation in
the inaugural issue, which charges the new population to uphold proper
conduct, and to be vigorous in addressing those who don’t. In view of this clarity
and urgent sense of moral purpose, the words in these issues are hardly what
Kesterton (1967:9), looking at the emergence of early newspapers in Canada,
characterizes as “a pallid, neutral, harmless sheet without any vital role to play in
the social and political life of the community.”
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Conspicuous lack of rival local papers no doubt enhanced this clarity of
purpose. Not only was the Gazette the first newspaper in Upper Canada, it
remained so until the appearance of the Kingston Gazette in 1810. Compared to
later years, especially the newspaper boom time starting in the 1920s, absence of
rivals ought to have translated into greater readership. It does not follow, of
course, that everyone was reading or even talking about this newspaper. There
were rivals—papers from Quebec, Albany, Philadelphia, Boston, and through
these, excerpts from papers overseas—but none of them were local.58
4.1.1 Assessing audience
A defining aspect of any paper, of course, is its audience. In the absence of
subscription lists, which might indicate names of subscribers and perhaps some
clue about their occupations or other demographic details, guesswork and
generalization become overextended in suggesting concretely whom the paper
reached in its early years.59 For the present purpose, however, which is to show a
serious attempt by the new government to reach a wide audience with its
moralizing publication, a good starting metric would be level of literacy at the
time. Although contents would not be limited to readers in an oral-based society,
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Ironically, what early issues of the Gazette were particularly short on was local news. And for news from
elsewhere, it depended almost entirely on other newspapers.
59
Even if one had a full list of subscribers, of course, it would not reflect actual numbers of people who
accessed the newspaper, since a single copy would disguise differences in sizes of household, and also a
practice, perhaps common, of passing copies among friends or acquaintances. Such a list would provide
merely a minimum number which actual readership could be assumed to exceed.
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literacy at least estimates the size of conduit through which literary contents
entered society.
Scholarship on colonial North America distinguishes two basic prongs of
literacy, namely reading and writing. As Monaghan (2006) observes, the two
were not merely different, but helped distinguish both gender and class given
that writing was usually taught only to boys, that it involved a substantial
apprenticeship (unlike reading, which could be taught at home), and that it thus
selected for gender in filling some of the most publicly respectable jobs. More
basically, notes Monaghan (404), it was a job-related skill whose gender-based
teaching supported a pervasive idea that girls were to be groomed for life at
home rather than out in public. Materials to teach writing, she adds (408), were
also relatively expensive and hard to find, which would have further entrenched
a gender divide where expensive resources in materials and tutelage for public
vocations were largely reserved for males.60 Monaghan and Saul (1987:88) point
out, moreover, that writing was really about penmanship rather than anything to
do with composition, which also sets it apart from notions of the “printed” word,
as one reads coming off the press at the office of the Gazette. So we must be clear,
first, that as far as perusing pages of the Gazette is concerned—as far as assessing
its “audience”—writing is irrelevant.
60

Monaghan further notes (406) that tutelage in writing sometimes, and increasingly into the 1700s,
included girls as well, but that gender distinction remained obvious. Also see Koehler (1980) for a general
discussion of associations between responsibility and power on one hand, and gender on the other, in 1600s
New England. Even given a rise in the admission of girls into some town schools, differentiation of schools
themselves helped resist change to the underlying gender role status quo. Schools that boasted tutelage in
Latin, which Monaghan calls the true hallmark of a grammar school, were tightly restricted to boys.

98
Regarding reading literacy, several basic difficulties challenge the use of
signatures and marks as measures of literacy and illiteracy, respectively. The
assumed importance of the signature in assessing capacity to read follows from
sequence of instruction: reading was always taught before writing, so it is argued
that any amount of writing, including a signature, presumes a fair grasp of
reading.61 With the mark, one senses that lack of more definite evidence relating
to reading ability has sometimes lead to hopeful over-interpretation. One
indication that the relation is at least uneven, and possibly quite misleading, is
that different studies that examine the use of marks for overlapping geographical
area come up with dramatically different results. Looking at a sample of three
thousand wills signed in colonial New England, Lockridge (1974) estimates that
from the mid 1600s to the late 1700s, male literacy rose from 60% to around 90%,
while female literacy, always lower, rose from 31% to only 46%. A study by
Auwers (1980) focuses more narrowly on Windsor, Connecticut but expands
source material to include deeds as well as wills, and shows that female literacy
during the same interval rose from 27% to about 90%--on a par with men. Brown
(1989:12), also looking at colonial New England, goes even further (though
without reference to hard numbers) in suggesting that by the late 1700s, virtually
all the Anglo-American population—men and women—were literate; by the
early nineteenth century, he says, “difference between male and female literacy
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For an overview of argument for and against the validity of signatures as measures of reading ability, see
Kaestle (1985).

99
rates became negligible”. Such discrepancy shows that estimates may depend
closely on the specific population being sampled, and also on the kind of
documents used: if wills may be skewed by loss of a steady hand with which to
write or by making the will before literacy got acquired later in life, deeds may
be skewed in the other direction if regular prosecution of deeds encourages
some, as Magnuson (1992:103) suggests may have been true of merchants and
craftspeople in Quebec, to learn rudimentary writing for purely business reasons.
Transacting a narrow bit of business, especially if routine, may not have required
or motivated full literacy, either reading or writing. There is a further danger,
suggested by the generalities of Brown’s language on one hand and the
concentrated availability of data in urban centers such as Boston on the other,
that urban data gets used to represent much broader areas, including hinterlands
that had far fewer schools and, as a result, fewer opportunities for girls in
particular.62 Boston, by comparison, would have been ahead of most curves in
New England.
Another challenge to using the mark as indicator of reading literacy,
demonstrated for England of the seventeenth century by Spufford (1981) and of
the eighteenth century by Nueberg (1971), is that many women who made their
mark (or chose to) could, indeed, read—popular fiction at any rate. This raises
yet another issue with estimating literacy. As Davidson (1986:59) observes, one
62

In Boston, for example, private tutors were readily available to teach writing to girls after usual business
hours. Such opportunity, Monaghan (409) notes, would have been far less common or absent altogether in
the hinterland, where even elevated social class could not have pulled a tutor from a hat.
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must understand reading literacy not as something one has or lacks, but as
something that can be acquired to many different degrees: being competent
enough to read community postings about events, sales and runaways, or even
popular fiction, does not mean the average person could read the treatises of
John Locke.
Beyond these general problems in estimating literacy are problems specific to
populating a new province with migrants from multiple directions. One major
source of influx to the region, especially after the American Revolution, were
Loyalists from New England, for which previously mentioned estimates, if
vague, are at least germane. Another population source, invited in modest
droves during the first years of the new province, was areas of Quebec that
became Lower Canada. Literacy estimates once again depend heavily on urban
data, mainly the use of signatures or marks in marriage registers. From that data,
Magnuson (1992) suggests that by 1750, with few exceptions, all professionals,
administrators, civil servants and military officers were literate; that artisan
classes, for whom literacy was less critical, measured over 50%; and that the
lowest classes—“commoners” is his word, which he associates mostly with rural
parishes—had almost no ability to read or write. He notes that literacy varied
also by gender—a detail that goes unelaborated in his study but is reflected,
perhaps, in the singling out of “male” occupations for literacy tests.
Another source of immigration to Upper Canada was Ireland, heavier in the
later 1700s, and especially after the 1798 uprising. On one hand, Fallon (2005)
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notes an explosion of printing presses and publications in Ireland after 1750, and
a concomitant rise in general literacy. Once again, however, literacy was uneven
between urban and rural areas and between classes, and the political hardship,
food shortages and high rents that many immigrants left behind, as well as the
loathsomely poor conditions and oppression they assumed at the other end,
suggests that immigrants during this time may have represented the lower end
of a general literacy statistic.
Reading literacy between and among waves of immigration to Upper Canada,
then, potentially varied to extremes. This adds to the difficulty of attempting
hard estimates of literacy in any place, which soon founder on intervening
uncertainties, from how to interpret a signature or mark, to questions about how
specific waves connected back to educational circumstances and opportunities
back home. But the discussion is sufficient nonetheless to grant that literacy,
while varied, was both considerable and on the rise, particularly in larger
population areas that the Gazette would have targeted. It must have been above
the province-wide average in the early years in both York and Newark, the early
homes of the Gazette printing office: not only were these the two main urban
centers, but there was a predominance, Hulse (1993:v) notes, of government and
military officers and their families to precisely these towns. We have seen that
such people were likely literate, no matter where they came from.
Another aspect of reception, noted in passing earlier, distinguishes between
readership, narrowly taken to mean those who are literate and read the paper,
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and audience, which includes those who read but also those who received
contents by word of mouth. A community where illiteracy may still have been
common, and which in the early years probably had limited access to printed
materials, would have depended significantly on the oral transmission of
information.63 And yet, perhaps Stabile (2002:11) overstates this in her attempt to
put early newspapers in perspective:
Such colonial towns were characterized by a strong oral culture.
Information was shared in face-to-face encounters at common meeting
places, such as assemblies, the market, the church, and the courts. In such
an environment, the newspaper was of marginal importance for the
transmission of information.
Perhaps the relationship between orality and early issues of the Gazette was more
synergistic than this passage portrays. Mandate as government mouthpiece was
one aspect of this synergism: the paper existed to reach as wide an audience as
possible, and especially in a strongly oral society64 this would not have been
restricted to the literate, but passed along through established networks of
information exchange. Indeed, the inaugural proclamation makes explicit use of
such networks in commanding
…that this Proclamation be publickly read in all Courts of Justice, on the
first day of every Session to be held in the course of the present year, and
63

For discussions of oral culture legacies, see Brown (1989) and Stabile (2002). On cognitive shifts
entailed in the acquisition of literacy and writing in particular, see Ong (1997), Havelock (1963), Chartier
(1989), and Eisenstein (2006).
64
The underlying assumption is that oral habits do not end with arrival of printed content and a capacity to
read it, any more than residential pattern gets fixed by removal to so-called sedentary land. (Will cite
Darnell’s accordion model—reference in a binder elsewhere this moment.) Aligning with the latter
example, I would suggest that apparent emphasis on written forms in our own mainstream society gets
dramatically overplayed.
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more especially in such of His Majesty’s Courts, as have the Cognizance of
Crimes and Offences; recommending the same, to all Christian Ministers
of every denomination, to cause the same Proclamation to be read four
times in the said year, immediately after Divine Service, in all places of
Public Worship… (Gazette, April 18, 1793)
Illiteracy was not a bar: illiterate members of every congregation would hear the
document read multiple times from the pulpit, as would anyone attending court.
With limited choices for reading material beyond a Bible,65 a new newspaper
was gold to the literate, both for its content (apart from government notices, it
became a main source of intelligence about events overseas) and for the sheer
pleasure that savoring written words could indulge. As Stabile observes
(2002:86;90-91), eagerness for news tended to prompt close reading from the first
word of a newspaper to the last. Monaghan (2006:410) echoes this view: “we
should not underestimate the pleasure that even a limited reading ability can
bring.”66 But the sudden appearance of a first newspaper would not rewrite
overnight the social conventions of a time-tried orality; surely, the contents of a
first newspaper became topics of everyday conversation too, to an extent not
strictly or even closely tied to literacy.

65

Chief among these were the hornbook (a flat piece of wood covered with a page showing the alphabet,
elementary syllables, and often a prayer, covered in turn by a transparent sheet of protective horn), and a
psaltery (book of psalms), which were studied in that order on the way to reading literacy. After the
psaltery, one studied the New Testament, and finally the entire Bible. Where this sequence of readings
formed the core of reading instruction, one must understand reading as inseparable from religious
education: to be a literate reader meant to be versed in Scripture. This inseparability of reading and religion
puts the emphasis on Christian virtue in Simcoe’s Proclamation into perspective.
66
She stresses this for colonial women in particular: “reading must have provided one of the very few
sources of satisfaction that was not dependent upon others.” In most of her roles, Monaghan argues, a
woman’s role was to look out for the welfare of others.
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And that is the main point here: although hard numbers on literacy are
speculative to the point of irrelevance, it seems fair to conclude that reading
literacy in early Upper Canada was considerable, for men and women,
particularly in urban centers such as Newark and York; that it was on the rise;
and that contents in the gazette spread well beyond the literate in any case. As a
venue for solidifying a unifying, coherent notion of proper conduct at the front
lines of diversity and difference, the Gazette had the promise of considerable
reach into the population.
4.1.2 Overview of the Gazette
With only a few gaps in publication, most notably during the War of 1812
when American forces occupied York, the Gazette ran from 18 April 1793, when it
first came off the press in Newark, until 7 April 1849, when the last printer,
Robert Watson, died in a Toronto fire while trying to rescue type from the
printing office.67 Soon-to-be Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe first stated
his plans for the paper in a letter to Henry Dundas of the colonial office, in which
he laid out seventeen requirements for his upcoming duties in the new colony.
Establishing a king’s printer was number ten:
67

For a physical description of the newspaper, including size, pages, type face, format, and a general
survey of contents by placement in the paper and percentage of space it occupied, see Stabile (2002:82ff).
Generally meticulous in her details, Stabile suggests that one quirk in the paper was the location of local
news, which she says comes early in the paper, immediately after the second masthead. At the paper’s
inception and generally for the first few years, local news came near the end immediately following a
heading called “Niagara”. Occasionally though, it moves earlier in the paper, and this oscillation is never
explained by the editor. Placement at the end, as well as the relatively small size allotted to local affairs,
may be another hint at the depth of oral practice: in a society that privileged face-to-face, local news would
be old by the time it hit print. Appropriately, it was news from further afield, beyond the expedience of talk,
that occupied most of the news.
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The Office of Printer seems to be of the utmost importance. It has been
suggested to me that by annexing the Office of Post Master to that of
Printer a sufficient Salary may be annexed to induce some person to
expatriate ... But a printer is indispensably necessary; and tho' many may
be found to rush into crowded cities, 1 see no likelihood that any Person
will venture into a Wilderness and yet in the Infancy of this Establishment
He will be found to be of the utmost Utility.68
One of the primary duties of such a printer would be circulation of an official
newspaper through which the new administration would publicize laws, notices,
proclamations and other government business.69 But the full original title of the
newspaper, the Upper Canada Gazette, or American Oracle, reflects a paper that did
double duty as a source of non-government news as well, which got printed at
the government-supervised discretion of the printer. In a nutshell, other news
could be printed if there was room after providing for government needs, and if
it was not anti-British. An introduction from Louis Roy, the first of many printers
for the newspaper, gives a sense of this scope in a column on the last page of the
inaugural issue:
The Editor of this News Paper, respectfully informs the Public, that the
flattering prospect which he has of an extensive sale for his new
undertaking, has enabled him to augment the size originally proposed
from a Demy Quarto to a Folio.
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Letter from John Graves Simcoe to Henry Dundas, 12 August 1791. In Cruikshank, The Correspondence
of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe 1:43, 48.
69
This official function of the Upper Canada Gazette continues today as the Official Notices Publication
Act, which authorizes The Ontario Gazette as the official and mandatory mouthpiece for “a) all
proclamations issued by the Lieutenant Governor; b) all notices, orders, regulations and other documents
relating to matters within the authority of the Legislature that requires publication; and c) all
advertisements, notices and publications that are required to be given by the Crown or by any ministry of
the Government of Ontario, or by any public authority, or by any officer or person. R.S.O 1990, c.0.3, s.2”
Cited online 1 August 2010 at: http://www.elaws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90o03_e.htm
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The encouragement he has met, will call forth every exertion he is
master of, so as to render the paper useful entertaining and instructive, he
will be very happy in being favoured with such communications as may
contribute to the information of the public, from those who shall be
disposed to assist him, and in particular shall be highly flattered in
becoming the Vehicle of Intelligence in this growing Province, of whatever
may tend to its internal benefit and common advantage. In order to
preserve the Veracity of his paper, which will be the first object of his
attention, it will be requisite that all transactions of a domestic nature,
such as Deaths, Marriages, &c. be communicated under real signatures
This sounds fairly open, but we’ll see momentarily what happens when the
intelligence this paper flatters itself to report casts the slightest aspersion on
anything British.
Before turning to more specific issues of conduct, it is worth a pause to
contemplate the movement of news at the time, so tough to imagine from the
view of getting impatient when an internet link takes an extra few seconds to
load. But then, they were actually used to letters and news taking a month or
three to cross the Atlantic, plus extra time to go overland, plus still more time to
set a printer and produce copies before spending even more time to deliver
them. Just to put that general image into hard numbers, the following list
compares the date of publication for an issue of the Gazette, and the original date
of publication for news borrowed and reprinted from another newspaper.
Gazette publication date

Source publication date

May 2

February 23, Philadelphia
February 15, New York
March 2, Virginia
March 28, Quebec

May 16

December 17, London
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February 7, London
November 19, London
June 13

May 20, Philadelphia
May 7, Philadelphia
March 16, London
May 16, Quebec

July 4

June 13, Albany
April 1-6, unsourced
April 4, letter from “Lisle”

These are typical delays for news from afar: news from south of the border takes
a month or more on average, and never much less, while news from overseas
adds at least a month. These delays are often compounded, of course, as the
paper one borrows from borrowed it in turn from a previous source. One article
in the May 16 issue of the Gazette credits an extract from a New York paper of
April 8, which dates the story in turn back to January 22. The May 2 issue credits
a New York paper dated February 15, for a story first put into print on December
15. And so on. The surface-level surprise with timing is local news, which is
almost always dated the same day as publication of the current Gazette. This
seems to be merely conventional, however, and not a measure of how quickly a
printer could speed through the laborious process of type-setting.

4.1.3 Matters of conduct
Returning now to the explicit, government-sanctioned purpose of the Gazette, a
key function of the paper was to provide guidance in Christian morality.
Inaugural readers could have no doubt of this, given the “Proclamation for the
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Suppression of Vice, Profaneness and Immorality”70 which covered half of the
first page of the first issue (and several issues following). The proclamation, and
by extension the paper, intended to set the bar for moral conduct in the province
by
causing all Laws made against Blasphemy, Profaneness, Adultery,
Fornication, Polygamy, Incest, Profanation of the Lords Day, Swearing
and Drunkeness, to be strictly put in Execution in every part of the
Province.
Only by having in mind the Manual’s (387) declaration that Christianity is part
and parcel of the law of England, and also the interdependence of Christian texts
and literacy, does one appreciate the force of this statement. Breaking these laws
of the land was also an assault against God, whether one was literate or not. The
web of connections between secular acts, religious overtones and English laws
would seem to be reinforced by figuring in the religious rigors of acquiring
literacy through Christian texts. To the extent that readers would relish every
single word, as Stabile suggests, enunciation of these violations may have
sounded more like warnings than prescriptions.
Those enforcing these laws, moreover, while not themselves pretenders to
divinity, become agents of God when human law acquires both God’s
endorsement and alignment with God’s purpose. This heady combination of
God’s purpose and God’s agents ought to manifest as minimal violations of the
law, or failing that, as efficient material and governmental force that violations
70
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would mobilize. But in Chapter 3 we saw it manifest as Bartholomew Tench
instead, who could hardly have been less effective at imposing anything, or even
at communicating across differences of status, official role, religion, and the
pesky legacy of English-Irish relations. Apart from status, which enforcement
was supposed to enable, not inhibit, none of these elements were scripted to have
anything to do with doing one’s job as magistrate, which suggests a serious
oversight with the script. Basically, it ran into a real world, and that world
pushed back. And for all real-world people, from Tench to Joel Skinner to the
higher-ups forced into damage control, this was frontier morality. On the
frontiers between different people—in the traction one might describe, always
slightly after the fact, as issues, quarrels, obstinacy, confusion, or even moments
of agreement—morality (or other dimensions of conduct) isn’t the stable,
impervious, safe space of an abstracted system of thought, but its confrontations
with people and situations that upset perfection enough for one to notice.
Morality is struggle, not complacence. What deflected the struggle between
Tench and Skinner the way it unfolded was not merely the bald fact of
concreteness, though, but the tenacity with which Tench in particular stuck to his
idealized model and overlooked contingency. That is to say, Tench’s was also an
impossible task, a consequence of sending a real person out to do an ideal
person’s job. Ideals never account for messiness, the kind of messy, street-level
differences Tench ran into. As long as he stuck to that ideal job, he was bound to
fail.
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To take another example of conduct, this one more directly about loyalty to
Britain,71 consider again the introduction by Louis Roy, the first printer at the
Gazette office, in the inaugural issue. Specifically, he states his hope that the
paper may become “the Vehicle of Intelligence in this growing Province, of
whatever may tend to its internal benefit and common advantage.” Internal
benefit and common advantage, read through the government eyes monitoring
this paper, meant loyal to Britain or at least in no way disparaging of it. This
implicit mandate is evident on one hand in letters from the lieutenant-governor’s
office to subsequent printers who strayed, and also, when push frequently came
to shove, in preferring an untrained printer who was loyal over a trained one
whose loyalties were suspect. An example of the former is a letter to Gazette
printer Gideon Tiffany from E. A. Littlehales, Simcoe’s secretary, expressing
concern for the paper’s political tone. Tiffany is therein advised that “your own
good sense and discretion in a variety of intelligence would induce you to prefer
that, if it appears to be true, which is most favorable to the British government.”
In case that hint was missed, Littlehales adds, “You may depend upon it that
while you act uprightly and industriously, you will meet with His Excellency’s
support”.72 Working relations only got worse,73 and Tiffany received further

Everything overlaps not far below the surfaces of difference, though.
Littlehales to Tiffany, April 1795. In Cruikshank, Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves
Simcoe, vol.3, p.346.
73
On December 14, 1796, Tiffany inaugurated the “letter to the editor”, where he lamented how travelers
through Upper Canada found its roads “the worst in the world”. And in the November 9, 1796 issue, while
it was not directly anti-British, Tiffany’s enthusiasm for American settlement progress, and Upper
71
72
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reprimands until 1797 when, perhaps serendipitously, he got removed after a
court conviction rendered him ineligible for public office. Frustrated with a
printer playing too loose with the paper’s mandate and its role as a vehicle for
Upper Canada, the lieutenant governor hired one Titus Simons, who could claim
no experience but whose loyalty could be trusted because he was a trained
soldier and the son of a Loyalist. Tobin (1993:9) notes, as a further preventative
measure in wake of the Tiffanys, the Executive Council seized more direct
control of how government content got presented, notably by moving
proclamations and other issuances from the lieutenant-governor’s office back to
the first page, where it had been in the early issues.
As with the blowup between Tench and Skinner, the way to understand these
confrontations between the Tiffanys and the Lieutenant-Governor’s office is that
loyalty, as anything measurable or perceptible, was the traction of individuals in
the midst of argument. It didn’t have to be argument, of course, but it was, and it
had to be something noticeable. Loyalty is decisiveness, not blandness or the
invisibility of someone so consonant with a canon that no one sees. Loyalty, as an
issue, had to be made issue of, one way or other. Also as with Tench versus
Skinner, what propelled this issue of loyalty along was misperception of one side
by the other. In Littlehales’ 1796 letter to Gideon Tiffany, reprimanding him for
even thinking of starting up a second, monthly paper on his own—for being

Canada’s status as “an infant settlement” by comparison, is just the kind of slant that put hives of bees in
the bonnets of British officials.
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independent minded—one cannot escape a sense that Tiffany had meant the
proposal very differently than Littlehales heard it.
In reply to your request relative to the publication of a Monthly Magazine, I am to
observe it of the greatest importance that the Provincial Statutes should be printed
and promulgated; in consequence of which, your whole attention is to be devoted
to this most necessary object in conformity to the instructions of the 12th of
November delivered to you by Mr. Clark…. His Excellency is much surprised in
seeing an advertisement in the late Gazette you published respecting the scarcity
of paper in Albany. I am therefore to signify to you, that in future, you must
procure paper from Montreal, as you will not be permitted to get it from the
United States.74
Given that Tiffany thought to write and ask about the project before proceeding,
he does not appear secretive or scheming against his bosses, whether one defines
them as individuals named Simcoe and Littlehales or the abstract institutions of
British colonialism. Neither, judging from his ad in the Gazette, was he secretive
about where he procured paper. He was apparently being pragmatic at a local
level, and creative with his energy, which got understood as some willfulness
against the colonial project. This grip between individuals skew to each other,
what Sahlins might have called a poorly working misunderstanding, was the
dynamic that drove matters onward, and eventually, as Tiffany started to dig in,
toward his dismissal from the job.
4.2 On female conduct
Discussions have already shown that prescriptions about conduct, such as a
proclamation about the suppression of vice and immorality or the feeble
Littlehales to Tiffany, 15 February, 1796. In Cruikshank, Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John
Graves Simcoe, vol.4, p.196.
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enforcements of a magistrate intent on stopping work on the Sabbath, point to a
much wider, messier world than imagined in the tidy ideas of a self-serving elite
class. This disparity between neat models and a complex and often unruly world
finds no exception in constructions of gender: on one hand, female gender was in
the midst of reconfiguration as part of a new delineation of public versus private,
and as part of this shift, women also found themselves granted innate moral
superiority that must be protected—in no small part by the walls of a dwelling
house. On the other hand, a bounty of evidence in the Gazette, from notices of
elopement to outcry over a widow remarrying too soon to daring jokes about
prostitution, make it impossible to imagine a society of well-heeled Sundayschool girls and matrons. The paper’s prescriptive wisdom spoke for some
women and to others, some of whom apparently had better things to do than
listen.
Morgan (1996:8-11) says much the same in carving out her study of gendered
language in Upper Canada. Notions of male and female, she notes, were neither
monolithic nor static but actively and unevenly contested. But it should also not
be dismissed as merely political. The collected tropes of separate spheres, for all
their monolithic hegemony, “were not just intriguing literary devices but were
instead strategies whereby relations of power were produced” (10). To assign
fault to inherent gender asymmetries in those relations of power would be to
ignore “men and women of particular socioeconomic, religious, racial and ethnic
backgrounds . . . division of society along the lines of public and private was an
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important conceptual framework” (10). For many men and women, in other
words, relatively monolithic division of society into public and private made
sense, gave a baseline for everyday life.
Using a few examples from the Gazette, my point is to note the prominence of
that view, and to note that while it was strategic rhetoric of power, it also
genuinely informed the lives of many. At the same time, it smacks of wayward
presences that gave the push to conformity traction, made it visible and
necessary.
On the well-heeled side, the December 14, 1796 issue laments the passing of a
true exemplar of conduct, one Mrs. Hamilton who possessed qualities that
marked her “a patron to her sex, endeared her as a wife, a mother, daughter,
sister, friend; and all to whom she was thus relate, knew well the affection and
diligence with which she discharged their several duties.” Two weeks earlier, on
November 30, a poem targets the younger woman for whom Mrs. Hamilton
served as an ideal. Charting a course into the future, the poem compares
morality and purity to images of lilies and roses, and their loss to decay,
repulsion and debasement. The image comes as a nice supplement to October of
that year, where a separate section on “Subjects for the consideration of ladies”
stresses delicacy of comportment, and also bashfulness—especially potent when
leavened with modesty.
Consistent with the rise during this time of conduct literature devoted to
women, and the eclipsing of counterparts aimed at men, the Gazette has precious

115
few entries on male conduct specifically. The following advice, from the April 5,
1797 issue, is characteristic of those that do: “Military skill and prowess have
their honor, as well as use, and the laurels, gathered in the field of battle, have
been thought to compose the fairest crown that can adorn the head of man.” The
author goes on to celebrate the true greatness of self-command, calling it
…a road to glory that lies open to all. For tho’ it be not in every one’s
power to ascent the slippery steep of honor, and reach the summit of a
statesman’s or a hero’s fame; yet all may figure in the less splendid, but
more substantial virtues of the Christian, and the man who cannot rule
another’s spirit, may secure the far nobler attainment of the two, I mean,
that of ruling his own
The passage, perhaps having a little cake and eating it too, simultaneously exalts
the place of a public statesman and a brave, violent hero through reference to
laurels, fairest crowns and slippery steeps, while calling self-mastery the greatest
virtue of all. This mastery is not embroidered with fine distinctions like delicacy,
bashfulness, modesty, never mind lilies or roses, which perhaps fits the
encompassing role of that mastery as head of a household too. It is in another
address to women, dated March 24, 1798, that refinements of male character get
spelled out:
The Young Lady’s Choice
Let the bold youth, who aims to win me, know,
I hate a fool, a clown, a sot, a beau:
I loath a sloven, I despise a cit,
I scorn a coxcomb, and I fear a wit.
Let him be gentle, brave, good-humored, gay;
Let him, in smaller things, with pride obey;
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Yet wise enough in great ones to command—
Produce me but the youth, and here’s my hand.
She is thus channeled toward her ideal event of marriage by identifying ideals in
a man. A gendered difference of implicature is telling: he gets told what to do if
he wants her hand; it is merely assumed, as the unsaid (and unquestioned)
foundation of what does get said, that she is to marry. This difference of voice,
the one active, the other passive, is perhaps augmented further given that the
author of the poem is male.
Counter examples are striking both as glaring presences when they occur, and
for the consistency of their negative image. In notices of elopement, it is difficult
to fathom just how the words were read in the day—perhaps it reads too much
into a vastly different society to judge both parties as coming off badly. Surely
though, given the explicit moral mandate of the newspaper, one does not find a
‘patron to her sex’ in reading,
Elopement! Whereas Deborah my wife, eloped from my bed and board,
and improperly resides with Charles Wilson, of this town inn-keeper, and
refuses to return to the duties of her family; all persons are therefore
strictly forbidden harboring or trusting her, as I will pay no debt that she
may contract or occasion. Signed, Daniel Buchner
These notices—and they abound—occur in the advertising section of the paper,
so they are not mandate in the same sense that body text might be. But we
observed in the exchanges between Tiffany and Littlehales that the government
did monitor content closely, including Tiffany’s ad for paper from the wrong
source.
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These few examples, which can be supplemented by others throughout the
early Gazette, are sufficient to show the basic tone behind constructions of proper
female conduct. They existed, in positive and negative forms, as advice, anecdote
and poetry, for the same reason Simcoe’s proclamation did: it was needed, not
because that is how women consistently were, but in an effort to make them that
way.
4.3 Survey as settlement
Inscribing survey lines on the land did not, directly at least, make someone
Christian, or moral, or female or male, or define their activity as domestic or
public. They did not condemn burglars to the gallows or equate women with the
home. But the deeper point of this chapter is that organizing frames intended for
one narrow purpose resonate elsewhere, and thus help solidify categories of
thought shared among different social activities and spaces. Or as Morgan
(1996:11) notes about gender, “Even when . . . concepts of power are not
‘literally’ about gender, as in the areas of politics, diplomacy, and the military,
notions of masculinity and femininity structure perceptions and become
‘implicated in the conception and construction of power itself’.” Boundary lines
delimiting a settlement ghost onto the boundary separating society from
wilderness and human from beast. The logic of containment implicit in survey
lines, which first delimit and then subdivide, thus facilitate contrasts between
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public and private, inner and outer, own lot versus other, home district versus
others, and home province and nation versus foreign.
4.3.1 David Smyth
Turning to surveys themselves, the following map was produced in 1799 by
David Smyth, the first Surveyor General of Upper Canada.

A Map of the Province of Upper Canada, David Smyth, 1800

Figure 1. Map of the province of Upper Canada, David Smith, 1800
Cited online on 17 April 2011 at:
http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~4040~330018:A-Map-of-theProvince-of-Upper-Cana.
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One salient feature of this map is the array of straight lines and ninety-degree
angles, two things not found in any natural landscape. By definition, therefore,
these lines neither describe nor respond to the physical features a surveyor
encounters. As with ink on paper, they impose structure on the blank canvas of
geographical space, within which places have yet to be eked out. It is abstraction,
not geography on the ground, which has agency. This assignment of agency is
even more overt in the written description that accompanied the map, Smyth’s A
Short Topographical Description of His Majesty’s Province of Upper Canada in North
America (hereafter Topographical Description). The work opens with a quote from
the Constitution Act of 1791, which set boundaries for the new province of
Upper Canada by establishing
…the following line of division…To commence at a stone boundary on the
north bank of the lake St. Francis, at the cove west of Pointe au Bodêt, in
the limit between the township of Lancaster and the seigneury of New
Longueiul, running along the said limit in the direction of north 34
degrees west, to the westernmost angle of the said seigneury of New
Longueiul; then along the north-western boundary of the siegneury of
Vaudreïul, running north 25 degrees east, until it strikes the boundary line
of Hudson’s Bay, including all the territory to the westward and
southward of the said line… (Smyth 1799:1-2)
It is the abstract line, not the landscape, which gets the active voice throughout.
The line runs, and runs along, and even more emphatically, strikes. Indeed, the
thing it strikes—which thus acquires the ontology needed to receive a strike—is
another abstract boundary line. This pattern of animating geometrical abstraction
continues in Smyth’s own words as he describes a new province

120

bounded to the eastward by the United States of America; that is, by a line
from the 45th degree of north latitude, along the middle of the river
Iroquois or Cataraqui, into lake Ontario; through the middle likewise,
until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and lake
Erie; thence along the middle of the communication into lake Erie;
through the middle of that lake, until it arrives at the water
communication between it and lake Huron… (1799:2-3)
So the description goes, continuing beyond this quoted passage until the
province is fully bounded. In the above quote, the expanse of land and landscape
defining the new province is once again passive, bounded by a line whose active
voice continues through the various lakes and rivers, striking and arriving as it
goes. Where in the previous quotation this line struck another line, here it strikes
a communication by water—a laborious phrase for river. In this moment, a
specified, located physical feature of landscape gets identified through its
subjugation to abstraction, which uses not only a juxtaposition of passive and
active voice, but also, again, the force of the word strike.
Where these boundary lines do not strike, meet or arrive at lakes, rivers or
Hudson’s Bay, they extend overland with utter disregard for features on the
ground. To the north, for example, the province is bounded by “the 49th parallel
of north latitude, extending due west, indefinitely” (3). The category of
indefiniteness, no less than the formal purity of a line of latitude, treats landscape
as a blank, like a piece of paper. Tellingly, the only spot on this definitive
circumnavigation of the province where the surveyor’s abstractions do bow to
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local overland features is when they run into seigneuries near Pointe au Bodêt.
Describing and acquiescing to previous settlement logic, Smyth observes:
The object of dividing the province of Quebec at a stone boundary, in the
cove, west of this point, was apparently in order that the seigniorial
grants, under French tenure, should be comprehended in the province of
Lower Canada, and that the new seigniories or townships, which were
laid out for the loyalists, should be within the province of Upper Canada;
the said stone boundary being the limit between the uppermost French
seigniory (Mr. De Longueiul’s) n the river St. Lawrence, and the lower
new seigniory of Lancaster… (1799:6)
Consistent with the logic of settlement and laws of property based on
improvement, it is not wilderness, but transformation of landscape through
human labor, that produces a capacity for land to push back. Here, it pushes to
the point of sending a survey marker out into the cove.
Perhaps one shouldn’t make too much of these metaphors, for surely even
surveyors, to say nothing of those toiling to carve settlement from a wilderness
lot, would bump up against the physical conditions of a landscape. Settlers and
administrators may be driven by ideology, but that doesn’t mean blind: no one
following a line would fail to notice themselves walking into a marsh, or off a
cliff and into Hudson’s Bay. In this sense the land does push back; indeed,
several of these “lines”, such as the banks of a lake or edges of a bay, do
correspond to the landscape. But these metaphors that animate the abstract do
deserve notice. First, this pattern of rendering abstraction active and landscape
passive is part of a deployment of resources, including everything from people,
money and institutions to writing materials and language, specifically intended
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to make and administer land as property. If theoretical strains of the last few
decades have generally debunked any notion of innocent language, the point is
especially clear when patterns of language overtly mimic the logic underlying
settlement and property: a basic argument of this dissertation is that ideology
gets entrenched as much through harmonics as by institutional formulations and
their administration.
Another aspect of this description and the acts of surveying and settling it
implicates is its stress on containment. The new province was constructed,
literally, from the outside in. The Constitution Act of 1791 begins by setting the
boundaries of Upper Canada before addressing internal divisions. Further
divisions, such as the renaming of districts and creation of counties in 1792, were
later developments. Smyth’s topographical description, as we saw, mirrors this
chronology by setting the frame first and then moving to internal features. In
volume 1 of his Statistical Account of Upper Canada, Gourlay presumes the same
frame by insisting: “In sketching the Geography of the province, the first object is
to ascertain its Boundaries” (1822:17). Natural as may seem this idea of
establishing a perimeter (of a place, of a discussion, of an artistic canvas) before
getting into details, it is certainly not the only way to imagine or encounter land,
or to manage coexistence among different societies. Native groups had done
without these abstract divisions for centuries, and even today, land negotiations
between Native groups and the mainstream government often run aground on
precisely this issue of how land is framed: as a blank sheet to be overlain with a
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conceptual grid imported from somewhere else, and then transformed into
something useful and valuable; or as something where decisions about land use
derive from accumulated experience in and stories about that (rather than any
other) place. A corollary, appropriate to the present discussion about early
surveys in Upper Canada, is that even land that is imagined and constructed as
empty, or as wilderness whose value resides in transforming it, is first of all
made, and made in place. Although vitally connected to a legacy of experience
overseas and in other colonies, Emptiness, and the abstractions—survey lines,
lines of latitude, ninety-degree angles, rectangles, arpents, feet, lots, townships,
districts—used to define, bound, and then fill a blank sheet is not a contrast to
place but a specific practice of place. It is the concrete engagements of and in land
that activate, make manifest, and to a degree reproduce the prior experience of
land for the newcomers.
4.4 Preliminary sense of domestic
As a segue into the next chapter, it will help to gain a basic sense of what
domesticity means. Despite careful parsing of a dwelling house in the Manual’s
definition of burglary, which we visit in the next chapter, that source offers only
a fuzzy notion of “domestic”, and it must be inferred rather than read more
directly. But the resulting approximation of physical and social space is a place to
start: it provides something to expand later through a look at conduct literature.
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In defining a dwelling house for the crime of burglary, the Manual uses the
word “domestic” (the only variation of the word) just once, stating that
“…though a person actually sleep in the house for the purpose of protecting it, if
such person forms no part of the domestic family of the owner” (1835:85), then it
is not a dwelling house. We saw last chapter that sleeping in a house or room
had the capacity to transform it from a space that is merely owned or rented into
a dwelling house. But this passage says that only family members (not defined)
have this transformative capacity. This clarification in the Manual is part of a
scenario where the owner of a house has moved in furniture with the intention of
residing there, and has even taken meals and conducted “all the purposes of his
business” there. It remains just a house, however, and not a dwelling house, as
long as “neither he nor any of his family ever sleep there” (85). Domestic is thus
aligned squarely with family, at least the sense of family relevant to the space of
a dwelling house. The strictures about sleeping and family also apply to rented
spaces. A rented shop, not connected internally to the owner’s dwelling space,
does not become the dwelling house of the tenant “when neither he nor any of
his family sleep there.”
A striking aspect of this domestic family space of dwelling, just observed in
repeated stress on the absence of internal communication, is how completely the
Manual severs it from surrounding spaces. The crime of burglary, crucial here
because its careful description of dwelling is what defines the crime, does not
apply to a rented shop that is attached to the owner’s dwelling house as long as
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“there is any internal communication” between the two, “though there may be a
separate entrance from without to the part let off; as where the communication
was formed by means of a trap-door and a ladder, which were seldom used, but
the trap door was never fastened.” And when the owner of a house rents out
rooms in a house but “continues to sleep in it, no part of it then can be so severed
by being let off to a tenant or a lodger, as to become a separate mansion-house.75
But tenants do get to claim a dwelling house when “that which was one house
originally comes to be divided completely into two separate tenements, and
there is a distinct outer door to each, without any internal communication” (84).
This isolation of dwelling and domesticity from surrounding spaces recalls
Blackstone’s distinction between relative and absolute duties, which consigns the
latter to the realm of individual (internal) governance because they are beyond
the observation by anyone else. “Let a man be ever so abandoned in his
principles”, he wrote, “or vitious in his practice, provided he keep his
wickedness to himself” (I, I, 120). This limiting of law to what is publicly
observable simultaneously removes private spaces—individual conscience and
private dwellings alike—from direct legal scrutiny and adjudication. In Chapter
2 I also suggested, extrapolating from Blackstone’s distinction between
individual rights and duties, that the purpose of a legal system that does not see
beyond the social, but nonetheless depends conceptually on the existence of
75

This is a synonym for dwelling house. Except in some uses where mansion seems to allude to the
considerable size of a house (not the case in this passage from the MM), the two terms are completely
interchangeable.
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independent human nature, is to safeguard that essential but invisible nature of
the human being through acute attention to what can be observed—public
conduct, in other words.
A powerful symmetry emerges when this invisibility of private space, its
coincidence with domestic space, invisibility of intention and conscience (these
can only be inferred), and invisible human nature converge on a dwelling house.
Symmetry only grows by adding notions of female to this mix, for in addition to
a widely reproduced social alignment between gender, domestic space and a
canon of domestic duties specific to women, there lurked a perceived natural
alignment too. On one hand, a view of female “sensibility” that was promoted in
philosophy and also through medical science’s theory of nerves, held that
women were more fragile, excitable, and susceptible to deflection, and thus unfit
for public offices. At the same time, women were believed to possess elevated
morality that made them ideal guides in the raising of children. Ignoring the
contradiction of a mind at once pure and overly susceptible to wayward impulse,
this twin view of women as unfit for public roles and as naturals in child raising
lodges them rhetorically in domestic space both through stated roles, and also
because these roles were supposedly “natural”. Women thus endured a double
naturalization as domestic beings: domestic space mirrored the invisibility of
human nature, as protected through an emphasis on visible conduct; and
women, as marked beings, were naturally suited for domestic space and duty in
ways men were not.
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Chapter 5
Of Beasts and Burglars

In 1792, a black slave in Detroit was convicted and executed for burglary. By
various eyewitness accounts and his own admission, Josiah Cutan had broken
into a private dwelling during the night and tried to make off with some smoked
skins, rum and pelts. As noted previously, British law governed criminal cases in
Upper Canada, and by its terms burglary carried the death penalty without the
benefit of clergy.76 To the extent that necessary facts were evident and that Cutan
confessed to the crime before justices of the peace, the case was open and shut.
This chapter explores the outcome of the Cutan trial and specific words used to
express its verdict, and more fundamentally, the conceptual framing required to
understand them. In doing so, it revives overtones sounded in previous chapters,
especially those related to prescriptive practices in the Gazette, to land surveys, to
literature on conduct, and to ambiguous overlap between domesticity as family,
as nation, and as woman. This resonance with other practices in other social
arenas adds social depth to a charge of burglary, and in particular to words
uttered during sentencing that did more than just end a life.
76

Benefit of clergy was originally a privilege by which clergymen, insisting that secular courts had no
jurisdiction, could be tried for certain crimes by the more lenient ecclesiastical courts instead. Over time
this benefit transformed into more general leniency for certain first-time offences. Especially heinous
crimes, including burglary, never enjoyed this benefit: clergy were not granted exemption from secular
courts, and the later sense of leniency for first offenders did not apply. For a general history of the benefit
of clergy, see Baker (2002) and Briggs (1996).
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If a guilty verdict on any high crime might be unusually visible against the
humdrum of everyday legal process, two (probably related) features make this
trial particularly apt as an exemplar. Cutan’s conviction produced the first
execution in newly minted Upper Canada; and where most cases are hard to
extract as anything but brief summaries that name the accused, the charge,
whether it was returned guilty or not and if so, the sentence, this one is readily
available in full transcript form today, which suggests that its potential
significance was both understood at the time and maintained since.
This case thus offers an extraordinary window on the inscription of proper
conduct in and by legal institutions in the new province. The trial inscribed
conduct “in” legal institutions by entering the case as precedent, as something
that helped comprise the larger text of legal procedure where it could then be
accessed, reviewed and applied in subsequent cases. It was an inscription “by”
legal institutions in two senses. First is the straightforward sense that legal
understandings of crimes and culpability, what counted as evidence, what got
heard or not, and how a trial proceeded from its opening before a judge through
to conviction, sentencing and execution, had real force as expressed in grounded
social life. In the language of a previous chapter, this response to a specific crime
by means of a trial, and its culmination in the pronouncement and execution of a
death sentence, revealed a world that pushes back. This pushing also exposes
some of the stark asymmetries upon which social order was predicated. If
asymmetry is generally presumed as an engine of both inertia and
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transformation in practice theory, the asymmetry between the compelling force
of law and those being compelled to the gallows is extreme by any measure. A
second, more elusive sense of law’s “agency” emerges during the verdict and
sentencing. The event becomes precedent for the future, but it is also an act of
interpreting backward, of retroactively condoning a specific interpretation of
everything that led up to that moment. In that condoning, previous trouble
spots—inconsistencies, unanswered questions, alternative interpretations, doubts
about particular bits of evidence—are brought into line with the fateful narrative,
not by resolving them, but by overruling them.
5.1 The transcript
Before jumping into the case itself, it is worth pondering for a moment what
may get lost across distances of time and context, and through elisions or
inaccuracies between the full detail of a trial and what ends up in a court
transcript we read today, even a full one.
One filter in transcripts from the court of Oyer and Terminer (hereafter O&T),
where Cutan was tried, is pervasive use of the third person. There is no first
person pronoun, even in the reported speech of witnesses. To take just one
example, the witness Ralph Pilon, after being sworn in, conveyed “That about
the eighteenth day of October last he resided at Mr. Robert McDougall’s”, and
that after being called upon to assist in catching a thief, “he went up into the
garret of M. Joseph Campeau’s store”, and that “on his way to the said house he
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observed a bag lying on the road.” (Cited in Riddell (1926:350-351). If it weren’t
already clear that Robert’s “I”s are being transformed into “he” and “his”, the
“said house” would confirm that even a complete transcript does not mean
verbatim quotation: all original words, including points of reference, have
experienced the purifying, objectifying rigors of court language. The second
person (you) occurs in three spaces: when the court asks a witness what “you”
saw, heard, etc.; when the judge, charging the jury to go and deliberate, reminds
them that the conditions of burglary “have been proved to you”; and at the very
end, when the judge tells Cutan, “you have been found guilty by the Verdict of
twelve impartial men”. The complete absence of “I”—even in the judge’s
sentence, which gives all agency to “the Court” and “the Law”—evokes the
instrumentality of the court system, and the role of individuals, however notable
in name, as place holders in that system.
Looking beyond this transcript and case to other charges and verdicts in the
O&T court, correlations between a given crime and its sentence are flexible to the
point of seeming haphazard. Crimes also attach to various, sometimes competing
descriptions, as when petit larceny is the charge even though the amount stolen
exceeds the threshold of grand larceny, or vice versa. Perhaps sloppy record
keeping is a culprit here, which Holloway (2009:PC) suggests was common in the
early days. Or it may be, as Philips (1992:258) notes for evidenciary standards in
a modern courtroom, that sometimes “fact finders do arrive at rather different
decisions regarding guilt from those reached by others who have access to
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different information and who are unconstrained by the interpretive principles
imposed on the jury.”77 In any case, a problem for modern interpretation is that
reasons for all this variance in O&T transcripts tend to go unstated. And when
real detail comes along, as it does in Cutan’s trial, it entices partly because lack of
comparative cases make it provocatively hard to see in context. And perhaps, as
Stoler (2009:1) shows for other archives, hazy associations also suggest that tight
order and coherence were something of a conceit anyway. It would be a conceit
on the part of early Upper Canadians whose faith in the social order they arrived
with blinded them to local difference and a need to adapt; and perhaps a conceit
on the part of someone looking back on the early province without an
appreciation for the extent to which the administration did adapt, or try to, even
if those efforts sometimes backfired. Without access to greater detail, there is
little way to distinguish among these possibilities.78
What I hope to suggest is that while consistency in sentencing remains elusive,
and so too an algorithm for the legal implementation of proper conduct, Cutan’s
77

A myth of the legal system, in other words, seems to be that having access to the same information ought
to produce a consistent verdict. In this trial, before sending them off to deliberate, William Roe reminds the
jury of all the facts in the case, and stresses that they are both unambiguous and sufficient for a guilty
verdict. Thus instructed, he tells them to “consider of the evidence under this view of the Offence, and
discharge your consciences”. This myth of facts speaking only one way, of course, ignores any sense in
which facts are made rather than found, and can be made differently given different social, cultural,
historical, personal backgrounds.
78
For further description of such adjustments to the laws of England, see various acts in the Upper Canada
Statutes, including: Fourth Session of the Second Provincial Parliament, Chapter I, p.86ff: An Act for the
further introduction of the Criminal Law of England into this Province, and for the more effectual
Punishment of certain offenders; and First Session of the Third Provincial Parliament, Chapter IX, p.95: An
Act the better to adapt the establishment of the Court of King’s Bench to the present situation of this
Province. This fine-tuning of criminal procedure to suit Upper Canada, of course, reflected the more
general purpose of statutes in Upper Canada, which reacted to what worked and what didn’t, and adjusted
to perceived trajectories of change. On the emergence of separate identity in Upper Canada relative to
British colonies more generally, see Esten (1836). On the specific adaptation of Blackstone’s
Commentaries to the situation in Upper Canada, see Leith (1864).
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trial and especially sentencing nonetheless give an indelible sense of society’s
edges and also its core, an image that remains consistent even when—perhaps
especially when—people sometimes get away with murder.
5.2 The case
The basic facts of the case were not much disputed. Court Clerk William Roe,
who administered this trial,79 sums them up in sending the jury off to reach its
verdict:
It is proved… that on the night of the 18th of October last the Prisoner
about midnight was found in the road near Mr. Campeau’s house. That
upon alarm of noise several persons assembled and found the Store of Mr.
Jos. Campeau broke open. They found a Carpenter’s adze near it, the
supposed instrument of the violence, and merchandise and liquors were
found near the store, but not proved to have been the property of Mr.
Campeau—but the Prisoner’s voluntary confession on examination before
two Justices proved in evidence to you, shows beyond a doubt that he was
guilty of the Burglary, that he forced the door with the adze, and took
away the articles described. (Riddell 1926:352)
Trial minutes report that Cutan attempted brief resistance but was quickly
overcome, and cooperated thereafter, even giving his voluntary confession to
two justices of the peace.
A few matters of procedure in the trial do raise questions. We have Cutan’s
confession, but it seems slightly odd that the stolen items were not otherwise
proved to have been the property of the store owner, who helped with the arrest
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Until legislation in 1797 regulated the practice of law in Upper Canada, most advocates and judges in the
court system were not trained lawyers but received their legal appointments based on social standing. At
the time of Cutan’s trial there were but two trained lawyers in the entire Western District: William Dummer
Powell, who officially presided in this court, and Walter Roe, who administered Cutan’s trial.
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and was presumably available to identify his own goods. Cutan also did not
speak French. Called upon to speak in his own defense in the courtroom, the trial
minutes record Cutan’s response: “That true it is, Mr. Campeau took him
prisoner; that he does not understand French, but that in answer to any questions
he proposed to him, he may have said yes” (Riddell 1926:351-352).80 If he didn’t
speak French, did he have a sure grasp of what he was saying yes to? What does
it mean, in a court that seeks hard facts, that he “may” have said yes? Is it
possible that a lone man, captured by foes, and also a black slave in the custody
of angry white men, might say whatever was necessary to appear conciliatory in
the moment? These questions are not even raised; indeed, there is no mention of
what exact questions Cutan was asked by these speakers of French. Surely these
are critical, commonsense things to be sure of, especially in light of Blackstone’s
stress on the extreme care and caution required in assigning a death sentence.
The important thing, though, is not whether such matters, pressing as they may
seem from the hindsight of today, were overlooked two hundred years ago, but
whether the trial seemed fair in its day. Certainly the weight of evidence was
against him. The stories of multiple witnesses who helped apprehend Cutan
match well in their details. Most importantly, Cutan confessed, and in the judge’s
summary of the trial that confession evidently trumped the curious lack of
confirmation from the owner of the stolen objects that they belonged to him. The
80

This use of the third person to render what otherwise appear to be direct quotes is consistent throughout
the transcript. Whether a conscious strategy or merely conventional, this practice helps evoke a realm of
objectivity, and of law’s objectivity in particular.
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objects were “not proved to have been the property of Mr. Campeau—but the
Prisoner’s voluntary confession on examination before two Justices proved in
evidence to you, shows beyond a doubt that he was guilty of the Burglary”.
Perhaps this confession seemed even more secure given that one of the justices of
the peace who obtained it was John Askin, a man widely known for his fairness
and unimpeachable character. Askin declared under oath that the confession was
“voluntarily taken before him, without any threats or menace being used to
obtain the same” (cited in Riddell 1926:351). One can understand how a jury of
the time supposed this evidence to be sound, especially when corralled toward a
guilty verdict by the judge’s preamble. From that view, a different outcome
becomes hard to imagine.
As for the charge, Roe reminds the jury that burglary was “a breaking of a
dwelling house by night with intent to commit a felony.” This definition is
echoed in the June 11, 1803 edition of the British American Register, in section
XVI, which defines crimes against habitation (the other being arson). Burglary, it
adds, is a felony without clergy: it permitted no leniency even in the case of a
first-time offender. Roe goes on to clarify what is meant by a dwelling house:
“…to give to every house the character of a dwelling house, it is enough that the
owner or someone having charge of it, sleeps in the house usually, although he
may board elsewhere” (cited in Riddell 1926:352). Campeau’s house, which was
also his shop, clearly qualifies since he slept there usually. Given the hour of the
deed, burglary it was. That leaves only the sentence, and in British law at the
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time, conviction usually carried a death penalty, mitigating circumstances
notwithstanding. There is also no sense in early O&T court records that slaves or
other disenfranchised groups got slapped with more severe sentences, or that
acquittals were less likely for them.81 Winks (1971:50-51) concurs, noting that
three years later, in Powell’s court, a Negro slave was again convicted of
burglary and sentenced to death, but that Powell then appealed to the
Lieutenant-Governor for a reduced sentence owing to the slave’s tender age.
Winks names further examples—two slaves of William Jarvis, the provincial
secretary of Upper Canada, who stole gold and silver from his desk; a black
woman who killed her husband by stabbing him in the temple with a fork—
where the consequence was not summary punishment but the process of a full
and fair trial.
I do not, then, seek to explain why the trial went the direction in did in Cutan’s
case: it apparently did so because in the eyes of the time, evidence took it there,
and the conviction got a death sentence because burglary usually did.82 Rather, I
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It is worth suggesting, of course, that social disenfranchisement may predispose an individual against the
law to begin with in ways that social entitlement would not. Existing court transcripts from O&T,
unfortunately, do not usually indicate the social station of the accused. Riddell (1923:252) points out that
while the laws of England did not dictate lesser legal rights to the slave, the deeper problem is that English
law at that time didn’t recognize the slave at all; there was no relevant category of person, which meant that
even basic rights did not apply: right to marry, rights as a parent, rights to property, even the right to
security and life. And yet, the fact of a trial by jury in Cutan’s and other cases and apparent evenhandedness in the judge’s interpretation of evidence suggests that whatever rights, or lack of them, may
have been practiced off the legal stage, slaves—as humans if not slaves—were legal persons in the eyes of
the law.
82
Justice Powell’s appeals for leniency on a sentence, when they occurred, tended to come after the fact, in
letters to the Lieutenant-Governor. Viewed in light of character sketches by Riddell (1924) and Mealing
(2000), one understands Powell’s respect for his role as judge, which was not to sway the sympathies of a
jury but to preside over a fair hearing. This did not preclude his own intercession afterward, however,
where he believed he had access to information that warranted special consideration. By keeping these
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want to look at the burglary and trial from the standpoint of the conviction and
sentence as Roe handed them down. From a pragmatic point of view, this was
the moment that retroactively defined what had gone on before, and the moment
when Cutan, as exemplar, served social order and set legal precedent.
5.3 The sentence
At the end of the trial, a guilty verdict now in hand, Roe asked Josiah Cutan if
he knew any reason why the court’s sentence should not be carried out. Cutan
said no, so Roe continued:
Josiah Cutan, you have been found guilty by the verdict of twelve good
and impartial men upon the plain evidence of your own voluntary
confession in addition to other proof, of having committed on the
eighteenth of October last a burglary in the house of Jos. Campeau. This
crime is so much more atrocious and alarming to society as it is committed
by night, when the world is at repose and that it cannot be guarded
against without the same precautions which are used against the wild
beasts of the forest who, like you, go prowling about by night for their
prey. A member so hurtful to the peace of society, no good laws will
permit to continue in it, and the Court in obedience to the law, has
imposed upon it the painful duty of pronouncing its sentence, which is
that you be taken from hence to the gaol, from whence you came, and
from thence to the place of execution, where you are to be hanged by the
neck until you are dead. And the Lord have mercy upon your soul. (Cited
in Riddell 1926:354-355.)
On the surface, this verdict assigns a sentence of death, according to law, and
thus brings an end to Cutan’s life. But Cutan is not merely sentenced to death
here. This summation of issues at stake in the trial could not be starker in its
actions separate from the trial, his intercession concerned the sentence, not the evidence in trial, which thus
remained intact and unquestioned. This clarity supports Mealing’s suggestion that “Powell’s primary
loyalty was always to English common law, not to the provincial administration of Upper Canada.” (Cited
online on 4 March 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=37202.
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construction of a boundary between society and wilderness, and its distinction of
inhabitants on either side. By conflating the nighttime hour of the deed and a
moral/geographic space antithetical to society, and through liberal use of feral
imagery, Cutan is banished to a savage world outside society where wild
animals and burglars at night ranked the same. On the civilized side of the
boundary is a particular sense of order, embodied in the productive trades of the
jurors (armourer, trader, shoemaker, schoolmaster, innkeeper, tailor, cooper,
joiner and blacksmith). Order also resided in the sense of fair procedure available
to everyone including criminals, and the institutions of law and government that
serve the interests of settlement.
This condemnation of Cutan appears in greater relief when compared to a
second verdict in the early court. Jack York, another black slave, convicted in
1800 of a burglary in the court of William Powell, also landed a death sentence,
but the crimes of which he was convicted suggest a whole different level of
threat, for in addition to forcible entry by night, the conviction included assault
and rape of the home owner’s wife, itself a capital offense. The violence of York,
in other words, far exceeded that of Cutan, who stole but attacked no one as part
of the felony defining his actions as a burglary, and he cooperated fully leading
up to and during the trial. He also did not “fly for it”, or flee, which Riddell
(1926:457) notes carried formal punishment of its own: even if the accused is
proved innocent and acquitted, having fled would mean he loses all his
possessions. As a slave, of course, Cutan had no possessions anyway, but this
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definition of flight and its consequences state formally that he did nothing to
aggravate his situation in the eyes of the court. In one sense, a death sentence on
both cases erases what seem like important differences about willingness to
threaten someone’s life. Given English law’s basic protection of a person’s right
to security, as explained by Blackstone, it is not surprising that the defining
element of another capital crime, robbery, is fear, threat against a person’s sense
of security. On the amount taken in a robbery, the Manual (401) notes that “The
gist of the offense being the force and terror used by the offender, the value of
the property stolen is quite immaterial.” Clarifying this relationship between fear
and violence, the Manual goes on to explain:
The principle of robbery being violence, some degree of force is therefore
necessary to constitute the offence. But there may be a constructive, as well as an
actual force, for where such terror is impressed on the mind as not to leave the
party a free agent, and in order to get rid of that terror he delivers his money, this
is a sufficient force in law. And where actual violence is used, there need not be
actual fear, for the law will presume it. (402)
Just this element of force, fear and duress, it turns out, define the crime of rape,
of which Jack York was convicted. Defining rape as “carnal knowledge of a
woman, forcibly and against her will, and above the age of ten years”, the
Manual (374) stresses: “The offence of rape is in no way mitigated by shewing
that the woman at last yielded to the violence, if such her consent was forced, by
fear of death or of duress.”83 In a system where fear and terror have such
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Rape of a girl under age ten bypasses the issue of consent since, “by reason of her tender years, she is
incapable of judgment and discretion” (374). Issues of consent aside, the Manual adds that rape could be
difficult to prosecute because “it is an accusation easily to be made, and hard to be proved, and harder to be
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capacity to raise the punishable stakes of violence, it seems odd to punish Cutan
and York equally. If one of these two sets of actions deserves condemnation as
beastly, the perpetrator removed from society as an irredeemable menace, it
would have to be Jack York. On the other hand, given a death sentence already in
place for Cutan, there’s no way to kill Jack York more. The real question
becomes, what was it about Cutan’s actions that required a death sentence? In
what way does Roe’s extreme recasting of the event make sense?
Two threads of British tradition can help illuminate the specific feral metaphors
Roe uses: the practice of dueling, represented in the early court of O&T by four
cases, and the practice of game hunting. Both practices had deep histories
overseas, and in certain important circles at least, were at least tolerated both
socially and legally.
5.4 Murder and other honorable pursuits
In early Upper Canada, killing someone deliberately without formal warrant
(such as the execution of official duty) was murder. And killing doesn’t get more
deliberate than in the practice of dueling where a challenge is planned, sent out,
received, and responded to according to a strict set of protocols. In the eyes of the
law, killing by a well-planned duel was therefore murder, plain and simple. The
telling thing is how often the law had to make this point, which starts to sound

defended by the party accused” (375), even though the manual also calls rape “a most detestable crime”,
one that “ought severely and impartially to be punished with death.” Even though these difficulties may
have made some rapists more bold, the present point is not about success in prosecuting rape, but
understanding the crime and its severity in principle.
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very much like a twist on Schneider’s sign: “No Murdering”. One finds the sign
sprinkled through court transcripts and repeated throughout the Manual,
apparently necessary because this murdering was such a problem. And it was a
problem, in part, because the law kept excusing it.
There is no mistaking the official letter of law on dueling. Under the category of
murder, the Manual says,
And the law so far abhors all dueling in cold blood, that not only the
principal, who actually kills the other, but also his seconds, are guilty of
murder, whether they fought or not; and the seconds of the party slain are
likewise guilty, as accessories (224).
Indeed, even to initiate a challenge to a duel was an indictable offense, and as the
Manual makes clear, “it is no excuse that the challenge is given under
provocation, for if one person were to kill another in a deliberate duel, though
under provocation, it would be murder in him and his second” (99).
Deliberateness is key in both cases, suggested in the first by use of the term “in
cold blood”. For as the manual also states,
If two fall out upon a sudden occasion, and agree to fight in such a field,
and each of them go and fetch his weapon, and the one killeth the other—
this is no malice prepensed; for the fetching of the weapon and going out
into the field, is but a continuance of the sudden falling out, and the blood
was never cooled; but if there were deliberation—as, where they meet the
next day,—nay, though it were the same day, if there were such a
competent distance of time, that in common presumption, they had time
to deliberate—then it is murder.
We thus see, on one hand, the extreme care taken to delineate capital offenses,
given what is at stake in the issue of human rights; and on the other, the
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unambiguous legal stress on deliberate duels as a high crime. This position also
finds support in Blackstone, who says
…where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder, thinking it
their duty as gentlemen, and claiming as their right to wanton with their
own lives and those of their fellow creatures, without any warrant or
authority from any power either divine or human, but in direct
contradiction to the laws of God and man…the law has justly fixed the
crime and punishment of murder on them and on their seconds also.
(Commentaries vol. 4, p.199)
This stance appears again in courtroom transcripts where the presiding judge
advises the jury not to misunderstand the legal status of duels as murder. In the
high-profile trial in 1817 of Samuel Peter Jarvis, who had killed John Ridout in a
duel after Ridout issued a challenge, Chief Justice William Dummer Powell
repeats the legal status of dueling as murder, and adds that the charge “was
anything but indulgent to the prisoner and was so considered by most of the
persons in Court” (Powell, cited in Riddell 1915:170). In another high profile trial
of August 9, 1833, where John Wilson stood accused of killing Robert Lyon in a
duel, Chief Justice Beverly Robinson again stresses the legal terms of the offense
and the criminality of dueling.
At the same time, actual exercise of the law, where murder by duel is almost
always acquitted, tells a different story, one not just apparently contrary to the
letter of law but also, measured as outcomes, above it. As Chief Justice Robinson
goes on to say, “The practice of private combat has its immediate origin in high
example, even of Kings. Juries have not been known to convict when all was fair,
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yielding to the practices of Society” (Robinson in Riddell 1915:175). One could
hardly find bolder or more official encouragement to read between the lines of
law. As with most cases of duel, returning an acquittal took only minutes.
This stress on fairness echoes another passage in the Manual, which warns that
No breach of a man’s word or promise, no trespass either to lands or
goods, no affront by bare words or gestures, however false or malicious or
aggravating, will excuse him from being guilty of murder, who is so far
transported thereby, as immediately to attack the person who offends
him, in such a manner as manifestly endangers his life, without giving him
time to put himself upon his guard, if he kills him in pursuance of such an
assault, whether the person slain did at all fight in his defense or not (224,
my emphasis).
Read against both the preceding passage about a hot-blooded duel and the actual
practice of acquitting cases of murder by duel, even those where the blood had
time to cool, the above passage says two things: first, that despite the law’s letter,
breaches of word or promise, trespasses on lands or goods, affronts by word or
gesture, especially when false, malicious or aggravating, can fairly (if illegally) be
responded to with violence as long as it is pursued correctly; and second, none of
the unofficial legal exemptions about responding to an offense apply if you catch
the opponent with his guard down. This core issue of honor and fairness
continued centuries-long traditions and published codes of conduct relevant to
dueling.84 From that perspective, the astonishing outcome would have been
conviction. But what was it, exactly, that made this killing outside the law
84

See, for example, the 25 rules of the Code Duello, drawn up in Ireland in 1777 to govern the practice of
dueling there. This code was adopted, with some variation, in England and continental Europe, and with
greater variation in America. Also see The British Code of Duel: a reference to the laws of honor and the
character of gentlemen, Knight and Lacey, 1824.
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acceptable, while stealing some rum and a few furs nets a death penalty, even if
it was at night? Any logic motivating the duel only looks more forceful to the
extent that public resentment over duels was starting to smolder even in the
earliest years of Upper Canada, and could only have made rationalizing
exceptions to law increasingly difficult.85
Halliday (1999) explains this tendency in terms of class exceptionalism: the
duel reproduced ideals of conduct among the aristocracy where it originated,
and to protect the duel through legal attitudes and precedent meant to protect
the class. Supporting that view, Halliday notes a conspicuous representation of
both duelists and social elite among the judiciary where the matters related to
dueling reached their legal outcomes. Perhaps it is not surprising that juries on
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The Niagara Constitution, dated January 11, 1800, published unveiled disgust for a deadly duel that had
occurred just eight days previous, in which John Small, Upper Canada’s first Attorney General, shot and
killed John White, Clerk of the Executive Council. It could be, as Halliday (1999:47) observes, that Small’s
subsequent failure to win two elective offices, and his wife’s isolation by the upper crust (it was she who
charged John to defend her honor), went beyond coincidence. It may be, though, that at least some of the
growing antipathy to dueling expressed a sense that its honor code—its sine qua non—was eroding and in
some cases missing altogether, transforming the dueling field from a place of honor into a place for
hotheads to blow off steam. What seems to have stoked public ire over the Small/White duel was, above
all, a trivial Mrs. Small’s role in starting the feud by insulting Mrs. White at a public gathering in 1799, and
then insisting her husband defend her honor when she received insults in return from John White. Even if
duels of the day still proceeded according to a code, and had honor at their core, the genesis of this one in a
pointless cheap shot may have made the whole affair appear base. Chamberlain (2009) suggests a broader
foundation for this interpretation of the Small/White duel in looking at the entry of middle classes into a
practice that had been reserved for gentry, and the shift from a practice of honor to one whose “honor”
aligned with party politics and journalism. From the standpoint of the honor code, whether one really
supported dueling or not, a rising generation of climbers, pretenders, opportunists and hotheads must have
looked particularly vile. The problem with such pretenders, from a gentry point of view, is that they have
the class-defining relationship between deed and character exactly backward. The presumption is that just
as a gentlemanly character is inclined toward gentlemanly deeds, so gentlemanly deeds point to a
gentlemanly character. From the perspective of higher status, the difference of where deed points in each
case is between a character that is of a gentleman, and one that is of someone who would pretend.
Gentleman status, although evidenced through actions, is fundamentally essentialist in its basis in heredity,
or the “common law of GOOD BREEDING” as the Code of Duel (8) calls it. (Capitals in original.) One
might speculate that this insistence on visible trappings of character that are independent of deeds, such as
details of lineage summed up in “good breeding”, took aim at precisely this capacity of innate character to
hide from view, and even to masquerade.
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such trials were reasonably well stocked, though not exactly stacked, with social
notables, at least judging from the honorific suffix “Esq.” on the jury list. Serving
on a jury was a public duty, after all, one that included but was not actually
about trials related to dueling.86 It is much less clear which, among that elite,
actively supported the idea of duels in a climate of growing grassroots antipathy
for the practice.87 A charge of protectionism by certain of the jury’s elite, while
plausible, remains speculative without a record of who was inclined to vote
which way, and how efforts at persuading dissenters on the road to a verdict
might have played out. Without that evidence, it is too easy for suspicions of
protectionism to transmogrify into implausibility of them being anything other,
and thus to homogenize a class. Being elite doesn’t mean homogeneous: in
Chapter three we noted significant dissentions among the governing elite over
when to impose, adapt or abandon administrative and social practices imported
from England.
In broad brush, though, there is undoubtedly correlation between dueling and
class, even if imputation of motives to individuals in a courtroom remains hard.
The British Code of Duel (hereafter Code of Duel), a formal codification of Britishderived dueling practices as of its publication in 1824, locates dueling in “the
higher orders of society, including legislators”, among whom “it is indirectly
86

If specific appointments to a jury for cases of duel were intended to produce sympathy and an acquittal,
that correlation is not revealed in O&T court records directly.
87
William Dummer Powell, a steadfast opponent of dueling and the practice of excusing it, was notably
absent from the trials of John Small and David Sutherland. Duty at the time may simply have fallen on a
different judge for these trials, but it seems possible that protectionism, if it occurred, also extended to
arranging for a more sympathetic judge. Regarding antipathy for dueling, see also footnote 10.
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proclaimed contrary to law” (Code of Duel:4). It also observes that rules prohibit
dueling across classes: “…if a gentleman (by blood, or coat armour) detracted
from another the combat should be allowed; but if a clown, he was to take the
remedy of legal action… a clown might not challenge a gentleman to combat
because of the inequality of their condition” (1824:14). Chamberlain (2009:17)
backs this up with mention of cases where a duel was refused because the
challenger was not of the appropriate class.
The larger problem with an explanation of protectionism, though, is that it
misses a deeper point about what kind of conduct dueling represented.
Whatever kind of class collusion may have helped protect an unlawful practice
after the fact of a duel, and no matter the class habits and expectations that may
have helped stoke temper and indignation toward a duel, reducing it to the act of
solidifying class ignores everything individual that made heads hot enough to
fight and to risk being killed. By looking inward to the courage and stakes of
individuals rather than outward to collective maintenance of class, one observes
ideals that ramify well beyond the narrow circles of duelists or even aspiring
duelists. Indeed, they help bring Cutan’s crime of burglary into sharper focus.
The Code of Duel (43) notes that in a previous age in England, swords were the
weapon of choice among duelists. This detail receives mention “only to mark its
evils” in a new age that boasted dueling pistols instead. Two of these evils—the
severity of wounds from a sword cut and the absence of any natural pause in the
action that might open a chance for reconciliation—clarify that dueling by the
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British code, while a form of combat, was not about fighting. At core, it provided
an unambiguous, socially meaningful and loaded means of recovering from an
insult or engaging a challenge: through the process of duel, the society of peers88
who counted the duelists among its members deemed a grievance settled. We see
this pragmatic dimension of dueling again in the Code of Duel’s description of
shots to be fired: “Three fires should be the ultimatum in any case; any further
reduces duel to a conflict for blood, or must subject it to the ridicule of incapacity
in arms” (50).
A third evil of swords, though, and the first mentioned in the Code of Duel, is
perhaps the most telling: swordplay easily exposes and exploits differences of
skill level, whereas the code of duel does just the opposite. Dueling pistols were
notoriously inaccurate to begin with, a great equalizer in itself. Acknowledging
that some pistols are nonetheless superior to others, dueling weapons were to be
inspected to ensure that “the same degree of excellence…be used by both
parties” (45). The ritual of duel progresses through a series of further equalizers,
carried out by the seconds. Pistols are examined for condition to preclude misfire
of one, and each pistol is then loaded in the presence of both parties. The ground
for combat is inspected to ensure no advantages on one side, like obstacles, line
of sight, or location of the sun. Distance along that ground is then measured by
pace, to a distance not less than ten paces but otherwise at the discretion of
88

This sense of a society of peers has no relation to today’s notion of a jury of peers, where peerage
presumes common ground among people that class systems try to keep stratified. Juries at the time of
Cutan’s trial, though, were not described as peers, but as “honest and impartial men”, which at that time
entailed at least modest class standing.
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seconds. Parties then agree to a firing signal, commonly the movement of a
handkerchief. By its suddenness, the signal “prevents that decisive aim, which
might give one party the advantage over another, and is always to be avoided”
(48).89
From this perspective of meticulously orchestrated equivalence, the dueling
code brings to mind Geertz’s observation of the Balinese cockfight: the closer and
more equivalent the match, the deeper the play—or here, the more honorable the
contest and courageous its participants, and the purer, therefore, its restorative
alchemy. This heady brew of fair play and ultimate risk deserve emphasis, on
one hand for drawing attention to the poignant, irreducibly personal dimension
of dueling that gets elided from arguments about reproducing class in the
courtroom. The weight of insult, progress through failed attempts at
reconciliation, and finally, the intense fortitude to look death in the eye at just a
few paces, have no surrogates outside an agitated individual psyche: not in a
social class of peers or in the machinery of law. On the other hand, it was
precisely the urgency of proper standing in the eyes of others that drove men to
duel in the first place. This sense of standing, Fischer (1989:396-7) suggests,
89

In the duel between John Ridout and Samuel Peter Jarvis, Ridout acted out of turn and tried to get a shot
off first, but missed his mark. He was then ordered to give Jarvis a free shot, which mortally wounded him.
Based on the wound, the coroner inferred that death was instant, but a rumor spread that Ridout stayed on
his feet just long enough to shake Jarvis’s hand, thus ending the quarrel before he collapsed (Halliday
1999:56). Whether true or not, but perhaps especially if it isn’t, the case illustrates the restorative potential
of a duel to those who fight them, but only as long as rules are strictly followed. Just as Ridout’s earlier
misconduct by acting out of turn had damaged his reputation, his apocryphal swansong restored it by
conforming to the code: in the case of a mortal wound, the Code of Duel (50) states, parties should not
separate without mutual forgiveness. The “rightness” of this moment, even if fictional, would not have
been lost on any jurors who valued the honor codes embedded in the duel, no matter what they may have
thought of dueling more narrowly.
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meant social death if lost. Perhaps that overplays things slightly, given the
potential for recovering from a fall from grace, but an appropriate notion of
standing certainly went beyond superficialities like vanity or pretense; excepting
fools, those would be the wrong words to describe someone whose principles
stood tall while facing down a pistol. As the Code of Duel puts it,
While honour and dignity are the reward of virtue, any lapse of it that
may tend to affect the character of Gentleman, is punishable by formal
degradation, expulsion from peculiar association, and, ultimately, with
loss of privileges, from society in general. A Dignitary is bound by the
most solemn oaths, the perpetuity of which is supposed to render that test
unnecessary to Peers, where required in inferior orders. These declare
only upon honour… (9-10)
This threat of lapsed virtue, combined with the sheer mass of worth and
expectation loaded onto words—meaning and keeping to what one says—
suggests an extreme need for vigilance about action and reaction, about
rendering virtue as deed. Or to take it a bit further, honor depends crucially on
deeds to make it visible to peers, and remains unproven, hypothetical and
possibly even pretentious without them. Honor, in other words, is extremely
fragile and must be guarded as such.
Pretenders and pretensions notwithstanding, this code of honor, crystallized in
deeds that accept mortal individual risk rather than insult, has strong overtones
in the broader notion of virtue outlined by Blackstone (see Chapter 2) as being
foundational to English law. To this degree, anyone with respect for common
law notions of human rights and duties, and especially the law’s coding of what
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it meant to act properly in the eyes of others (recall that being vicious and drunk
out of sight was not a legal sin), would find something to admire in the
principles governing duel, even if that admiration be tempered by loathing for
the practice more narrowly. Given the deep history and inertia of the dueling
code in a politically influential stratum of English society, and its importation
into Upper Canada’s upper administrative echelons as English gentlemen took
up positions of authority (Riddell 1916:165), it is not surprising that the code
maintained influence in the new province. Judging by the ubiquity of acquittals
and their overt contrariness to the letter of law, the laws of honor were held by
the consensus of juries to be above the laws of England. Indeed, the Code of Duel
makes this very point:
…it is evident, that propelled on one hand by opinion, and but negatively repelled
on the other by legal power, the principle of duel retains its full force, and while
holden to be without the pale of law, possesses the most positive laws (5).
Beyond providing a sense of what the code of duel looked like “from the
inside”, so to speak, two takeaway points in this discussion are, first, that the
code held considerable sway at the legal level. From a practice perspective, the
collusion of juries in producing acquittals (or negligible fines) for what the law
calls murder does not suggest contrariness to and defeat of law, but the capacity
of law, when implemented by living bodies rather than placeholders, to help
constitute the place of duel and its embedded code of honor. In this sense, law
did not, contrary to the Code of Duel, “negatively repel” the practice of duel.
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Rather, by providing on one hand an official legal stance on a “crime” and set of
legal rituals through its letter, and on the other hand, the fact of a jury whose
power to deliberate in closed session and produce a verdict potentially at odds
with that letter, introduced flexibility that enabled the exceptionalism regarding
duels. This enabling was according to the scripts of all concerned, from juries to
judges, with the possible notable exception of William Dummer Powell, whose
opposition to the duel seemed more fervent and genuine than most.
The second takeaway point is that, while the practices of honor described in the
Code of Duel relate to duel and duelists specifically, they have ringing overtones
in notions of virtue and integrity that extend to society generally. And this brings
us back to the sentencing of Josiah Cutan for a crime “so much more atrocious
and alarming to society as it is committed by night, when the world is at repose.”
The world does not repose: people do. This simple switch of referent reframes a
crime against a person as a crime against civilization; or perhaps, limits the view
of civilization so that violence against a person means everything. In the codes of
duel and legal attitudes to it, we’ve just seen that attacking the person fairly lets
you get away with murder, so it’s hardly surprising that attacking where and
when they should be horizontal in bed with eyes closed won’t help the attacker
in court. As in the duel, honor comes down to deeds.
The violence of intrusion by night emerges even more clearly in William Roe’s
descriptions of a dwelling house as he sent the jury off to reach a verdict:
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It remains only for the court to inform you that by a dwelling house alone
being the subject of the aggravated offence of burglary, the law meant to
secure to the subject the peaceable indulgence of rest by night, and that to
give to every house the character of a dwelling house, it is enough that the
owner or someone having charge of it, sleeps in the house usually,
although he may board elsewhere. The being absent from the house on the
night of the burglary does not diminish the offence, if you shall be
satisfied that it was not abandoned…. You will consider the evidence
under this view of the offence and discharge your consciences. (Cited in
Riddell 1926:352-353)
A dwelling house is thus more than just a place, a private residence. In the
context of burglary, it is a constellation of place, ownership, and time of day,
which together represent the circumstances of greatest vulnerability. To attack
that would be to violate both deeply ingrained sensibilities about fair conduct,
and the most basic conditions of a successful and safe society, both of which a
proper duel upholds.
5.5 Hunting and prowling
This fatal breach of honor is then linked to a wild beast of the forest prowling
for prey, and each of these words suggest clear contrasts to the idea of a hunt,
another strictly codified and honorable mode of killing. In British tradition90,
from deer and boar hunting and then fox hunting after that, each possible object,
subject and action are precisely defined and given its own special term. In the
example of fox hunting, by this time replacing deer hunting abroad and also on
the rise in North America, the action of “hunting” itself gets broken down:

90

Comparison to British hunting tradition is most directly relevant since we’re talking about British justice,
but highly codified traditions of hunt had long histories through much of Europe by this time.
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hunters “cast”, “draw” and “head” as their “hounds” (never “dogs”) “feather”,
then finally “open” to give “tongue” to a “line”, trying not to “blank”, “heel” or
“riot” meanwhile.91 On the receiving end of all this code and ritual is the fox,
who is not prey, but “quarry”. Unless this quarry has luck, it will be driven to
“covert” and ultimately “accounted for”, a privilege-driven euphemism for
ripped apart by dogs. In the trial, the words “beast”, “prowl” and “prey” are
merely used as quoted, not explained, so perhaps one shouldn’t overplay this
comparison to a hunt. But three particular differences between the two deserve
mention. First, precise terminology specific to a highly codified activity like the
hunt creates its own conceptual territory that rules out substitute words: the
“quarry” in a hunt is never “prey”, and the rich vocabulary of ways a huntsman
can hunt do not include “prowl”. Given the previous discussion of honor, call
the huntsman a “beast” and you have a duel on your hands.
Second, the relation between “wild”, “beast”, “forest”, “prowl” and “prey” on
one hand, and membership in society on the other, is both mutually exclusive
and starkly hierarchical. The very existence of the court, never mind Cutan’s
death sentence, demonstrated that society stood in control and judgment of the
beast. The two sides are also asymmetrical, with one side richly described
through various trades among jurors, a complex court system, classes of
building, multiple languages, unique personalities with their own names and so
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See Ridley (1990), and Cannon (2002). For an anthropological view of fox hunting as ritual in England,
see Howe (1981). For parallel terms used for hunting other kinds of game, see Cox (1928).
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on. The other side is singular, “the wild beasts of the forest”. The plural on
“beasts” only makes them generic when preceded by the article, “the”, which
stresses that they’re all the same, that they must all be “guarded against” with
the same set of precautions. This opposition, of course, resonates with a notion of
progress that motivated the overseas journey and then settlement, with all its
prejudices about what civilization entailed, what had to be done or changed to
achieve it, and what the vision excluded. Settlement brought order and law to
wildness, created contingently safe, productive space out of forests, and tamed
the beast. Conversely, any member of society convicted of turning into beast got
his membership revoked.92
Third, just as the duel was a practice of privileged classes, so the vocabulary of
a proper hunt would reproduce a sense of class since the hunt was historically a
class based activity. If that vocabulary was not itself used in the trial, I have
suggested that awareness of it would have helped give the feral metaphors
leveled at Cutan the oppositional force they had. It would be simplistic to say
that even an implied opposition to hunting was about class protectionism, that it
reproduced a ruling class in any simple sense. The noble classes among which
the hunt first emerged as a distinguishing sport are not the same classes one
92

It is tempting to imagine this implied boundary between society’s inside and outside as a kind of
markedness relation, specifically in a semiotic sense that Waugh (1982) distinguishes from the
phonological approach first proposed by Trubetskoy and Jakobson. As with markedness relations, the term
defined as “other” (in our case the beast) becomes internally undifferentiated: there is only one kind of
beast, but many kinds of membership in society. Markedness relations are also hierarchical, and as Waugh
points out, linguistic markedness does not exist in a social, political or conceptual vacuum, but in a world
where all these elements resonate with and reinforce each other. For a general discussion of markedness in
linguistics, see Battistella (1990). On semiotic and social ramifications of linguistic markedness, see
Waugh (1982).
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finds centuries later in a different country, where both the structure of rule and
the emerging exigencies that needed ruling were different. Even in Britain,
hunting eventually came to include many rungs below the royalty and
aristocracy where it began, so dynamism of the acting subject would have to be
accounted for in any case. On the other hand, if the specific identity of class
structure and how it got shaped by new exigencies and players makes the
reproduction of a specific class a complicated matter on the frontier of Upper
Canada, perhaps the hunt and the duel resonate with a sense of class more
abstractly. As Howe (1981:296) argues for the case of fox hunting in Britain,
support for the sport among various classes, even those who could not directly
participate but who could at least “agree” to have the chase run over their land,
suggests at least a grudging consensus about class itself, much the way people
across the social hierarchy might be persuaded to believe in a monarchy. In this
view, what got reproduced in Roe’s words, as also in acquittals for the duel, was
at the very least a sense that not all people, as measured by their current
situations, are actually equal.
5.6 Order and good government
Two underlying patterns of thinking further raised the stakes of assaulting the
dwelling house. One, alluded to earlier, was a Lockean ideal of progress such
that rights and ownership of property—indeed its emergence as property—
connected to the work of transforming wildness and savagery into civilization

155
and settlement, and thus chaos into order. This ideal, which motivated both a
journey overseas to a new continent and a pervasive push westward, was also
epitomized in the dwelling house, the safe and hard-won retreat from all the
dangers that civilizing effort and property making entailed. Just as the beast lies
outside society, so the dwelling house, as safe haven, was a symbol par
excellence of social order. To attack it meant to attack society’s raison d-etre.
Another force that repelled and would have been repulsed by the chaos of a
nighttime home invasion was the superimposition of religion and state. In Upper
Canada, in contrast to emerging republican democracy in America, recognition
of divine order in the universe and submission to laws and government were
ultimately one and the same. As the Manual (387) says, “The Christian religion,
according to high authority, is part and parcel of the law of England.” An attack
on social order was thus an attack on God.93 The honor code embedded in
dueling made a similar claim, as one might assume given any genuine
commitment to Christianity among the social elite. Addressing the possibility of
“Deity” taking offense at a duel, the Code of Duel (50) says, “…parties may be
reminded that humanity is identified with honour, and that the qualities of a true
Christian, are the same as those essential to form the character of a gentleman.”

Clark (2001:54) suggests that many people took the identity of church and state to the point of
seeing Upper Canadians as a chosen people.

93
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5.7 Beastly metaphors
Josiah Cutan’s death sentence should now appear in a deeper light. Gone, one
hopes, is any question of why the theft of mere goods, even when measurable at
the level of grand larceny, should translate into such an extreme punishment and
condemnation from the judge. We have seen, for one thing, that burglary is not
about theft even if it occurs: it is about intention to commit a felony, which can be
larceny or any other felonious crime. And crucially, it is about when the assault
occurs, and that the assault is against a dwelling house, a place ultimately
sanctified through this specific, extreme punishment against its aggressors. Even
stealing from a church ranked lower than stealing from a dwelling house at
night. Defining “sacrilege” as theft of items from and belonging to a church,
Manual (404) notes that while the crime used to be punishable by death without
benefit of clergy, a tightening of cases for which death sentences should apply (in
accordance with Blackstone) rendered sacrilege—unlike burglary—no longer
capital. More to the point, the clamor of overtones as burglary ramifies through
all of society shows how deep a burglary strikes. The fact of rum and furs, never
mind calculation of their measure, completely misses this, the real measure of the
crime.
Gone, too, is suspicion of inconsistency in laws on the books, where murdering
by duel is excused even though technically murder, while thieves in the night
suffer death as well as demotion from the human race. Not only does sense of
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honor serve as common denominator in both cases, but as practice, the letters of
law that define duels as murder and require their punishment as such, actually
provide a place for exceptionalism, which is what class is about. The “ism” here
is attested to by the ubiquity of acquittals in cases of duel. Noting this
reproduction of class, however, is not to reduce dueling itself to this
reproduction. Indeed, it is the particularity and inward intensity of the stakes
raised in duel that underwrite all of the honor in the code: the understanding of
code, its definition and exposure in moments of insult, the progress from seeking
reconciliation by other means to ultimate showdown in a duel, and the refusal to
flinch even when staring down a loaded barrel, locate individual psyches or they
locate nothing.
Given resonance between burglars and beasts in resolving the boundaries of
society, and resonance also between violating formal codes of honor and
attacking a person/place in their state of greatest vulnerability, Cutan’s sentence
was about the very emergence of society on the frontier of western expansion,
which was simultaneously a frontier between civilization and wildness, order
and chaos, light and dark, right and wrong, and in a world where government
and Christianity were one, between good and evil. This doesn’t mean that the
trial couldn’t have gone Cutan’s way, or that we must blink with noncomprehension when another burglar gets sentenced more mildly. A good deal
about the local implantation of legal procedure remains veiled by sketchy
records, which otherwise might help explain the wide and unexplained latitude
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in naming, describing and sentencing crimes. It does mean, though, that no
milder sentence would use the metaphors applied to Cutan, which make sense of
nothing less than execution, and do so by linking Cutan’s act to social values in
specific ways. The dwelling house is linked to society’s core by opposing it to
darkness, beastliness, chaos, wildness and mortal danger to all. The actions of a
prowling beast also suggest clear contrasts to honorable modes of hunting
animals for sport which, like the duel, had the interpretive momentum both of a
deep history and entrenchment in privileged, politically influential classes in
particular.
Through this linking to the feral world, Cutan didn’t attack a house but the
heart of civilization and the very notion of progress—a heinous crime indeed,
viewed that way and at that time. And it’s all in the viewing; links don’t reflect
standpoint: they create it, are it. If this case and its deployment of damning
metaphors confirms anything, it is that standpoint does not exist apart from its
emergence in particulars, which are viewed by specific people and spoken about
in certain ways. Standpoint is not ontologically prior, somehow apart from or
above concreteness: concreteness is the very scene where it gets produced at all
and the groundwork for its posterity laid.
To that end, crucial metaphors, the heavy artillery of the sentence, were leveled
against Cutan, not so that people looking would recognize who he was, but to
make him that person. Without these metaphors and their overtones with social
order, and looking only at his actions including his cooperation, a different
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sleight of hand might have been required for posterity to find him beyond
redemption. Finding him beyond redemption and ranking him among the beasts
were not, of course, done for Cutan’s sake, even though the sentence is spoken to
him. Now a short walk to the hangman’s noose, nothing in society is for his sake
any longer. To have any pragmatic value, the words must thread back into
society, not out of it. They did so in two directions. As a revisionist summation of
the trial, Roe’s words acted backward on the proceedings to reframe them:
however those attending the trial may have construed events during the
questioning of witnesses and unfolding of evidence, or harbored unresolved
questions based on that evidence, the final word was now in; there was but one
way to understand what had transpired. As the moment when legal precedent
gets set and words are recorded for posterity, Roe’s words also acted forward in
time. Precedent, of course, constrains the interpretation of similar cases in the
future. But the extreme feral metaphors were not part of that precedent in any
formal sense, because being a beast was not a formal legal charge, or even a
possible one. What gets reproduced in that moment, superimposed on the
sentence, is a reminder of what society was and was about, where its edges lay,
and what it meant to be on either side of that edge.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions

Check the back page of any issue of the Gazette, or most other newspapers of
the time, and chances are you’ll find ads listing dwelling houses for sale.
Unremarkable in their ubiquity, mundane and routine in their associations, there
is little surface hint of the moral gravity that anchors this unassuming space to
the social firmament of early Upper Canadian society. Contrary to this easy
impression, this study has found that the dwelling house was not merely
important beyond casual impressions, but figured as no less than the moral core
of society. Understood in the context of human rights, codes of honor, visions of
social progress and ideas of property, each of which ramified widely in society,
one grasps why the dwelling house was protected even more fiercely than a
house of god.
The measure of that protection, the subject of Chapter 5, was the crime of
burglary, among the most heinous of crimes and specific to the dwelling house.
Indeed, it is through a definition of that crime that the dwelling house gets
rendered as a precise idea. But legal definition alone does not account for the
extreme metaphors leveled at Josiah Cutan during his sentencing, which did
more than simply condemn him to death: they first stripped him of membership
in human society, and drew their power for this from the deep toll of a resonant
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social fabric beyond the realms of burglary, crime, and law. In making an
example of Cutan, this resonance with other realms, which included gendered
understandings of conduct and space, geographical surveying, fighting duels,
hunting game, and managing political loyalty, was deeply constitutive. In that
sense, resonance is itself the exemplary thing, that which renders a symbol or
idea indelible to all. To isolate a discrete moment of dazzle is to miss what
energizes it. This study has tried to give voice to some of the resonances that
energized a burglary sentence.
The baseline resonance in the case of burglary was a peculiar notion of honor,
so deeply entrenched that the legal system routinely forgave honorable murder,
contrary to the explicit letter of law and its repetition to juries about to deliberate
on such cases. In Chapter 5, however, I suggested that this opposition was really
a kind of collusion, whether quite intended or not, at least in the early years of
the province (and genuine opponents to the honor law nothwithstanding). On
the one hand, murder by duel was not exempt from the legal system itself; at the
level of forcing such events to trial and submitting evidence to a jury, the system
did what it was there for: to subordinate evident transgressions to the rigors of
legal procedure and judgment. In this sense, none of the actions heard and
judged by a court system were outside the law. Indeed, by forcing proper
procedure, the system in effect created the legal space for everything it judged
according to protocol. A key part of that machinery was the distinction between
the law’s letter, and the relevance and power of a jury, which produced dramatic

162
potential for flexibility of outcome—the one a judgment of law on the books, the
other a judgment of peers, both equally constitutive of the legal system. Thus,
when a jury returns a verdict that excuses duelists of murder, either acquitting or
assigning a token fine, the judgment is legal in every sense. So it was that space
for dueling was protected by the very law that presented itself as threatening it
with a death sentence.
Although usually reckoned as a deterrent to crime, especially extreme kinds
such as burglary, law as just described is also what made burglary literally
possible, the difference being that with burglary, jury and laws on the books
usually aligned well. Socially harmful breakings, enterings and robberies by
night did not, of course, depend on law to happen, nor did the social opprobrium
that attached to them. But the thing called burglary, its definition as precise as its
overtones were rich, depended on a specific legal code because that code was
what it expressed. In the tendency of its verdicts and its overtones with a view of
honor, burglary stood at the opposite pole from a duel: an attack against
someone who was not merely down and asleep, but in the space above all
designed to protect a person (and society) in that state. Attack against that space
amounted to an attack against the ordained order of things.
Crucially, honor did not itself help define dwelling or a dwelling house.
Indeed, honor per se was not directly regulated by law. What got regulated,
going back to Blackstone, were measurable acts from which intentions would be
inferred. Honor, once further removed, was a specific judgment about those
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intentions. John Ridout’s pre-emptive shot at Samuel Peter Jarvis got read as
intention to win the duel at any cost, and thus as willingness to put survival
above honor, which led to the remedial, restorative decision among the parties
regulating protocols of honor to give Jarvis a free shot. This, in turn, ended up
killing Ridout. Such preoccupation with honor informed burglary no less than
the duel. But it got its force in law from implication rather than definition, and
instrumentally, in the Cutan case, from allusions of metaphor that extended
relevance the other realms of society where a prowling beast on the loose would
entail a threat. This, of course, meant all of society, whose essence as
improvement from a wild state pitted civilization against the uncivilized
wilderness and human against beast. Such oppositions would have been even
starker in a society built on a marriage of god and law, where industriousness
addressed obligations not just to society but also to god; industry was a form of
piety. Informed by faith, the axes along which work got measured, with
society/civilization at one pole and nature/wildness at the other, acquired the
further, austere judgmentalism of light vs. dark and good vs. evil. These
overlapping contrasts mapped densely onto the dwelling house as a legal and
social entity.
The deeper point in all this is that legal definitions, however explicit and
detailed and however solemnized by the prospect of a death sentence for
transgressors, demonstrate but do not themselves account for the importance of
dwelling as a practice or the dwelling house as a place. To grasp that importance,
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one must appreciate overlap among ideas and social spaces, understand notions
of dwelling as surfaces on which multiple ideals coalesce, which gives dwelling a
rich dimensionality not explained by any surface in isolation. This capacity for
occurrences in one realm to sound overtones in/of another illustrates what
Chapter 2 calls the integrationist aspect of practice theory. We noted there that a
core element of practice is the use of special terms (most famously habitus) or
combinations of ordinary words that evoke the emergent simultaneity and
inseparability of “things” that analysis separates in order to see, things like
structure, action, agent, predisposition, and so on. Even habitus, and “practice”
for that matter, derive their specific meanings from a sense that conservative
predisposing structures, accumulated individual experiences, deflections of the
moment, and the choices these inform, have mutual constitution as their
dynamic. As practice, the multiple overtones of a settlement plan, a notion of
wilderness and wildness, gendered space, honor codes and the implications of
burglary are separable only as analysis, and then only given a clear sense that
what one tries to see are consequences of inseparability. With the right categories
and analytic machinery one can identify distinct overtones in a given note, but
the mistake would be to forget that if isolated from the note and moment of its
sounding, they no longer exist.
Another integrating aspect of exemplars, also noted in the discussion of
practice in Chapter 2, is their acute stress on first-person interaction. This is not
the generic first person of merely named individuals who, for all their
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distinctions of detail, nonetheless depend on a generic “being” that is presumed,
brought to a place, into engagement with other named individuals, who then
push and pull each other in ways that leave traces in archives and historical
narratives. Such individuals are generic in being kinetic rather than truly
emergent and mutually constituting. One can think of them as third-person “I”s.
The individual of practice, in contrast, exists (if one wishes to keep the word) in
terms of her traction with others, who simultaneously exist as traction that
pushes, pulls, compels and otherwise engages her. In a moment considered in
Chapter 3, magistrate Bartholomew Tench was his contentious engagement with
Joel Skinner, which crystallized Tench’s sense of duty as a magistrate, his resolve
in spite of what he no doubt foresaw as a hard sell of his authority, perhaps his
sense of class difference, and quite likely, his sense of self as Irish Catholic in the
company of an English Protestant. He was not, as the generic sense of individual
would make him, a vessel in whom these things were brought to Skinner, who in
turn brought his own predispositions and experiences. He was no mere vessel,
named or not, in whom government authority traveled to Skinner by way of
Tench’s prior experiences and connections to certain institutions: Tench’s
humiliation revealed as a brittle fiction the idea that tokens of authority pointed
to some mystically presiding force of order. The only sense of institution relevant
to that moment was humiliating mismatch between the formality of vested
authority and the expectations that come with it, and utter disregard for these,
plus all the angst, bewilderment, anger and resolve this mismatch generated.
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Perhaps the courts had some inkling of this when, rather than pursuing the
grievance against Skinner, they merely imposed a fine to keep the peace between
them for a year. As if to say, “You’ll get your money back if you stop making
waves and just go away.”
The point, of course, is not that system apparently failed in this case, but that its
failure or success is always irreducibly concrete, which is what gives “I” and
individual their meaning. System also doesn’t shade into independence and selfsufficiency as an outcome adheres more closely to pattern. In Cutan’s trial, the
force of presented evidence, its career toward a guilty verdict, and the awful
metaphors that removed Cutan’s humanity on the way to the gallows, emerged
through multiple, livewire “I”s whose potency resided in their simultaneous
presence to each other. One is tempted to see system at work through the agency
of third-person “I”s, given that a conviction led where it usually did for burglary,
especially when viewed through the . But it makes no more sense to understand
the usualness of a burglary sentence as the unfolding of a system run by thirdperson “I”s than it does to disembody the participation of unique identities that
helped achieve Jack York’s escape.
But then, what is historical narrative if not reduction to third-person “I”s? The
“I” of practice is a shifter whose identity gets fixed only in being inhabited,
invested with the full power of irreducible concreteness and traction. That
inhabiting never survives the trip into abstraction. But just as the gist of practice
is evocative rather than definitive, so one might construe or combine elements of
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narrative in a way that stokes imagination and, to a small degree at least,
transcends the tight, persistent limitations of vocabulary. One hopes it does
something to suggest that as practice, it is never individuals, but their trace
fossils, that get linked to narrative. The practice individual is always steps ahead
of any analysis, always over an event horizon separating emergent, tractiondriven moment and its recognition and interpretation. This radical embodiment,
always beyond the reach of the named and therefore dead bodies of analysis, is
surely a culprit in conjuring, despite best efforts and cunning circumlocutions,
the kinetics of presumed ideas, bodies, habits and other “things” brought into
engagement.
7.1 Frontiers of fieldwork
Recalling the adventure of beginning research for his dissertation, Dirks
(2002:50) says he “walked into the archive for the first time with all the
excitement that my fellow anthropology students reserved for the moment they
arrived in a ‘field of their own’”. He goes on to describe how excitement soon
merged with terror at not knowing how to face such vast archival excess, a
sentiment echoed elsewhere where he calls this a moment of panic. This
recollection of panic and terror may seem familiar to anthropologists with their
own fieldwork stories to tell. Anthropologists will also appreciate his ensuing
deconstructions of historiography, and likewise his focus on small voices and
contradictory ruptures—part of his strategy for relating insights from the
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disciplines of history and anthropology. At the level of description, however—
and Dirks chooses his words carefully—there seems an important difference
between Dirks’ experience and the core of conventional anthropological
fieldwork. If historians and anthropologists alike will find an archive “pushing
us by its recalcitrance, limiting us by its aggravating absences, fascinating us by
its own patterns of intertextuality, and seducing us by its appearance of the real”
(60)—or in the language of previous chapters, demonstrating a capacity to push
back on researchers who push them—historians and anthropologists will
experience pushing, limitation, fascination and seduction is some different ways.
I want to suggest that this difference is more about the respective disciplines than
the fields they typically operate within—that one can do primary anthropology
in the archives and history in a small community, and vice versa.
Locating this difference between conventional anthropological fieldwork and
archival research depends on being clear about characteristics of both. Taking
them in order, it seems ironic, given its iconic status within the discipline, that
conventional fieldwork is rarely systematically identified or discussed prior to
the inaugural moment when the neophyte leaves home. In part, of course, this is
because fieldwork tends to be unsystematic in the same sense that “deep hanging
out” is a recommended long-term strategy. Plans are made and formally
approved, but anthropology is perhaps unique among disciplines for the degree
to which initial preparations are susceptible to revision and abandonment in the
course of fieldwork encounters. Whatever the reason, the core of anthropological
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fieldwork—the thing that makes it essential to admission to the profession—is
rarely spelled out, yet for many it remains, as if by unspoken consensus, a
necessary rite of passage for new candidates of the discipline.
So what is this thing that is so rarely spelled out? Although typically described
in terms of time spent in the field, being among the locals, living in some sense as
they do without easy recourse to home, such descriptions of conventional
fieldwork gloss over what is perhaps the core of the enterprise: psychological
shake-up that arises when routine social practices and expectations get revealed
as wrongheaded, in a context that forces you to stay and deal with it. It is the
absence of an easy retreat into the comforts of home when this happens—the
ability to close a book and go for coffee, to fall back on myriad habits and
routines that rejuvenate peace of mind and sense of place. If, as Guemple (PC)
put it, being sane is a process of having bedrock social assumptions affirmed by
those around you, then the conventional fieldwork moment is a kind of insanity,
a moment where basic affirmation fails and there is no convenient exit from the
situation. This insanity has unique potential to teach things, expose things, or
simply drive one home again.
The rite of passage is more than this, of course. It is a rigorous and sometimes
painful elaboration on moments of shake-up which leads, in the form of a
dissertation, to a realignment with the discipline. This signature product
supposedly owes its worth to the fieldwork moment, which provides a unique
kind of impulse to think outside prior experience and expectations, just as it
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constitutes fieldwork’s test of sheer resolve and mental toughness that not
everyone will pass. This fieldwork moment, the spine of all fieldwork products
including time spent in the field, resolves in two basic ways: perseverance and
eventual success in producing an institutionally recognizable final product, or
failure, retreat into existing comfort zones and (not uncommonly, perhaps)
abandonment of the discipline, at least in a formal sense. Once completed, this
rite of passage becomes a key basis of integrity and authority when talking about
or within the discipline. And because this view seems to be a consensus,
especially a somewhat unreflective one, it is very hard to defend any plan that
appears to omit it.
It is hard to make similar claims about archival “moments”. Archival research
has its epiphanies, of course, and failures, senses of loss, sinking feelings of
having gotten it all wrong, senses of having perceived a new and larger world.
But these generally happen (and certainly did in the present case) in the context
of known and familiar worlds where safe retreat is around every corner—
libraries, archives, universities, and churches. Even institutions I’d never heard
of, like the Sisters of the Holy Order of Mary and Joseph in Windsor, offered no
obvious surprises at the institutional or social level; I explored their recesses from
the comfort of habitual social space. The world in which I did research still
operated in the same basic ways I expected. Other archives, like the Burton
Collection in Detroit, hid surprises behind the sheer complexity of its filing
system, but again one can blow off steam under a familiar blue sky, venti
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Starbucks in hand. Archives, moreover, in lacking the kind of social interaction
that puts your deep conventions actually at stake, also lacks conventional
fieldwork’s source of insanity.94
Although archival research is by no means identical with this sense of
conventional fieldwork, it does entail confrontations and transformations of its
own that are easily overlooked in adhering to a fieldwork “tradition”.
Psychological characteristics aside, one basic feature of conventional fieldwork is
degree of openness and submission both to raw material that becomes analytical
data, and to how one perceives/locates raw material to begin with. The
underlying idea is that engagement of material in the field acts as a catalyst that
propels effort and discovery in unpredictable new directions. Anthropology, to a
degree not characteristic of most other disciplines, reverses cart and horse as they
get proposed in the form of research plans. If all good social science discovers
things not known beforehand, anthropology is perhaps most radical in the
degree to which it makes research design itself subject to outcomes as they
unfold in the field. This feature is no less evident in archival research than in
conventional fieldwork, and indeed is the first and most basic thing the budding
anthropologist must learn and grapple with when thrust into the archives for
dissertation work. Nothing about my initial proposal even hinted at the
importance of a burglary trial until I encountered it by accident. Even then, real

94

Peirce’s notion of firstness, secondness and thirdness, especially with its many subdivisions, offers a
meticulous framework for talking about the conventional fieldwork moment and its aftermath.
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questions only started to form after subsequently bumping into a court transcript
about duels. Only then did the seeming paradox emerge: what consistent mode
of thinking hangs someone for stealing a little rum and a few furs, yet acquits
people for killing someone apparently outside the law, despite express and
repeated legal emphasis that duels were murder? Going in, I hadn’t the slightest
clue about the central moral importance of a dwelling house. I also had no
thought of complicating everything with gender questions, or more
fundamentally, with a plan to listen for something as diffuse as resonance. These
new horizons deflected into utterly unpredictable areas and opportunities for
insight.
If conventional anthropology is about expanding habitual horizons and finding
new boxes to think inside, this is no less true of archival work. But it is much
harder to achieve in the archives, which lacks the flashing neon of surprised or
irate individuals, weird and sticky relationships, personal embarrassments or
other faux pas that help point the way. By the same token that archives allow
you to close the books and go for coffee when the going gets tough, they also
demand keen and patient attention to unpack their interior worlds, those other
boxes that let researchers get outside their previous selves. These new boxes are
equally abundant in each case. But what often arrives with the force of a
highway accident in the one case, can only come by quiet focus, reflection and
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discipline in the other.95 New boxes also come by a different route in the
archives, one that must account for how archival collections are assembled, by
whom, for what purpose, what they systematically include and exclude. This
kind of question is familiar in conventional fieldwork too but is directed there at
different institutions. Other questions, which do not straightforwardly privilege
one kind of fieldwork over the other, nonetheless distinguish them. What does it
matter, for example, that texts can collect dust in ways spoken words and people
do not?
To say that conventional fieldwork is based in social interaction easily suggests
a wrongheaded contrast to archival work. It is certainly true that archives don’t
get to “talk back” in the same sense that living people do, and that its physical
space and contents didn’t emerge in interaction with the researcher the way
conversation or living with people does. Bakhtin’s idea of co-presence, a basis of
his model of dialogue, starts to seem either trivial or silly if we imagine
researchers being present to the archives. Archives are also silent in the literal
sense (sound archives notwithstanding) that they don’t take the form of audible
vibrations to our ears. But to deduce wholesale silence and non-interactivity does
not follow. If recent anthropology has accomplished anything, it is the end of
social innocence for things in the world. In order for a box of archival papers to
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Compounding this problem in the case of archives, it is difficult to use that discipline while
simultaneously putting its underlying disciplinary force (in the corrective sense) up for scrutiny, something
that happens more automatically in conventional fieldwork when routine interpretations fail despite the
fieldworker’s tendency to cling to them.
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rise above the role of a doorstop or paperweight, it requires the interactive
positioning of a critical mind.
The usual buzzwords for fieldwork in anthropology, including participant
observation and deep hanging out, attempt to capture a sense of the field’s
dynamism, its capacity to shape projects rather than just give them a place to
happen. They describe a sense of context’s agency. If all projects in all disciplines
are somehow dynamic and engaged in place, anthropology perhaps commits to
this more radically than most by viewing that agency as programmatic for the
work to be done. For all their intended openness and flexibility, these buzzwords
nonetheless evoke a sense of established routine as well, a basic sense of method,
of knowing how we, as anthropologists, intend to orient ourselves toward the
idea of being and learning in the field. They do this in part simply because the
terms themselves are established in the literature, and thus reproduce a shared
sense that there are real terms for what we do. Specialized vocabulary, whether
invented by or simply appropriated by a discipline, seduces us further into
imagining our methods with a precision deserving of the terms; saying “we go
and do stuff we didn’t know we were going to do, pull our hair out, go crazy,
and finally learn something unrelated to our initial project if we don’t give up
first”, while probably more accurate, is harder act dignified about.
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Appendix A: Definition of Burglary
The following definition comes verbatim from Keele’s Magistrate’s Manual. The full
title of this work, including subtitles, gives a fair sense of overall contents and purpose:
“The provincial justice, or magistrate’s manual, being a complete digest of the criminal
law, and a compendious and general view of the provincial law; with practical forms,
for the use of the magistracy of Upper Canada.” In reproducing this definition, I keep
faithful to the use of spellings, italics, punctuation, and line breaks, but not to font
(guesswork to reproduce anyway), or to line or page endings, which reflect nothing
beyond the physical dimensions of Keele’s book. For ease of reference to passages, I also
add line numbering; note that it does not relate in any way to lines in the MM.
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BURGLARY is a felony at common law, in breaking and entering the mansion-house of
another in the night, with intent to commit some felony within the same, whether the
felonious intent be executed or not.
By Stat. 12 An. c. 7. if any person shall enter into the mansion-house of another by day
or by night, without breaking the same, with an intent to commit a felony, or being in
such house shall commit any felony, and shall in the night time break the said house to
get out, he shall be guilty of burglary.
Every entrance is not a breaking;—as, if the door stand open, and the thief enter—this
is no breaking. So if the window be open, and the thief draw out some of the goods—
this is not burglary, because there is no actual breaking. But if the thief break the glass
of the window, and draw out the goods—this is burglary. 3 Inst. 64. And lord Hale
says, these acts amount to an actual breaking:—opening the casement, or breaking the
glass window; picking open the lock of the door, or putting back the lock; or the leaf of a
window; or unlatching the door that is only latched. 1 H. H. 552. And so does the
pushing open of folding doors. Rex. v. Brown. 2 East. P. C. 487. 2 Russ. 902. Pulling
down the upper sash of a window. Rex. v. Haines. Russ. & Ry. 451. S. C. nom. Rex. v.
Harrison. 1 Chetw. Brom. 497. Creeping down a chimney. Cromp. 32. Dalt. 253. 1 Haw. c.
38. § 6.
The breaking is not confined to the outer door, or external parts of a house; for if A.
enters the house of B. the outward door being open, or by an open window, and when
within the house, turn the key of a chamber door, or unlatch it, with intent to steal—this
will be burglary. Johnson’s case, 2 East. P. C. 488. And the like if any lodger in a house, or
guest in a public inn, open and enter another persons chamber door, with intent to
commit a felony. 1 Hale. 553. 554. 4 Bl. Com. 227. Rex. v. Bington, 2 East. P. C. 488. But if
an inn-keeper break the chamber of his lodger or guest, at night, to rob, this would not
be burglary; for a man cannot commit a burglary by breaking his own house. 2 East. P.
C. 502. Kel. 84.
Constructive breaking, is where, in consequence of violence commenced or threatened,
the owner of the house, (through fear, or in order to repel the violence) opens the door,
and the thief then enters,—this amounts to burglary; for the opening of the door in this
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case, is as much imputable to the thief as if it had been done by his own hands. Crompt.
32 (a.) 1 Hale. 553. 2 East. P. C. 486. And so, if in consequence of any fraud or deceit, the
owner is induced to open his door to the thieves—this will amount to breaking.—As
where thieves came with a pretended hue and cry, and required a constable to go with
them to go with them to apprehend the owner and search his house; and the owner, at
the command of the constable, open the door, when the thieves bound the constable and
rob the house;—this was held to be burglary. 1 Hale. 553. 3 Inst. 64. Cromp. 32 (b.) 4 Bl.
Com. 226. And the like if a man go to a house under pretence of being authorized to
make a distress, and by this means obtain admittance. Gascoigne’s case, 1 Leach, 284. For
in all these cases, the law will not endure to have its justice defrauded by such evasions.
1 Haw. c. 38. § 5. 4 Bl. Com. 227.

What is an Entering.
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It is deemed an entry when the thief breaketh the house, and his body, or any part
thereof—as his foot, or arm, is within any part of the house; or when he putteth a gun
into a window which he hath broken; or into a hole of the house which he hath made,
with intent to kill or murder. 3 Inst. 64. Or where the thief merely puts his fingers
within the window. Rex. v. Davis, Russ & Ry. 499. But if he shoots without the window,
and the bullet only comes in, the point is doubtful. 1 Hale, 555. Yet Hawkins says, this is
a sufficient entry. 1 Haw. c. 38. § 11. Where a glass window, which had shutters inside,
was broken, and the window was opened with the hand, but the shutters were not
broken or opened—this was ruled to be a burglary. Rex. v. Roberts, alias Chambers, 1 East.
P. C. 487. But as in this case, Holt. C. J. and Powell, J. doubted, and inclined to another
opinion, no judgment was given. But in a recent case, the same point was before the
judges, who were of opinion (three being absent) that the entry was sufficient. Rex. v.
Baily, Russ. & Ry. 341.
If divers come in the night to do a burglary, and one of them break and enter, the rest
of them standing to watch at a distance—this is burglary in all. 3 Inst. 64.

What is a Mansion or Dwelling-house.
Where the whole of the house is let out into lodgings, and the owner does not inhabit
any part of it, though there is only one outer door common to all its inmates, yet every
separate apartment is the distinct mansion-house of its possessor. Rex. v. Trapshaw, 1
Leach, 427. So where a loft over a coach-house and stables was converted into lodging
rooms. R. v. Turner, 1 Leach, 305.
But where the owner of a dwelling-house lets off the shop to a tenant, who occupies it
by means of a different entrance from that belonging to the dwelling-house, and carries on
his business in it, but never sleeps there, it then becomes so severed from the rest of the
house, as no longer to be a place where burglary can be committed; for it ceases to form
parcel of the dwelling-house of the owner, being thus severed by lease as well as by the
distinct mode of ingress and egress to it; and it does not become the dwelling-house of
the tenant, when neither he nor any of his family sleep there. 1 Hale, 557. Kel. 83. 4 Bl.
Com. 225. 2 East. P. C. 507. But if the tenant, or his servant, should usually, or often,
sleep in the shop at night, it would then become the dwelling-house of the tenant. 1
Hale, 558.
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There is no severance, however, where there is any internal communication, though
there may be a separate entrance from without to the part let off; as where the
communication was formed by means of a trap-door and a ladder, which were seldom
used, but the trap-door was never fastened. Lord Ellenborough said it could make no
difference whether the communication was through a trap-door, or by a common staircase. Rex. v. Stockton, 2 Taunton, 339. 2 Leach, 1015. And when the owner of the house
continues to sleep in it, no part of it then can be so severed, by being let off to a tenant or
a lodger, as to become a separate mansion-house. Rex. v. Rogers, 1 Leach, 89. 2 East. P. C.
507. Unless, indeed, that which was one house originally comes to be divided
completely into two separate tenements, and there is a distinct outer door to each,
without any internal communication; in which case, they will then become separate
houses. Per Ld. M. Cowp. 8. But if the owner of a house neither inhabits it himself, nor
any of his family, it will not then become his dwelling-house, as applicable to the offence
of burglary. Therefore, when a man purchases or rents a house with intention to reside
in it, and moves some of his furniture into it, but neither he nor any of his family ever
sleep there, and it is broken open in the night time,—the judges have determined that a
breaking into a house of this description does not amount to burglary. R. v. Lyons, 1
Leach, 185. 2 East. P. C. 496. R. v. Hallard, 2 East. 498. 2 Leach, 701. (note a.) R. v.
Thompson, 2 Leach, 771. 2 East. 498. Contra 1 Haw. c. 38. § 18. 1 Kel. 46. And this—even
though the owner of the house has used it for his meals, and for all the purposes of his
business. Rex. v. Martin, Russ. & Ry. 108. Or, though a person actually sleep in the
house for the purpose of protecting it, if such person forms no part of the domestic
family of the owner,—as where the owner puts in a workman or other person, who is in
no situation of servitude to him, for the purpose of taking care of his goods. Rex. v.
Fuller, 2 East. P. C. 498. 1 Leach, 186. (note b.) Rex. v. Harris, 2 Leach, 701. 2 East. P. C. 498.
So if a servant it put into a ware-house to watch goods, this does not make it a
dwelling-house. Rex. v. Smith, 2 East. P. C. 497.
But where the owner of the house has once inhabited it, it will not cease to be his
dwelling-house on account of any occasional or temporary absence, provided he has the
animus revertendi—the intention of returning to it;—in such cases, the premises may be
the subject of burglary. Rex. v. Murray & Harris, 2 East. P. C. 496. cit. Fost. 77. But where
a person had a country house at which he lived only a part of the year, and then quitted,
with a considerable part of his furniture, with no intention of immediately returning,
and during his absence his house was broken open and rifled—this was held not to be
burglary. Fost. 76. 77.
And now, by stat. 3 W. 4. c. 4. § 10. it is enacted, that no building, although within the
same curtilage with the dwelling-house, and occupied therewith, shall be deemed to be
part of such dwelling-house, for the purpose of burglary, unless there shall be a
communication between such building and dwelling-house, either immediate or by
means of a covered and enclosed passage leading from the one to the other. And by § 12.
accessories before the fact shall be punishable as principals.
Of the time of committing the Offence.
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It must be in the night, and, generally speaking, in the darkness of the night; for though
the day was formerly accounted to begin only at sun-rise, and to end immediately upon
sun-set, yet it is now settled that if there be daylight or twilight enough to discern a
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man’s face, there can be no burglary. 3 Inst. 63. 1 Hale, 550. 1 Haw. c. 38. § 2. 4 Bl. Com.
224. 2 East. P. C. 509. But this does not extend to moonlight, for then many midnight
burglaries would go unpunished; and the malignity of the offence, as Blackstone
observes, does not indeed so properly arise from its being done in the dark, as at the
dead of night, when all the creation, except beasts of prey, are at rest; when sleep has
disarmed the owner, and rendered his castle defenceless. 4 Bl. Com. 224.
The breaking and entering need not be the same night; for if thieves break a hole in the
house one night, with the intent to enter another night and commit a felony, and they
accordingly do so, through the hole they made the night before—this seems to be
burglary. 1 Hale, 551. 4 Bl. Com. 226.
Of the Intent.
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The intent of the breaking and entering must be to commit a felony. Therefore, if the
intention was only to commit a trespass, the offence will not be a burglary. Thus, an
intention to beat a man in the house, will not be sufficient; for though killing or murder
may be the consequence of beating, yet if the primary intention were not to kill, a
breaking and entering for the purpose of beating, will not amount to burglary. 1 Hale,
561. 2 East. P. C. 509. And where a man broke into a house with intent to commit a
rape—this was held to be burglary. Rex. v. Gray, 1 Str. 481.

By stat. 23 G. 3. c. 88. it is enacted, that if any person shall be apprehended having
upon him any picklock, key, crow, jackbit, or other implement, with an intent feloniously
to break and enter into any dwelling-house, out-house, &c.; or shall have upon him any
pistol, hanger, cutlass, bludgeon, or other offensive weapon, with intent feloniously to
assault any person; or shall be found in or upon any dwelling-house, ware-house, coachhouse, stable or out-house, or in any inclosed yard or garden, or area, belonging to any
house, with an intent to steal, he shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond within the intent
and meaning of the 17 G. 2. c. 5.

189

Appendix B: Proclamation for the Suppression of Vice,
Profaneness & Immorality
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